RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6

2014-10-06 Thread Howard Pattee
At 07:45 AM 10/6/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote: "Information" in Peircean logic is defined as the logical product of the breadth and depth of a sign; these are logical quantities and cannot be measured in bits. HP: I do not understand a "quantity" that has no measure of some kind. If not informati

RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6

2014-10-06 Thread Gary Fuhrman
l for purposes of semiotic analysis. We can't understand Dicisigns as "informational signs" or "quasi-propositions" (EP2:275) without using the semiotic concept of "information". gary f. From: Howard Pattee [mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com] Sent: 5-Oct-14

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6

2014-10-05 Thread Howard Pattee
At 06:41 PM 10/5/2014, Clark Goble wrote: The type/token distinction seems definitely to apply here [Pattee-Fuhrman disagreement]. HP: I agree. Bits are ambiguous. Bit may refer to a measure or type of information, or bit may refer to a token of information, like 0 or 1. Howard ---

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6

2014-10-05 Thread Clark Goble
> On Oct 5, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Gary Fuhrman wrote: > > HP: Suppose, in context of a Dicisign or a proposition, you ask me: > Is it true or false? I can give you a one-bit answer. Isn't that bit some > kind of sign? > > GF: My answer to your question is: 1. (as opposed to 0). > But without the