Francesco, List:
FB: Also, to say that a given combination is perfectly consistent would
mean that the order of the ten trichotomies has been determined, which
Peirce was far from having done.
We are discussing only the trichotomies that Peirce *did *clearly arrange
in an order of
Francesco, List:
FB: As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses "general"
in at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs indices, which
have an individual object), 2) legisigns are general in themselves (as
types that occur in replicas), 3) and universally
Dear Atila Bayat,
Thank you for providing this excellent short biography of Victorino Tejera,
a man who was not only an extraordinary scholar, but also teacher, poet,
translator, and diplomat. What an extraordinary life!
If feasible, we would like to place some of his scholarly work in the
Most interesting. The Plato remarks especially. I wish aesthetics was more
noted as essential to Peirce's notions.
amazon.com/author/stephenrose
On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 6:37 PM, Atila Bayat wrote:
> Dear All,
>
> Professor Tejera was a sometime contributor to the Peirce list in the mid
> 1990's
Dear All,
Professor Tejera was a sometime contributor to the Peirce list in the mid
1990's in contact with J. Ransdell. He wrote two books in Semiotics, and
many articles as well. I can supply a complete bibliography upon request.
He contributed "The Centrality of Art in Classic American
Jeff, Francesco, List:
JD: My understanding is that the sign and not the immediate object that is
being classified as a vague, singular or general.
I agree; what I should have said was, "Consistent with his earlier division
of Signs according to the Immediate Object into vague/singular/general
Dear Francesco, list:
In London, a person gets mugged every ten minutes.
And he’s getting mighty sick of it!
Why is this joke funny?
~Katy Sarah Jones,
Towards an understanding of the use of indefinite expressions for definite
reference in English discourse
With best wishes,
Jerry R
Now I understand better wath Jon meant with the following
JAS: the generality of the Object *itself *(Abstractive/Concretive/Collective)
has absolutely no bearing on the nature of its *relation *to the Sign
(Icon/Index/Symbol), since these correspond to *different *trichotomies for
classifying
List,
I would encourage all here who are interested in the type/token distinction
to read Gary Fuhrman's most recent, and useful blog entry, "Earthtypes"
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2018/09/earthtypes/
which includes the informative Online Etymology entry on 'type'
>
> Jon, List
>
> JAS: As I understand it, the subject of a proposition is a Rheme whose
> Object is also an Object of the proposition. Should we understand the
> Immediate Object of a proposition to be a Sign?
>
If one agrees that the subject of a proposition is its imemdiate object, of
course
Dear Francesco, list,
Thanks for being patient with me for it is not obvious to me, yet.
You said:
The statue of Peirce's example is an Actisign because it is a singular that
acts as a sign
But what I was asking is, given that that is the rule to which you refer
when you say,
As an
Francesco, List:
FB: I beg you to notice that my posts have all been about the immediate
object intended as the subject of a proposition
As I understand it, the subject of a proposition is a Rheme whose Object is
also an Object of the proposition. Should we understand the Immediate
Object of
Dear Jerry R.
The statue of Peirce's example is an Actisign because it is a singular that
acts as a sign
Best
Francesco
On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 9:46 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote:
> Dear Francesco, list,
>
>
>
> Peirce said:
>
> *That* statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign.
>
>
>
> You
Jeff, List
thanks for your comments. Further thoughts are interspersed:
My understanding is that the *sign *and not the *immediate object* that is
> being classified as a vague, singular or general. The classification is
> based on the immediate object having the character of a presentation that
Dear Francesco, list,
Peirce said:
*That* statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign.
You said:
As an actual piece of granite, *the* statue is obviously an Actisign
Is there here a difference between *that* statue and *the* statue?
That is, why is the statue an Actisign, and
List, Jeff:
> On Sep 5, 2018, at 1:43 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard
> wrote:
>
> Following the suggestion that John Sowa has made, I think that an appeal to
> Peirce's work in formal logic--especially the later work on the existential
> graphs--might provide us with useful tools for making a
Jon S, Francesco, List,
Let me start with a quick and minor remark.
Jon says: "Consistent with his earlier division of the Immediate Object into
vague/singular/general,..."
My understanding is that the sign and not the immediate object that is being
classified as a vague, singular or
>
>
> Would you mind clarifying, please?
>
> What’s the problem again and what rules?
>
According to the Syllabus, a Symbol can only be a Legisign (= Famisign in
the 1908 terminology), and thus cannot be a Sinsign (=Actisign in the 1908
terminology).
Best
F
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 12:19
Welcome Francesco;
dear list,
You said:
The statue is an Actisign, but its object is general, and thus is a Symbol.
But according to the rules, a Symbol cannot be an Actisign.
*The problem is already here*.
Would you mind clarifying, please?
What’s the problem again and what rules?
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Francesco, list
Thanks for your very clear outline of the term of 'general' as used
by Peirce.
One thing to note, in my view, is that at no time does Peirce move
away from using this term as embedded
Jon, List
thanks for these observations. My comments are interspersed below.
On Wed, Sep 5, 2018 at 5:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
wrote:
> Francesco, List:
>
> I need to digest your latest reply before responding, but it seems to move
> on to more fundamental issues than the quantification aspect
Francesco, List:
I need to digest your latest reply before responding, but it seems to move
on to more fundamental issues than the quantification aspect of the
Immediate Object, and I wanted to offer a few more comments about the
latter.
Consistent with his earlier division of the Immediate
On 9/5/2018 2:57 AM, Francesco Bellucci wrote:
As I mentioned, I think we should recognize that Peirce uses "general"
in at least 3 senses: 1) symbols have a general object (vs indices,
which have an individual object), 2) legisigns are general in themselves
(as types that occur in replicas),
Gary R., List:
Thanks for the feedback. I will answer a couple of specific questions that
you posed, and then make another attempt to tie together the various
threads (as you put it).
GR: But, should we speak of a General Object (singular) or General Objects
(plural)?
I lean toward "General
24 matches
Mail list logo
