List, Tom, JeffD, and GaryF: On Oct 14, 2014, at 6:57 PM, Tom Gollier wrote:
> I have to say, I just don't get this idea of "real facts" from reading > Peirce. On the one hand, we have the denotation of the subject, something we > all seem to agree on. On the other hand, Peirce describes the signifying of > the predicate, in discussing the icon more generally, as: > > "If it [an icon] conveys information, it is only in the sense in which > the object that it is used to represent may be said to convey information." > [Kaina Stoicheia] > This quote from Kaina Stoicheia demands a bit of chemical knowledge to get to the meaning of it. Allow me to attempt a partial argument that justifies this sentence from K.S.. A chemical icon (any chemical structure) is constructed from a series of propositions. Theses propositions are inferred from the quali-signs in an exact manner - Dalton's ration of small whole numbers for all chemical icons. CSP is seeking to generalize a chemical argument by using general terms in place of chemical terms. As a natural object, the object is the source of the information (the sin-sign) which in turn is the source of quali-signs and indices. In the sciences, quali-signs and indices may be measured, that is, assigned numbers representing measured facts. For example, water has a simple icon: H-O-H. As an object, water can be decomposed by electricity to generate two quali-signs, hydrogen and oxygen, in the relative volumes of 2:1. (Note that quali-signs may also be objects!) The principle of Dalton's ratio of small whole numbers indicates that the relative volumes of the gases can be pictorialized as the icon for water, H-O-H. In this case, the indices of water, with respect to the quali-signs measured following electrolysis (disassembly of the whole into parts) were two and one respectively. Thus, four of the nine logical terms of the triadic triad form a specific tetrad that conveys information from the object to the association of the the object with its icon. The logical association of these four terms - sin-sign as object, quali-signs as properties, the index as a ratio, and the icon as the chemical structure is a special case of chemical logic for a simple (small) molecule. Information is convey in a consistent manner among THREE different symbol systems, the alphabet, the mathematical and the chemical. (BTW, this example also illustrates the insufficiency of CSP's notion of information as being merely breadth and depth.) The example of water is a simple example of chemical logic, which, in general, requires the meaning of terms in at least three different symbol system and constrained by the necessity for coherence among all of them. This example should be contrasted with the comment by Gary F., whose restricts his interpretation to a single symbol system, namely, the alphabet and rejects your clear argument which is consistent with facts and measurements. In general, the more symbol systems invoked in a description of a natural object, the richer the set of natural propositions. Indeed, one could say, rather roughly, that the triadic triad is a method for associating information about objects in a coherent manner. And the richer the set of necessary relations needed to generate a coherent description of nature. The term "dicisign" can be viewed as a "relations collector" to bring together symbols and their relations from different symbol systems. In other words, I could expand the example of water to include all nine terms of triadic triad. The quali-signs would be expanded to include other physical properties, such a freezing point and boiling point and physical spectra relating electricity and magnetism to sub-atomic motions. In the interest in keeping it simple, the tetrad of terms - sin-sign, qualisign, icon and index suffice to illustrate the logic of relatives for non-technical philosophers. As CSP recognized elsewhere, Mother Nature is richer than our imaginations. Does this make any sense to you? If not, could you point to weaknesses that disconnect the rhetoric from the facts? Gary F., do you have any reason to reject this line of argumentation? Jeff. D. -we started a thread along this line some months ago. Do you find this argument consistent with your understanding of Kant? Cheers Jerry > Thus, if I say "the book is red," the predicate "red" conveys information in > the sense which the book itself conveys that information. That to me is a > denotation as well, a pointing into the world of our experience, but > regardless the denotation of the book and that that object conveys the same > information as "red" is enough to say whether the proposition is true or > false. So, why are we talking about the copula being an index, as if there > is no other way of combining indices and icons, or of "real facts" like they > are not just us coupling together two kinds of representation? Why are we > going beyond the represenation to metaphysically posit the objective > existence of "real facts," and/or where is the support in Peirce for doing > that? > > Tom > > > On Sun, Oct 12, 2014 at 11:20 PM, Catherine Legg <cl...@waikato.ac.nz> wrote: > Hi everyone, > > > I’ve made some progress reading chapter 3. > > > Re. 3.7: I’m very excited by this idea of replacing a copula with an index. > (Subject and predicate are joined by “an index pointing to the real fact > joining the Subject and the Object.”) I see how this idea lines up with the > originality in Peirce’s theory of perception (which I’ve only recently got my > head around) whereby the perceptual judgement is not a *copy* of the percept > but an *index* of it. This is such a powerful new idea Peirce offers to > Western philosophy. > > > Re. 3.9: Love the ‘top-down’ functional analysis of arguments whereby they > are not *composed* of propositions and terms, but rather the latter are > prescinded after the fact. > > > Cheers, Cathy > > > From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] > Sent: Tuesday, 7 October 2014 12:46 p.m. > To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee > Cc: Peirce List > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7108] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.7 > > > Frederik, Gary F, Jeff D, lists, > > > I've almost finished catching up with the very interesting terminological > discussions relating, on the one hand, to the subject (such as denote, > designate, indicate, etc). and on the other to the predicate, (such as > signify, comprehend, connote, etc.) It seems to me that Frederik here employs > such terms relating to the proposition as Peirce used them in his > extraordinary development and vast expansion of the proposition as the > dicisign concept in, especially, the Syllabus and Kaina Stoicheia ca.1903. > > > I hope, therefore, that it is safe to say that for the present analysis that > Peirce of this period (and Frederik) is saying: > > > In considering the proposition (dicisign): > > [the Subject--denotes the object == the breadth of the sign] (the Predicate > signifies its characters == the depth of the sign) > > > And, further, for Peirce these two are joined not, as they've traditionally > been, by a copula, but rather by an index of a peculiar kind, indeed of a > metaphysical kind, namely, an index pointing to the real fact joining the > Subject and the Object. Or, if I'm getting this right, the formulation > breadth x depth = information (i.e,, the sum of these two as equaling some > factual information) for the dicisign means that true information represents > a real fact in some world of experience. > > > In 3.7 Frederik shows, in considering the syntax of the proposition, that > Peirce replaces the traditional copula with an index pointing to the fact > being represented, the index being the necessary sign for joining the > replicas of the subject and the predicate of a proposition. This syntactical > index involves an icon (as all indices do), the icon being, in this case, > exactly the juxtaposition of the two, that is, their co-localization, as > Stjernfelt helpfully terms it. > > > The > > co-localization of the elements of the dicisign: > > [Subject](Predicate) > > > (Such a co-localization syntax is further understood to be primitive and > pre-linguistic.) > > > This syntax claims that the dicisign "is really indexically connected to the > real fact to which the subject and predicate correspond" (Stjernfelt, 66), > and how this happens forms the argumentation of the rest of this section and > some of the next (centering on the two objects of the co-localizing index) . > But, just to make sure I've got this right, I'd like to ask if the above > summary represents a correct understanding of the terminology dthat Peirce is > using ca. 1903 and if it correctly represents the argument being made > regarding the syntax of the dicisign in NP 3.7? > > > Understanding that there are in this syntax two objects helps explain how > Peirce can speak of the index as being in "existential" relation to the fact > being represented. But it seems to me that it is to the replica (Secondary > Object) that the existential relation especially applies, while the reality > (Primary Object) could be in any of the Three Worlds of Experience, and in > that sense is different and altogether greater than its replica. So the > language of existence, of facticity, of secondness, is a bit unnerving to me > for both Objects.. Frederik's chart on page 70 and the Peirce quotes on 71 > (from KS) are quite helpful in using the language of reality (3ns), but cf. > paragraph 1 on 68 (the quote from the Syllabus) where both use the language > of existence (2ns). (I am aware that I may be making a mountain out of a > molehill, and that Peirce is sometimes simply loose in his existence/reality > terminoiogy, an understanding I've argued for myself in the past; I doubt > that it signals a significant change in terminology from the Syllabus to KS) > > > Btw, I thought your choices of quotes and examples, especially of the > Achenbach portrait, which was a particularly apt example to make a rather > complex point (67), as well as your explication of the co-localization syntax > were both very helpful, Frederik. Thanks! > > > Best, > > > Gary > > > > > Gary Richmond > > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > > Communication Studies > > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > C 745 > > 718 482-5690 > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . 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