Jon,
First, thanks for filling in the gaps in R 637! I’ll be copying that into my
own ‘chronological edition’ of Peirce’s late works.
Just a few quick notes about “Direct vs. Indirect Experience.” The key point is
that percepts can be considered either as signs or as objects of signs,
dependin
Gary F., List:
GF: The key point is that percepts can be considered either as signs or as
objects of signs, depending on the purpose of one’s analysis.
I agree. I think of Percepts as Semes whose Objects are external to the
interpreting Quasi-mind, and Perceptual Judgments as Propositions whos
Jeff,
We agree. And thanks for citing the article about Riemann's hypothesis.
The only point I would ask: Please don't try to harmonize me -- i.e.,
put me in a mental straitjacket.
JBD
I've raised some questions about John Sowa's remarks about First
Order Predicate Logic being paradigmatic as
Jeff, List:
After reviewing the context of the quoted passage in R 637, I became
curious about the various other manuscript drafts that Peirce wrote for the
preface of his proposed collection of essays under the general title,
"Meaning." Robin's summary of R 634 concludes, "Nothing is able to
rep
