Gene, Gary F, and Clark,
Gene
let's remember the influential book by Ogden and Richards, The Meaning
of Meaning (1923), which brought discussion of Peirce to a wider
audience over many following decades. It was Lady Welby's influence on
Ogden that brought Peirce into the discussion, using quot
Adding to John's last statement concerning Peirce's letters to Lady Welby,
let's remember the influential book by Ogden and Richards, The Meaning of
Meaning (1923), which brought discussion of Peirce to a wider audience over
many following decades. It was Lady Welby's influence on Ogden that brough
> On Aug 9, 2017, at 7:18 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> But there is another side of the question revealed in Peirce’s 1909 letter to
> Welby (SS 118):
> “My studies must extend over the whole of general Semeiotic. I think, dear
> Lady Welby, that you are in danger of falling into some erro
On 8/9/2017 9:18 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
Peirce certainly devoted a lot of study to the meanings of English
words, especially in the period /before/ he developed his detailed
classification of signs, but of course his work was not /limited/
to those studies.
Yes. I would never "block t
John, Clark, Kirsti, …,
John, I agree with everything you say here. Peirce’s “high regard for his work
on lexicography” is well deserved, too. But there is another side of the
question revealed in Peirce’s 1909 letter to Welby (SS 118):
“My studies must extend over the whole of general Semei
Kirsti, Gary F., and Clark,
Kirsti
Meanings are contextual. - Do we agree in that?
Yes. Peirce said many times in many ways that any meaningful
concept must show its passport at the gates of perception
and action. That is a major part of its context.
Kirsti
Letters to lady Welby need to be
;
> } We are what we pretend to be, so we must be careful about what we
> pretend to be. [Vonnegut] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
> *From:* Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
> *Sent:* 7-Aug-17 16:54
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [P
Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: 7-Aug-17 16:54
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology
On Aug 7, 2017, at 10:21 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>
wrote:
Clark,
Kirsti has presented zero evidence that the sign classifications Pei
> On Aug 7, 2017, at 10:21 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> Clark,
>
> Kirsti has presented zero evidence that the sign classifications Peirce
> detailed in the 1908 Welby letters are summaries of earlier work rather than
> current work on his part. In fact, if you actually read the material
Signs gateway
From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: 7-Aug-17 11:31
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopy & Phenomenology
On Aug 6, 2017, at 2:06 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi
<mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi> wrote:
As evidence backing up interpretatio
Helmut,
What you project here is pretty much what I’ve done with Turning Signs. One
part of the text, the obverse I call it, consists of 19 sequential chapters
that were completed two years ago and have not changed (except that some links
have been added.) Another part, the reverse, is still
> On Aug 5, 2017, at 8:36 AM, John F Sowa wrote:
>
> Actually, there are many "strange states" of matter, for which that
> three-way distinction is extremely oversimplified.
I’d just add to your great comments that really these are just folk science
distinctions. They happen to work most of th
> On Aug 6, 2017, at 2:06 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
>
> As evidence backing up interpretations on CSP's then current main interests,
> works at hand, I find Welby correspondence necessarily weak. Not strong, that
> is.
Again I’ve not kept carefully up on the nuances of what was innovat
Thank you, Kirsti! I do not have time to write it as a scientifical correct book with all relevant literature mentioned (having an idea takes seconds, but comparing it with the most relevant existing texts about the subject has a different time scale) , and in the past it was always so, that thing
Helmut,
Todays systems theories were not known by Peirce. Thus he dis not use
the TERM (which is just a name for a theoretical concept) in the sense
(meaning) it is used nowadays.
I have studied some early cybernetics, then Bertallanffy and Luhman in
more detail. But I left keeping up with t
Letters to lady Welby need to be interpreted and evaluated on the basis
to whom they were addressed to. Lady Welby was highly interested in sign
classifications. Classifications were a dominant topic at the times, in
vogue. (Remnants of this vogue are still effective.) - Peirce was
explaining h
Helmut,
That is good to know. Thanks.
Kirsti
Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 5.8.2017 22:09:
Kirsti,
you wrote: "I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut,
because I do not
have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the
ground
for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to
List,
I did not claim that CSP in any way REJECTED the results of his work
with sign classifications.
Kirsti
g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 5.8.2017 19:52:
I've been looking for some evidence which would support Kirsti's claim
that "It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign
classif
Kirsti,
you wrote: "I find it difficult to answer your questions, Helmut, because I do not
have a clear enough idea of what you are aiming at. What is the ground
for you interest in CSP? What do you aim to do with the knowledge and
understanding you are after?"
I want to combine CSP with sys
I've been looking for some evidence which would support Kirsti's claim that
"It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign classifications
aside and proceeded towards other aims."
I haven't found such evidence, but if Peirce actually did that, he must have
done it in 1909 or later. On
On 8/4/2017 5:23 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
Something is either a gas, a liquid, or a solid, and you cannot
tell which one, by just looking at the chemical composition.
That is, because additional information is needed
Actually, there are many "strange states" of matter, for which that
three-way
Jerry, list,
It is a historical fact that CSP left his work on sign classifications
aside and proceeded towards other aims. My firm conviction is that he
found that way a dead end. - Anyone is free to disagree. - But please,
leave me out of any expectations of participating in further discuss
Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 21:06:
Kirsti,
you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do.
According to my
view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"."
Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). "
But, isn´t this a kind of containing or compos
Jerry,
A misunderstanding here. I did not mean all sign classifications in the
world. I meant those parts in CSP's work where he developed more and
more complex classification systems; and that taken in the context of
all his work. - Also, when said: "I have not found (etc...), I meant in
the
Jerry, List,
Maybe in the analogy with chemistry and physics one might say: Chemical composition is one thing, and classification into solids, liquids and gases another. Something is either a gas, a liquid, or a solid, and you cannot tell which one, by just looking at the chemical composition.
Kirsti,
you wrote: "Also, with triads, thinking in "parts" does not do. According to my
view, that is. Nor do the idea of "containing"."
Instead you wrote about: " Categorical aspects (or perspectives). "
But, isn´t this a kind of containing or composition? Like if you add all aspects or
Helmut, Kirsti, List:
> On Aug 3, 2017, at 2:54 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
>
> But composition is just a matter different from classification. Therefore a
> sign relation is either a quali- or a sini-, or a legisign, no matter what a
> sini- or a legisign is composed of.
> On Aug 3, 2017, at 4:
Kirsti:
> On Aug 4, 2017, at 1:34 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
>
>
> I have never found sign classifications of much use, even though I spent a
> lot of time once, long ago, with reading CSP's own writings on those issues.
In my view, the conceptualization of classes / categories lies at
Concernig the supplement:
Not just continental hybris, to my mind. I agree with Apel on this
"something higher". Kirsti
Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 4.8.2017 00:12:
Supplement:
I just have tried to read something on the internet about Apel´s
Peirce- reception. Wow, this is interesting. Is "I-thin
Helmut,
You wrote: "...eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and
"icon". First, they are ripped off from different trichotomies (of which
one is left out, by the way). Second, these present something arrived at
from differing Categorical aspetcs (or perspectives). Without workin
Dear list,
"In an illuminating image, Aristotle compares the use made by the noetic
soul of phantasia to the role of diagrams in geometry:
*It is impossible even to think (noein) without a mental picture
(phantasmatos). The same affection (pathos) is involved in thinking
(noein) as in drawing
Helmut,
It’s not that complicated.
A triad is a set of three — three of anything.
A trichotomy is a division of something into three — usually a division of a
type into three classes, or subtypes. For example, signs can be subdivided into
three classes, in various ways: icon/index/symbol
Helmut, list:
You said:
“Is "I-think" the same as "consistency"?”
To which I would reply:
Consider what effects that might *conceivably* have practical bearings you
*conceive* the objects of your *conception* to have. Then, your *conception* of
those effects is the whole of your *conception
Supplement:
I just have tried to read something on the internet about Apel´s Peirce- reception. Wow, this is interesting. Is "I-think" the same as "consistency"? And what about the logic of relatives? Is it not a different topic either, but must be made part of the whole topic too, thus is re
Kirsti, List,
For me both (classification and triads) was and still is complex and hard to understand. Before I have had a more or less proper understanding of the sign triad, I did not understand sign classes, eg. what would be the difference between "qualisign" and "icon".
Another puzzling thi
Triads belog to the system of Categories, the hardest part in Peircean
philosphy to fully grasp. It is much easier to use only classifications.
This appoach involves confining to Secondness, as if it were the only,
or even the most important part in his philosphy. - Peirce definitely
left this
Helmust, list:
Accordingly, just as we say that a body is in motion, and not that motion
is in a body, we ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts
are in us.
Best,
J
On Wed, Aug 2, 2017 at 5:12 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> List,
> Are trichotomies and triads two different topi
List,
Are trichotomies and triads two different topics? I think so: One is classification, the other composition. "Signs" as a term, I think, is more connected with classification, and "meaning" with composition. Is that so? It is my impression.
And: Is it so, that Peirce called himself a "Pragm
Clark understood pretty correctly what I meant with my post: A question
of shifting emphasis by CSP. Which to my mind is shown in a shift of
interest from trichotomies (and systems of sign classification) into
triads and triadic thinking (as a method).
On these issues I have written extensivel
> On Jul 31, 2017, at 6:52 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> But you will recall that his classification of signs and expansion of this
> classification recently discussed here was an important part of his letters
> to Victoria Welby. And in his late work, even his discussion of and expansion
> of
Clark, Stephen R, list,
There a great deal I agree with in your post, Clark, but even more that I
disagree with. But I'll have to respond more fully at a later date. For now
just a few immediate reactions. I will have little to say on Heidegger as I
haven't read his work in years, and I recall th
> On Jul 31, 2017, at 4:41 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> But I consider Kirsti's notion that "CSP was all his life after SIGNS. That
> was earlier. Later he was after meanings" itself, if not 'gravely', at least
> completely in wrong. Peirce was actively thinking about signs and semiotics
> th
Clark, Kirsti, list,
Clark, it sounds like you have* a lot* to deal with at the moment, to say
the least! I suppose I do too, although quite very different mattersas upon
returning from the funeral of a close relative, my spouse and I have been
called out of town again to help another relative wit
That’s interesting. I was familiar with Derrida’s and of course Habermas but I
didn’t know there were others.
In Germany there were e.g. Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen von Kempski, Max Bense, his
wife Elisabeth Walther-Bense, the late Karl-Otto Apel, Klaus Oehler or Helmut
Pape.
Best,
Stefan
Am 31
Kirsti, list:
If the French style of writing relies on argumentation- within the text at
hand-
and it is assumed that any reader is thoroughly familiar with the sources,
then the reader ought to know that “see-my-otics” has a suffix that is of
Greek origin.
So, what is it we know about what
> On Jul 31, 2017, at 12:52 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> In my view Gary R. is gravely wrong in assuming that CSP was all his life
> after SIGNS. That was earlier. Later he was after meanings.
>
> Heidegger was never attempting to create any theory of SIGNS. He was after
> meanings. Thus
Peirce did not use the term "semantics. But he did use the term:
"semeiotics". He even gave advice in spelling the word. This was his
advice: " see-my-o-tics".
Anyone can google this, I assume. If need be.
In my view Gary R. is gravely wrong in assuming that CSP was all his
life after SIGNS.
> On Jul 28, 2017, at 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> By the 20th century Peirce will have somewhat changed his terminology; but
> from 1902 on I believe he always refer to three branches of logica docens, or
> logic as semeiotic: namely speculative grammar, critic, and methodeutic (or,
> s
On 7/28/2017 5:07 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
when [Peirce] uses “intentional” in an ordinary context, it means
pretty much the same as it typically does in ordinary usage today.
For instance, CP 1.334 (c. 1905)...
Yes. And note the definition of 'intentional' that he wrote
for the _Century
Clark, you wrote that for Peirce, “Intentionality is from object through signs
rather than anything like an ego or directness.” I don’t see that this applies
to Peirce’s use of the terms “intention” or “intentional,” and that makes it
difficult for me to see what your sentence means. Can you sup
Dear Clark, list,
I'm not sure what you're suggesting here. You wrote:
CG: For Scotus the foundation of signs thus because the *a priori* structures
of the soul. I’m here thinking of Scotus’ *Grammatica Speculativa.*
Peirce too turns to this same aspect of Scotus’ thought. In the Comments
dicti
On 7/28/2017 12:39 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
I’ve long noted that while Peirce’s phenomenology bears little
resemblance to Husserl’s, Heidegger’s seems quite different. Famously it
is both on the nature of consciousness and intentionality that Heidegger
breaks from Husserl. Heidegger too turned to
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