Jon A, List, Jon A wrote:
People will continue to be confused about determination so long as they can think of no other forms of it but the behaviorist-causal-dyadic-temporal, object-as-stimulus and sign-as-response variety. It is true that ordinary language biases us toward billiard-ball styles of dyadic determination, but there are triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction that are not captured by S-R chains of that order. A pragmatic-semiotic object is anything we talk or think about, and semiosis does not conduct its transactions within the bounds of object as cue, sign as cue ball, and interpretants as solids, stripes, or pockets. I agree. This is one of the reasons why some here--including me--have argued against the input-mediation-output model of semiosis which, in my understanding, is an example of the causal-dyadic variety of determination which does not capture triadic 'determination'. So it would seem that what may very well be needed, then, is our unpacking the "triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction that are not captured by S-R chains." Terrence Deacon's *Incomplete Nature *makes a stab at this in the context of 'emergence' theory, but his challenging theory requires s number of new concepts employing neologisms which take some work in getting ones mind around. Nonetheless, one can say that central to his theory is that certain 'absential' constraints (determinations and interactions) are at least as important as the causal-dyadic forms which physical properties take in consideration of self-organizing systems. (Gary F. and I tried discussing some of Deacon's theory in this forum, but this didn't go very far at the time, for reasons just noted.) This topic seems to me of some considerable importance and scientific-philosophical potential value and why I changed the name of this thread. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 6:25 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote: > | “No longer wondered what I would do in life but defined my object.” > | > | — C.S. Peirce (1861), “My Life, written for the Class-Book”, (CE 1, 3) > | > https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/16/abduction-deductio > n-induction-analogy-inquiry-17/ > > | The object of reasoning is to find out, > | from the consideration of what we already know, > | something else which we do not know. > | > http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html > > If the object of an investigation is > to find out something we did not know > then the clues and evidence discovered > are the signs that determine that object. > > We've been through this so many times before that I hesitate ... > but what the hecuba ... one more time for good measure ... > > People will continue to be confused about determination > so long as they can think of no other forms of it but the > behaviorist-causal-dyadic-temporal, object-as-stimulus and > sign-as-response variety. It is true that ordinary language > biases us toward billiard-ball styles of dyadic determination, > but there are triadic forms of constraint, determination, and > interaction that are not captured by S-R chains of that order. > A pragmatic-semiotic object is anything we talk or think about, > and semiosis does not conduct its transactions within the bounds > of object as cue, sign as cue ball, and interpretants as solids, > stripes, or pockets. > > Regards, > > Jon > > -- > > inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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