Gary, Lists In logic the simplest case of determination I can think of is P -> Q. I this case, on the condition, or limitation to the scope of P, Q.
I don't think this helps your case, Gary. It occurs to me that there is a sense of 'determine' in which we determine something (e.i., we determine P to be true, or to be the case). This is weaker than the above, but it usually has a human subject and involves mental action of a certain sort. I've just determined that rain is coming down in sheets. I'd better go close my windows :) John From: Gary Fuhrman [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] Sent: January 31, 2015 10:25 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List' Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8065] Re: Triadic Relations Howard, John, lists, As an addendum to my remarks about Peirce being extremely scrupulous (not "scupulous") in his use of words, I should mention that according to the Oxford English Dictionary, the verb "determine" when used in logic means "To limit by adding differences; to limit in scope." Now, compare that to the definition given by Peirce in the Century Dictionary about 50 years earlier: "In logic, to explain or limit by adding differences." So yes, Abduction is just constrained (informed) guessing, as Howard put it. And a guess is explanatory to the extent that it is constrained, narrowed down, limited, determined by the reality it aims to explain. Our collateral experience of the phenomenon in question adds differences to our existing model (sign) of the universe, differences which make a difference in the model, making it a less vague. Models are not created ex nihilo. Or if they are, they are neither testable nor fallible, nor are they informative. gary f. From: Gary Fuhrman [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] Sent: 31-Jan-15 2:48 PM To: 'biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee'; 'Peirce List' Subject: RE: [biosemiotics:8065] Re: Triadic Relations Howard, you say "Obviously nature puts constraints on our models, but that is far from determining our models" - but on the contrary, that is very close (maybe as close as you can get, without using the word) to what Peirce means by saying that the dynamic object determines the sign. As Vincent Colapietro put it, "The function of the dynamic object is not to generate but to constrain a series of interpretants." Nature, or that aspect of it to which we are paying attention, is the dynamic object of our model of that aspect, which is obviously a sign (primarily an iconic sign, by the way). Informational signs (dicisigns) are those which make some difference to the complex of models which we call our mind(s). And signs are the only things that can inform us. Evidently you, like John, move mainly in professional circles where the normal use of "determine" implies "determinism". But if you want to understand what Peirce is saying - or any writer who was extremely scupulous in his use of words and a leading expert on their usage by others - then you can't rule out a usage which differs from the one that happens to suit your habits. Especially when your accustomed usage would not make sense in the contexts where Peirce used the term - such as his definitions of "sign". gary f. From: Howard Pattee [mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com] Sent: 31-Jan-15 2:15 PM To: Gary Fuhrman; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>; 'Peirce List' Subject: [biosemiotics:8065] Re: Triadic Relations At 12:17 PM 1/31/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote: Howard, So you don't believe that the real world, "nature" as it is beyond our models, places any constraints on abduction? or on any kind of inference? HP: Obviously nature puts constraints on our models, but that is far from determining our models, which is the issue. Abduction is just constrained (informed) guessing. That is not determinism. We can make different models of the same reality. Howard gary f.
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