Very interesting, Gary F.
Damasio's view of the mapping of body states are already loaded with
interpretation and, as you suggest, underlie self-control. First, they are
indexes of particular physiological states that can be influenced by
further action in the environment. For example, blood sugar
Lists,
Two quotations, one from NP and one from Damasio’s Self Comes to Mind, which I
think make an interesting juxtaposition:
Minds are a subtle, flowing combination of actual images and recalled images,
in ever-changing proportions. The mind’s images tend to be logically
interrelated,
All,
In section 5.2, Stjernfelt brings up the “Adaptation to Rationality”
hypothesis in conjunction with the issue of "logical constants" so
problematic in Hurford's account. The logical constants problem is mostly a
consequence of Hurford's limited view that reference to a dynamic object
require
Jerry All due respect, but my post concerned the distinction Kirsti
claimed to find, not anything in your post. So I dont see the relevance..
From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com]
Sent: Friday, November 14, 2014 12:33 PM
To: Peirce List
Cc: Michael DeLaurentis; John N.
List, Michael, Kirsti, John:
On Nov 12, 2014, at 11:47 AM, Michael DeLaurentis wrote:
I don’t find any such distinction, implicit or explicit, in Peirce’s late
writings.
Motivated by your assertions, I re-read 4.172 and later paragraphs, searching
for distinctions between CSP logic and set
I find all this tediously obscure with a highly in-bred
self-congratulatory yet pointless circularity. How does an ordinary person use
language? That is the ultimate and always in the end the final criterion of
any verbal usage. You all have exactly the
same “starting point” that you can never ev
