Welcome to our discussion of Chapter 2 of *Natural Propositions*. My job as
threadleader for this chapter has been somewhat preempted; I can't very well
initiate a discussion that has already started without me. And Frederik has
been, not merely diligent, but rather clearly heroic in his
Lists,
Here are a couple of reflections on two different lines of discussion that have
come out of chapter 1 of Natural Propositions.
First, there appears to be a real disagreement over the nature of Peirce's
concerns about drawing on the methods and results of empirical psychology when
because it does not add anything to saying the crater is caused by the meteor
F
Den 07/09/2014 kl. 21.45 skrev Deely, John N.
jnde...@stthom.edumailto:jnde...@stthom.edu:
How is “the crater is an index of the meteor” superfluous for understanding the
crater?
From: Frederik Stjernfelt
Re: Jeffrey Brian Downard
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13971
Jeff All,
With regard to non-psychologism, it was a slip on my part to use that term. I don't think I've
ever used it before. At any rate I will try to avoid using it again. It may sound like a
Thread Patch:
FS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13825
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13826
JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13971
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13974
Peircers,
A Well-Known Rock On Tour
-
Suppose you come to a rock on the moor:
That may or may not have fallen there
as a meteorite burrows out of the sky,
or lava drops cool in a vanished lake.
That may or may not have rolled there
on the impulse of a rough-hewn hermit,
or the
Dear John, Lists
He thought that we set aside a certain class of experiences that we take
(fallibly in each instance) to be externally caused (an abduction) because they
surprise us. However our thought does not get outside of the sequence of signs
that are connected in our thought (or
Re: Frederik Stjernfelt
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13977
Frederik,
In the 70s I read as almost as much Frege and Russell as I did Peirce and I think I grasped Frege's
attitude fairly well, along with the mess Russell made of just about everything he touched.
Frederik, John,
As far as I can tell (and I've been looking around), Peirce never
distinguishes between _/mind/_ and _/psyche/_. But he does distinguish
between a logical conception of mind and a psychological conception of
mind. (See for example Memoir 11 On the Logical Conception of Mind
Please use “John C.” or “John D.” or perhaps the last names, so we can know
which “John” is commenting or being responded to
From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: Monday, September 08, 2014 12:23
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re:
Thanks for this, Ben.
John
From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: September 8, 2014 7:23 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6698] Re: Natural Propositions
Frederik, John,
As far as I can tell (and I've been
Dear Ben, John, list -
Den 08/09/2014 kl. 19.27 skrev John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za
:
Thanks for this, Ben.
John
But John, you did not respond to the query: If the world is sucked up inside
the head - where is that head?
Frederik, John,
As far as I can tell (and I've been
Of course, John D. - sorry
F
Den 08/09/2014 kl. 19.25 skrev Deely, John N.
jnde...@stthom.edumailto:jnde...@stthom.edu
:
Please use “John C.” or “John D.” or perhaps the last names, so we can know
which “John” is commenting or being responded to
From: Benjamin Udell
Dear Stan, Howard, list
I certainly agree with Howard here. My emphasis on the chain of reasoning in
recent list discussions may have given some a wrong impression of my position.
Again, the reason for this emphasis was to claim that the overall process of
knowledge-acquisition in a broad
Frederick, John C, John D, list,
On 9/8/2014 3:44 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
[BU] As far as I can tell (and I've been looking around), Peirce
never distinguishes between _/mind/ _ and _/psyche/ _.
[FS] I did not claim P made such a distinction. I claimed his notion
of mind was not
Spindle of Necessity:
FS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13825
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13826
JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13971
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/13974
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