I think this outline below by Frederik is excellent. But I'd like to add a few
comments.
Physics as a scientific endeavour does not study cognitive and communication
processes, but, yes, physics in itself functions with the realities of
semiosis. That is, my view is that semiosis - as an action of reasoning - does
not begin with the biological realm - where it is increasingly obvious as a
basic component of existence. Reason and therefore semiosis exists within the
physico-chemical realm. The fact that reason and its 'chain of processes' in
the physico-chemical realm are set, disinclined to adaptation and evolution -
almost akin to that frozen end state that Peirce suggested of 'hidebound
matter' doesn't mean that semiosis did not exist in that realm. Whether active
semiosis exists in the most quantum states - we don't know, but my view is that
Mind, or the process of reasoning, is basic to the universe and did not develop
only with the biological realm.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Frederik Stjernfelt
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce List
Sent: Thursday, September 04, 2014 3:21 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:6639] Re: Natural Propositions
Dear Clark, list -
I do not think physics pertains to secondness only. Physical laws safely
belong to thirdness. And all empirical processes involve 1-2- as well as
3rdness. But that is another issue.
Let me redescribe my claim. Physics, taken in itself, does not study
cognition and communication processes - biology does.
(Of course physics is indispensable as an auxiliary science in the study of
such processes in other sciences - all more basic sciences may be recruited by
the sciences depending upon them).
This discussion, however, is marginal to my purpose in the book.
The main idea of the first chapter is the claim that one of the most
important lessons to take from Peirce lies not in single parts of his
semiotics, like some of the famous triads. Rather, it lies in the vast
reorientation of the whole domain of sensation, perception, logic, reasoning,
thought, language, images etc. which it entails. That reorientation takes the
chain of reasoning as its primitive phenomenon. The claim is that it may be
formally described, independently of the materials in which it may be
implemented. Thus, language, images, perception etc. should be reconceptualized
for the roles they may play in the chain of propositions of the reasoning
process. This implies that propositions are not entities of language, nor do
they presuppose any conscious "propositional stance". Consciousness and
language should rather be seen as scaffolding serving and increasing reasoning
- and appearing and being selected for during evolution for that reason. In the
book I call this the "adaptation to reason" hypothesis - P does not call it
this but I think it may be safely abstracted from his writings.
It has the corollary that truth and validity may not be reduced to
epiphenomena of any other sciences - be it neuro(psychology) on the natural
science side or history, anthropology, or sociology on the humantities-social
science side.
Another corollary is that many of the received dualisms in this area are of
relative value only (language-images, perception-conception, mental-physical,
animal-human, subject-object, etc.) and should not be taken as points of
departure.
I think this strong hypothesis has rarely been isolated in Peirce's work. It
comes close to the surface, however, in his repeated insistence that logic
should be unpsychological - this is why chapter 2 is devoted to that.
Best
F
Den 04/09/2014 kl. 06.24 skrev Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>:
On Sep 3, 2014, at 2:47 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt <stj...@hum.ku.dk> wrote:
Personally, I tend to side with the latter of the two schools, based on
the observation that the science of physics does not need semiotics in the
description of its subject matter (only in its theory of science) while
biology, on all levels, involves spontaneous semiotic concepts, from
biochemistry to ecology and ethology you'll find "genetic code", "Information",
"signals", "cues" etc. which presumably form part of the subject matter of
biology.
Could you clarify what you mean with this distinction? I know physics is
cast in various guises. Even in basic mechanics. But I just don’t see the
distinction. (Undoubtedly a failing on my part)
While physics is often thought through in terms of secondness, I’m not sure
one can actually describe physics in that manner.
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
