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Continuing from 1.3 (EP2:247, CP 1.594):
. All action in accordance with a determination is accompanied by a feeling
that is pleasurable; but, whether the feeling at any instant is felt as
pleasurable in that very instant or whether the recognition of it as
pleasurable comes a little later is a
I've not seen a clearer set of signals from Peirce that we do experience
some satisfaction when we engage in a process of thought that results in
expressions and actions of a practical sort. Though he does not speak of
logic in this passage can there be any doubt that the reason he celebrates
reas
Referring only to this section, my questions are based around:
1[ This outline can only refer to a single man, whose beliefs are
'determined' by his past experiences/learning. This is relativism,
BUT -
2] Are his actions 'more reasonable' - understanding reason as
att
print("HAL?");
if(laugh == T){
print(";)");
}else{
print("+9000");
}
Am 29.09.17 um 09:41 schrieb Armando Sercovich:
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To me, feeling as firstness has nothing to do with pleasure, that would be secondness, or satisfaction, which would be thirdness. Feeling is a quality, pleasure a reaction, and satisfaction includes a mediation I would say. Why did Peirce mix these categories he himself had invented/discove