On 18 Nov. Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
My own interpretation may be substantively different, it may not.
I take Hilbert's position to be that the formalism is independent of
the subject matter. That is, I
take his view of formal interpretation to be mechanistic, specifying
valid transformati
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- Message from ianel...@iupui.edu -
Date: Sun, 27 Nov 2011 11:20:02 -0500
From: Irving
Reply-To: Irvi
Irving, Jerry, Steven, list,
Irving, thanks for your response, more interesting and informative than what I
have to say!
Irving wrote,
Is there some sort of causality, Aristotelian or otherwise, in [application
of] inference rules? Once again, I am at a loss here to comprehend how this
issu
CORRECTION (as usual). Sorry! I was unclear:
For Peirce in those terms, matter is a Second, and so chance/spontaneity does
not correspond more or less to the material cause, though it [I meant *the
material cause*] seems to have a ghost of role [I meant *in the
Firstness:Chance part of the tric
* Comments on the Peirce List slow reading of Joseph Ransdell,
"On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic",
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/paradigm.htm
Re: Comments by Auke van Breemen and Claudio Guerri
The question arose whether there is a uniquely dete
