List: This is just a brief addendum to my cosmological summary. It occurred to me that each account can be associated with a key component of Peirce's overall metaphysics.
- The fundamental constitution of being as a continuum reflects *synechism*. - - The ongoing sequences of events from spontaneity to reaction to habit reflect *tychism*. - The overall evolution of states from "unpersonalized feeling" to "dead matter" reflects *idealism*. The order even matches how Peirce evidently prioritized these three doctrines. CSP: Permit me further to say that I object to having my metaphysical system as a whole called Tychism. For although tychism does enter into it, it only enters as subsidiary to that which is really, as I regard it, the characteristic of my doctrine, namely, that I chiefly insist upon continuity ... Accordingly, I like to call my theory Synechism ... (CP 6.202; 1898) CSP: I have begun by showing that *tychism *must give birth to an evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth, and to a Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind. (CP 6.102, EP 1:312; 1892) CSP: In view of the principle of continuity, the supreme guide in framing philosophical hypotheses, we must, under this theory, regard matter as mind whose habits have become fixed so as to lose the powers of forming them and losing them ... (CP 6.101; 1902) For Peirce, tychism is "subsidiary to" synechism and "must give birth to" idealism, which is also required by synechism. Regards, Jon S. On Wed, Aug 7, 2019 at 7:13 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Edwina, List: > > ET: Therefore - there is no 'a priori' or separate MIND. > > ET: I have disagreed with such a separate linearity. > > ET: ... mind and matter - are not separated from each other. > > ET: That is Peirce does not separate mind and matter. > > > You keep attacking this straw man, over and over; *no one is suggesting > that mind and matter are separate.* The whole point of Peirce's > synechism is that while "*mind *and *matter *are of disparate natures ... > this disparateness is a mere matter of degree" (R 936:3); i.e., they are > not "entirely distinct" (CP 7.570). The whole point of Peirce's > Schelling-fashioned objective idealism is that "*matter *is a peculiar > sort of *mind*" (R 936:3)--specifically, "effete mind" (*ibid *and CP > 6.25, EP 1:293) or "specialized and partially deadened mind" (CP 6.102, EP > 1:312) or "mind hide-bound with habits" (CP 6.158, EP 1:331). What I have > maintained--and as Gary R. pointed out, what the overwhelming majority of > the secondary literature affirms, as far as we both know--is that Peirce's > *objective > *idealism is a particular form of *metaphysical *idealism; "the physical > law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as primordial" (CP > 6.24, EP 1:292). > > ET: And this has been my point all along - that you cannot separate > objective idealism from epistemological realism; i.e., mind is articulated > as matter; matter is instantiated via mind. > > > That is *not *what "epistemological realism" means. I already quoted > Guardiano's brief definition--"the real is mind, whether it is known or > not" (p. 191 n. 14)--and he elaborates on it a bit later. > > NG: Epistemic objectivity can mean many things to a philosopher, and > whatever its details on which Peirce elaborates in other writings, one > thing is certain--that he does not hold to an epistemological idealism, > whereby the real is taken to be determined by the mind of the individual > knowing subject ... Peirce is a realist as defined by his Century > Dictionary definition of "Realist": "A philosopher who believes in the real > existence of the external world as independent of all thought about it, or, > at least, of the thought of any individual or any number of individuals." > Yet and simultaneously, he holds to the doctrine of idealism as also > defined by his dictionary definition: "The metaphysical doctrine that the > real is of the nature of thought; the doctrine that all reality is in its > nature psychical." (pp. 192-193) > > > In other words, *epistemological *realism is essentially what Lane called > Peirce's *basic* realism--"A central thesis of this book is that Peirce > held there to be real things and thus that he believed in a real world, a > world that is the way it is regardless of whether you, or I, or anyone else > believes that it is that way" (p. 2). This is not in any way inconsistent > with Peirce's *metaphysical *idealism. > > ET: As I understand you, JAS, you do set up a linear path, beginning with > an omniscient God, followed by a primordial Mind which you define as pure > Thirdness, on its own - - which is then followed by 1ns and 2ns. > > > I did not say one word about God in my last post, and I also did not "set > up a linear path." Instead, I outlined a complex combination of > cosmological accounts drawn from Guardiano's later paper that must be taken > together, rather than treated in isolation. Here, let me summarize the > whole thing for you once more. > > 1. The *constitution of being* is an inexhaustible continuum, which > underlies indefinite possibilities, some of which are actualized (vector of > *representation*, 3ns→1ns→2ns). > 2. The *sequence of events* in each case of such actualization is > spontaneity, then reaction, then habit-taking (vector of *order*, > 1ns→2ns→3ns). > 3. The *evolution of states* is chaos in the infinite past, ongoing > sequences of events at any assignable date, and complete regularity in the > infinite future (vector of *process*, 1ns→3ns→2ns). > > 3ns is *logically *primordial relative to both 1ns and 2ns (#1), while > 1ns is *both *logically and temporally primordial relative to 2ns (all > three). 3ns is temporally last in #2, but the habit-taking tendency *itself > *is original. 3ns is temporally between 1ns and 2ns in #3, but those are > ideal limits. > > ET: My reading of Peirce in 6.24, is that, in his outline of [c] - with > "the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as > primordial, which is idealism' - my view is that this refers to pure > idealism. > > > On the contrary, it refers to *any and every form* of (metaphysical) > idealism. The different versions vary when it comes to the details, but > not this fundamental definition. There is no warrant in the text for the > claim that "this refers to pure idealism"; in fact, as far as I can tell, > Peirce *never once* used that term in *any *of his writings. > > ET: Not subjective and not objective - but to the pure 'Platonic' style > which separates mind and matter. > > > Peirce provided a different name in the same passage for the metaphysical > doctrine that "separates mind and matter"--*dualism*, which treats them > "as two radically different kinds of substance." He also provided a > different name in the same passage for the metaphysical doctrine that mind > and matter are "on a par" and "both primordial"--*neutralism*. He *never > once* called either of these views *idealism*, objective or otherwise. > > ET: Again - I have a quibble with this - to say that Mind, as the > organizing principle of the universe, has logical priority- makes sense > only because Mind is logical - but, I think that ALL three modes have > 'priority'. > > > That is *not *what "logical priority" means; and in any case, Peirce's > term is *primordial*, which in this context means "basic and > fundamental." Mind is primordial *relative to *matter; i.e., mind is *more > *basic and fundamental than matter. Again, "*matter *is a peculiar sort > of *mind*"--specifically, "effete mind" or "specialized and partially > deadened mind" or "mind hide-bound with habits." > > ET: Now - I know, JAS, that you will continue to disagree with my > interpretation of Peirce - but - that's just the way it is. It's NOT a > 'misreading' or wrong, as you inform me'; it's my interpretation and has, I > think, as I've pointed out in previous posts, enough backing from Peirce's > texts, to substantiate as a 'reasonable interpretation'. > > > Any legitimate "reading" or "reasonable interpretation" of someone else's > writings must be grounded in the text itself. There is absolutely no basis > in *any *of the passages that we have been discussing for the assertion > that Peirce *rejected *metaphysical idealism as the doctrine that "the > physical law [is] derived and special, the psychical law alone [is] > primordial"; on the contrary, he *explicitly endorsed *that view. > > ET: Now - whether others accept it or not - is up to others. > > > Indeed; as always, those reading along can evaluate our respective cases > and draw their own conclusions. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Aug 7, 2019 at 3:00 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > >> JAS, list >> >> 1] As NG writes - NG: It is useful to think of the "idealism" half of >> Peirce’s philosophy of objective idealism as pointing to a theory of >> metaphysics, and the "objective" half, pointing to a theory of epistemology >> ... We can say that objective idealism includes epistemological realism and >> idealist metaphysics. (pp. 192-193) >> >> And this has been my point all along - that you cannot separate objective >> idealism from epistemological realism; i.e., mind is articulated as matter; >> matter is instantiated via mind. Therefore - there is no 'a priori' or >> separate MIND. >> >> 2] As I understand you, JAS, you do set up a linear path, beginning with >> an omniscient God, followed by a primordial Mind which you define as pure >> Thirdness, on its own - - which is then followed by 1ns and 2ns. I have >> disagreed with such a separate linearity. My view is that all three >> categorical modes operate together, within the semiosic process. >> >> 3] John Sowa provided an addendum to his post, outlining multiple >> versions of idealism; that is - there are not 'just the two' - subjective >> and objective idealism. My reading of Peirce in 6.24, is that, in his >> outline of [c] - with "the physical law as derived and special; , the >> psychical law alone as primordial, which is idealism' - my view is that >> this refers to pure idealism. Not subjective and not objective - but to the >> pure 'Platonic' style which separates mind and matter. Peirce then rejects >> this - and offers his own outline of objective idealism, where the two ; >> mind and matter - are not separated from each other. >> >> As you, JAS, quote: "Nevertheless, he likewise goes on to describe >> objective idealism as the doctrine "that every instance of matter is also >> an instance of mind/feeling" (p. 78). And that is exactly what I've been >> saying! >> >> However - I disagree with this comment [not sure to whom it belongs]. >> " in other words, there is a sense in which mind encompasses both 1ns >> (feeling) and 3ns (thought), while matter primarily corresponds to 2ns >> (action)." >> >> Mind encompasses all three modes; matter couldn't exist without the laws >> organizing its matter. As Peirce writes; "All mind is directly or >> indirectly connected with all matter...all mind more of less partakes of >> the nature of matter' 6.268 >> >> And 'if habit be a primary property of mind, it must be equally so of >> matter, as a kind of mind" 6.269 >> >> That is Peirce does not separate mind and matter. >> >> 4] And, as I outlined Peirce's cosmogeny -[see 1.412 and 6.348] with an >> original - AFTER the Nothing - phase of pure feeling or 1ns. ..which then >> produced individual instances of matter [which would entropically >> dissipate] except that 3ns developed habits-of-association and formation to >> maintain this matter/mind actuality. >> >> 5]JAS wrote: " I suggest that this accords with the "topological" >> conception of continuity, in which a true continuum as a whole (3ns) has >> only indefinite parts (1ns) unless and until some are "marked off" as >> singularities (2ns). Specifically, the entire universe is just such a >> continuum (mind) governed by psychical law, whose indefinite parts >> (feelings) still exhibit considerable freedom, but whose actual parts >> (matter) are constrained by "inveterate habits becoming physical law." >> >> ET - I have no problem with the above. I've been saying the same thing - >> that the universe is rational and logical, and is articulated as organized >> matter - along with the freedom of chance. All three modes are necessary. >> >> 6] NG writes: ", mind is primordial, not because it is first in a time >> series, but because it has (phenomeno-)logical priority. (p. 196)" >> >> Again - I have a quibble with this - to say that Mind, as the organizing >> principle of the universe, has logical priority- makes sense only >> because Mind is logical - but, I think that ALL three modes have >> 'priority'. In other words - a universe without 1ns would be unable to >> adapt and evolve and change; it would be reduced to 'dead matter'. A >> universe without 2ns wouldn't exist since particulate matter wouldn't >> exist. And a universe without 3ns would be without organizing laws and >> would dissipate, entropically, into Nothing. >> >> So- how can one conclude which one has priority? All three modes are >> required- and can we privilege any one of them??? >> >> 7] Therefore - I disagree with: >> >> NG: " mind must be primordial to matter, since it is a necessary >> condition of such facts. (p. 198)" >> >> I think that the above contradicts the assertion "that every instance of >> matter is also an instance of mind/feeling" (p. 78). >> >> ------------------------------- >> >> 8] Now - I know, JAS, that you will continue to disagree with my >> interpretation of Peirce - but - that's just the way it is. It's NOT a >> 'misreading' or wrong, as you inform me'; it's my interpretation and has, I >> think, as I've pointed out in previous posts, enough backing from Peirce's >> texts, to substantiate as a 'reasonable interpretation'. Now - whether >> others accept it or not - is up to others. >> >> Edwina >> >
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