Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

Edwina, List: While I understand what you are asking and why, I think that it is an inaccurate and unfair characterization of my List participation over the years. I have stated repeatedly that the issue for me is one of *terminological ethics*--in accordance with Peirce's own well-documented sta

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }JAS, list Just a brief comment. You wrote: "He never claimed to have worked out all of the ramifications of his own thought during his lifetime; on the contrary, he said more than once that he was coun

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

nterpretant. Having said >> that, some signs have the character of necessitants. These include >> legisigns, symbols, arguments. For signs that have these three >> characteristics, do they have the internal structure of a triadic relation >> connecting its parts? I t

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

first correlate of a further triadic relation. Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 --------- From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Saturday, May 18, 2019 5:29 PM To: peirce-l@list.

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

quot;. As such, some signs > consist of triadic relations--even if they are the first correlate of a > further triadic relation. > > Yours, > > Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 >

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 - From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Saturday, May 18, 2019 5:29 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quot

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

irst correlate of a further triadic relation. Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 - From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Saturday, May 18, 2019 5:29 PM To: peirce-l@lis

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Saturday, May 18, 2019 5:29 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity.

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

Edwina, List: Yes, I refuse on ethical grounds to deviate from Peirce's own usage of these terms. Again, either a Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant (CP 2.274, EP 2:273 and CP 2.242, EP 2:291; both 1903), or "Sign" and "Representamen" are synonymous (SS 193; 1905). He never--*not

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }JAS - The Commens entry refers to definitions of the Representamen. I am talking about the full TRIAD - not the mediative part, aka, the Representamen, of the Triad. You repeatedly refuse to differentiate between the two a

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

Edwina, List: ET: I disagree with your 'referential' definition of the Sign. It is not *my *definition, it is *Peirce's*. If you do not believe me, then just read through the Commens Dictionary entry , or Robert Marty's compilation

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Methodeutic for resolving quotation wars (was Continuity...

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }JAS list 1] You wrote: "Where on earth have I ever "denied that physical things can be signs"? In your specific example of a rock, the rock is not the Sign, it is the Object of the Sign; but we could easily construct a different