Ben, List:
On Jul 26, 2015, at 9:29 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > Jerry, you're simply using the word 'individual' in another way than Peirce > does. When Peirce uses the word 'individual' he generally means something > such as this horse (Bucephalus), that building (the Empire State Building), > yonder tree (located on 7th St. in Manhattan), etc. In "Nomenclature and > Divisions of Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined" (starting on > p. 289 in EP 2, also appearing in CP 2.233-72) Peirce introduces his 10-class > system made out of three trichotomies of signs; he recapitulates it in a 1904 > letter to Lady Welby in CP 8.327-41. In that system, any individual serving > as a sign is a sinsign; also in that system, all symbols are legisigns, none > are sinsigns, i.e., no symbols are individuals. He's explicit about it. > Peirce also discusses there and elsewhere how the same sign can incorporate > icons, indices, symbols. You see a chemical analogy with Peirce's sign > classifications, but if the analogy puts you at odds with what Peirce said in > plain English, then your analogy isn't quite working. Trying to get me to be > less "rigid" in my interpretation of Peirce won't help your analogy if I'm > correct about Peirce. Anyway, Peirce may have been inspired by some chemical > analogies, and his meditations on complex chemical structures surely helped > him think more skillfully about other complex structures, but he was quite > explicit about not basing philosophical semiotic (or any other kind of > cenoscopy) _logically_ on any idioscopic principles or theories (such as > physics or chemistry). > > Ben, I find your thinking to be utterly confused. You are not distinguishing between a sin-sign, as a specific object with predicates (such as indices) from the broad generalities of the broad concepts used to classify related terms. Your attempt, several months ago, to use set theory to analyze CSP texts shows, to me at least, such a rigid and and not pragmatic perspective. In my opinion, CSP logic is remote from the propositions of set theory. The trichotomy itself, not the extension to "classes of signs", is composed of nine interrelated semantic and rhetorical terms. The entelechy, the goal, the purpose of the trichotomy was to express a consistent form of argument, not to classify or categorize. The magnitude of this categorical error is for you to decide. CSP's form of argument (in the trichotomy) was not derived from either De Morgan nor Boole. But it was, never-the-less, a consistent, complete and decidable (in the sense of Hilbert) form of argument, or at least, that is CSP's assertion. This is expressed very directly and with logical import in his development of his view of graphs as contrasted with sets. It is also expressed with his rejection of the Kempe approach to "spots" and relations. One must note that 5 of the nine terms were created by CSP! That is, he was creating a language for argumentation that he designed to be coherent with the rhetoric of scientific logic with the complete absence of direct reference to mathematics. This fact is amazing. How does one account for this? Set theory and NP of FS ignore CSP's basic concern with the scientific argumentation style that the trichotomy develops. One must further note that all the terms must contain information about the sin-sign otherwise the trichotomy would not work as a rhetoric system of thought. One must further note that this rhetorical scheme follows CSP's view that information is implication (1860's). That is, each of the rhetorical terms must contribute to the argument. Modal logic? > I didn't mention species, but since you bring it up: The word 'species' in > Peirce's time was taken to refer to a _kind_ as opposed to a total population > of that kind. There is a relatively recent shift of meaning, as John Collier > has pointed out, by some biologists to refer by the word 'species' not just > to the species as a kind but to the species' total population during the > course of the species' existence - that total population as a somewhat > scattered and long-existent collective individual - sort of like an > individual swarm or flock, etc., but with much more dispersion, longevity, > and turnover in membership. In that sense, the sense of a concrete individual > (soever scattered, etc.), a species is an individual even in Peirce's > sense. Is that your sense of 'biological species'? Meanwhile, I look up > 'chemical species' and find that definitions vary on whether it is an > _ensemble_ of identical atoms or identical molecules or identical ions etc. > under observation, or whether it is simply the unique _kind_ to which the > identical atoms or identical molecules, etc. belong. An individual ensemble > is a collective individual, as far as I can tell. But if 'chemical species' > just means the kind to which identical atoms (or the like) belong, then it is > not an individual in Peirce's sense, except in an abstract universe of > discourse with abstract singulars. Now, we often talk that way, speaking of > 'individual kinds' and so on. I suspect that that's what you mean by > 'individual species' both in biology and in chemistry - you mean a (taxically > more-or-less bottom-rung) _kind_. Or maybe you do mean this or that > individual ensemble. In any case I really don't think that by 'chemical > species' you mean, for example, the total population of O_2 molecules as a > single concrete collective (though dispersed) object throughout space and > time. Anyway in Peirce the main sense of 'individual' is not that in the > phrase 'individual kind'. > This paragraph lacks substantial meaning because you are not taking into account contextual usages of proper names. Within both chemistry and biology, the context of usage with respect to an existent identity (a sample or a physical object or a biological object determines the meaning of identity as a single or plural, as a proper name or as an indeterminate.) Within chemistry, the identity corresponds with measurements of physical units. What is absent from your strange rhetorical outburst is the lack of understanding the systematic nature of units and unities and how units are unified into unities. In short, the scientific methods of reasoning, the habits of scientists, is foreign to the rhetoric of the collection of sentences. Ben, this is below your usual clarity. What is it that you are really trying to express? > You have not clarified your sense of the word 'individual'. In calling an > atomic symbol 'individual', do you mean (A) an individual instance of the > symbol, a symbolic expression appearing on a certain page of a certain copy > of a certain book? Or do you mean (B) that atomic symbol in general, across > all its instances in a given language or (C) that atomic symbol in general, > across all its instances in all languages and thought? (B) and (C), in > Peirce's system, are legisigns, i.e., generals serving as signs. If you mean > (B) or (C), then you're simply using the word 'individual' in another way > than Peirce does. > With respect to your questions of the meaning of a atomic symbol, the meaning of a chemical system, today, in the 21 st Century, is, roughly speaking: 1. A individual irreducible form of matter with unique measurable properties that distinguish it from all other irreducible forms of matter (with certain technical caveats). 2. A member of an ORDERED collection of all known irreducible forms of matter, ordered by physical attribute of electricity. 3. As ordered collection of electrical relatives, each individual chemical element as a common electro-mechanical structure - a nucleus and an equivalent number of electrons. 4. Each atomic symbol is a representamen for a dynamic system described by quantum mechanics. 5. Each pair of chemical symbol form a unique compound by the simple rule of adding all parts to form a unique whole with a unique set of predicates. Thus, an atomic symbol, as a representamen, covers several coherent qualities and quantities. =============================================================== More concisely, the atomic table of elements, an ordered collection atomic symbols, form a restricted arithmetic of compounding, a logic of electrified relatives and a copulative and predicative grammar for parts and wholes (mereology). Obviously, this usage of atomic symbols is vastly richer than that available to CSP. Ben - the consistency of scientific thought rests on the consistency of correspondence between the definitions of the units of measurements and the corresponding rhetoric / grammar of description. Six of the seven international standards of physical units of measure - mass, temperature, distance, light, electricity and time serve as predicates. (The seventh unit, mole, is merely a number.) You really ought to think about this at great length if you wish to penetrate CSP's notion of logic. It is the physical units of measure that dictate the mereology of chemistry/biology - the part -whole relations that CSP uses in descriptions of medads as sentences and his logic of copula. Now, as for CSP's direct usage of the concept of "individual". CSP invokes the concept of "individual" repeatedly in developing his symbolic graph conventions. The text is 4.438 through 4.475. The term "individual" is contained as a part of the description of several conventions. Of particularly import in this exchange is the predicative generalization of "symbol" in 4.447, middle, page 360. "Every word is a symbol." "Every sentence is a symbol.'' "Every book is a symbol." It seems to me that: "Every individual word is a symbol." "Every individual sentence is a symbol.'' "Every individual book is a symbol." (What is missing from these simplistic notions of a symbol is the concept of symbol systems and the concepts of relations among symbol systems that is necessary for 21st Century science.) Immediately following this section, CSP immediately addresses Illative transformations and makes a clear distinction between the purpose of reasoning and the purpose of logic: 4.476. The purpose of reasoning is to proceed from a recognition of a truth we already know to the knowledge of a novel truth. ... 4.477 The purpose of logic is attained by any single passage from a premiss to a conclusion as long as it does not happen at once that the premiss is true while the conclusion is false. The concept of logic of 4.477 may suffice to pass from one term of the trichotomy to another term - for example, from a sinsign to qualisigns (from name to physical properties) or from sinsign to indices (from name to molecular formula). The concept of argument, as used in the trichotomy, is sufficient to satisfy 4.476 for the proof of structure from knowledge of the existence of chemical atoms to the forms of chemical molecules. Ben - from my perspective, this exchange has been all about meaning. Meaning prior to CSP, meaning of CSP writings and the meaning of mathematics for the sciences of today. Cheers Jerry > Best, Ben > > On 7/24/2015 4:17 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:Ben, List: > >> >> Although we discussed aspects of this question before, fresh citations may >> shed a different hue on the meaning of the CSP's usage in various contexts. >> Frankly, I think that your reading of the meaning of the term "symbol" is >> to rigid. >> >> First, CSP's trichotomy separates the concept of a sign (qualisign, sinsign >> and legisign) sharply and distinctly from the concept of symbol (and its >> association of symbol, index and icon) as the identities associated with and >> related to the first row terms. >> >> If my recall is correct he asserts that the terms (icon, index and symbol) >> contains parts of one another. (This is consistent with chemical units >> where all three are used in representation and all three are representations >> are products of the human mind from analysis of data and historical >> precedence. >> >> In this sense, the formulations of arguments (rhema, dicisign, arguments, >> that is logically meaningful terms) necessary draws on the immediacy of >> (icon, index, symbol) meanings to formulate the arguments, general or not. >> >> In Natural Propositions, FS cites the book of Mark Greaves, the >> Philosophical Status of Diagrams, (from the Stanford group). This book >> compares CSP's logical diagrams with various other forms - Aristotle, the >> Square, Venn, and so forth. This book is an historical perspective that >> compares logics and diagrams. An extra-ordinary book to be sure! >> >> Are symbols used in diagrams? Are symbols used in graphs? Are symbols used >> in calculations? >> >> CSP writes wrt 'beta' graphs, >> >> "It reasonings generally turn upon the properties of individual objects to >> one another." 4.510-4.511, (Greaves, p. 167 ) >> >> When looking at the trichotomy as a whole, I believe that you are seeking to >> outlaw the intertwining and interlacing of meanings of terms, under the >> guise of "independence". For example, >> >>> Nevertheless, a symbol that incorporates an index (supplied by one's mind >>> or more physically) makes a sign that can represent an individual action as >>> an instance of a practice, a form of conduct, a norm, a general. >>> >> >> makes no sense to me. The atomic symbols incorporate indices (physically >> measurable attributes. And they are NOT generals. >> >>> More generally speaking, to the extent that an individual is an instance of >>> a general, it is the individual that represents the general, not vice >>> versa, Peirce's idea here being that generals, norms, etc., govern, >>> more-or-less determine, individuals, not vice versa (or not significantly >>> vice versa); and objects influence, more-or-less determine, signs to >>> represent them, not vice versa, so the individuals take the sign role, the >>> generals the object role, in such cases. >>> >> >> Again, I find this gloss to be meaningless. In the natural sciences, a >> species is a species is a species. The concept of a individual (species) is >> fundamental to the logic of biology and medicine as well as chemistry. It is >> necessary for logic. >> The sentence seems to me to be an ad hoc mixture of concepts of set theory, >> mathematical independence, and shapeless philosophical usages. >> >> In the pragmatic world, a symbol may represent you as your name, Ben, or a >> collection (your family). Grammatically, this is merely a case of single or >> plural with respect individuals. What philosophical point is gained by >> invoking this sort of sentence? >> >> For closure, I return to my opening remark, your gloss here is to rigid for >> my simple mind. >> >> Cheers >> >> Jerry >> >> >> >> On Jul 23, 2015, at 11:52 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: >> >>> Hi, Jerry, >>> >>> You're welcome again. Now, in Peirce's view, symbols not only are generals >>> but also do not, of themselves, symbolize anything but generals, so that >>> excludes individual actions from being symbolized. Nevertheless, a symbol >>> that incorporates an index (supplied by one's mind or more physically) >>> makes a sign that can represent an individual action as an instance of a >>> practice, a form of conduct, a norm, a general. More generally speaking, >>> to the extent that an individual is an instance of a general, it is the >>> individual that represents the general, not vice versa, Peirce's idea here >>> being that generals, norms, etc., govern, more-or-less determine, >>> individuals, not vice versa (or not significantly vice versa); and objects >>> influence, more-or-less determine, signs to represent them, not vice versa, >>> so the individuals take the sign role, the generals the object role, in >>> such cases. (I give an example in an appendix to this message.) A symbol is >>> itself individually instanced, in Peirce's system, not by a concrete >>> individual symbol, which doesn't exist in Peirce's system, but instead by a >>> kind of indexical sinsign that points to one's experience of the symbolized >>> object. >>> >>> But is the question you're asking something more like: Are there >>> unconscious, instinctual, merely animal-level symbols? In Peirce's system, >>> they're certainly allowed, since a symbol is a sign that represents by norm >>> or disposition of interpretation regardless of (non-)resemblance or >>> dynamical (non-)connection to its object. Such a norm or disposition could >>> be instinctual. There are places (I forget where off-hand) Peirce says that >>> not all symbols are artificial (I mean in the sense that words are), some >>> are natural in some sense. Unfortunately I don't remember those discussions >>> well. >>> Best, Ben >>> Appendix: So, let's say you have an accurate computer-program model of a >>> storm. Indices help make the program part of a representation of the storm; >>> but without the indices, the program is a general diagram, and the actual >>> storm an individual diagram, of the same object, a mathematical structure. >>> (It would be an impossibly lucky program, to have been made without >>> indexical connection to the actual storm yet mirror the storm so well that >>> indices merely need to be added to make the result able to represent the >>> storm to an interpretant.) >>> >>> On 7/23/2015 11:38 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: >>> >>>> Thanks again, Ben. >>>> (Where would this list serve be without you?) >>>> >>>> After reading this again, it became obvious to me (I am a slow learner) >>>> that the underlying issue here is the origin of symbolization with respect >>>> to biological / human actions. >>>> >>>> Ben, do you suppose that instinctual actions (such as those that are >>>> directly comparable to animal behavior, such as fight or flight, or >>>> feeding,) are not symbolized? The quasi-hypotheses being merely mental >>>> patterns of spontaneous neuronal assemblies that manifest the material >>>> reality by activating communication toward the ecosystem through internal >>>> electrical musculatures? >>>> >>>> Cheers >>>> >>>> Jerry >>>> >>>> On Jul 23, 2015, at 10:16 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi, Jerry, you're welcome. Yes, some of the pages contain few words. If >>>>> something looks wrong, you can check it against the manuscript online at >>>>> http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:FHCL.HOUGH:12486086 (also linked at my >>>>> transcription >>>>> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm ) and >>>>> please do let me know if something's missing. I don't think I missed >>>>> anything but sometimes it takes one a few days to see an error, because, >>>>> I guess, of slowness of change of frame of mind. >>>>> >>>>> MS 831 is undated but one can see that it must have been written after >>>>> the publication of _Studies in Logic_ (1883) because Peirce mentions its >>>>> publication. >>>>> >>>>> Another way maybe to narrow the date down: In MS 831, Peirce uses the >>>>> words "inference" and "reasoning" to mean pretty much the same thing, and >>>>> uses "quasi-inference" to mean instinctive or otherwise automatic >>>>> inference. There comes a time when he uses "reasoning" to mean >>>>> "conscious, deliberate inference," thus widening the sense of "inference" >>>>> to encompass instinctive inference (quasi-inference in MS 831). I'm not >>>>> sure how consistent he was about that in later years, but assembling the >>>>> dates of later quotes on reasoning and inference might help suggest a >>>>> more specific time period during which he wrote MS 831. >>>>> >>>>> Best, Ben >>>>> >>>>> On 7/23/2015 10:46 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote >>>>> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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