Jim,
Sorry, I'm just getting more confused. I've actually seen "a", "b", etc.
called "constants" as opposed to "variables" such as "x", "y", etc.
Constant individuals and variable individuals, so to speak, anyway in
keeping with the way the words "constant" and "variable" seem to be used
in o
Ben, I made it too complicated. Sorry. It didn't help that "/-" was brought
into the discussion. You had the basic idea earlier with dicent and rheme. Fx
and Fa have to be kept together. So, the interpretant side of the semiotic
relation has priority. Conceptual analysis would move from the "
Hi, Jim,
Sorry, I'm not following you here. "F" and "a" look like logical
constants in the analysis. I don't know how you're using "v", and so
on. I don't know why there's a question raised about taking the
judgment as everything that implies it, or as everything that it
implies. Beyond thos
Ben, I suppose you could take the judgment as everything which implies it. (or
is implied by it) In this way, you could play around with the "judgment stroke"
and treat meaning as inferential. But, using a rule of substitution and
instantiation, I could show the content of the following judgmen
Dear Gary,
Since language only has meaning within contexts, change the context and you
are likely to change meaning altogether. Ambiguity and vagueness are the
enemies of clarity; Peirce's concept of terminological ethics is one of his
main contributions to philosophy and the extension (and purpos
Sorry, corrections in bold:
Jon,
The way I learned it, (formal) implication is not the /assertion/ but
the /validity/ of the (material) conditional, so it's a difference
between 1st-order and 2nd-order logic, a difference that Peirce
recognized in some form. If the schemata involving "p" and
Hi, Jim
Thanks, but I'm afraid that a lot of this is over my head. Boolean
quantifier 'v' ? Is that basically the backward E? A 'unity' class? Is
that a class with just one element? Well, be that as it may, since I'm
floundering here, still I take it that Frege did not view a judgment as
bas
Jon,
The way I learned it, (formal) implication is not the /assertion/ but
the /validity/ of the (material) conditional, so it's a difference
between 1st-order and 2nd-order logic, a difference that Peirce
recognized in some form. If the schemata involving "p" and "q" are
considered to expose
Hi Ben; My interest was historical (and philosophical) in the sense of what did
they say about the developing work of symbolic logic in their time. The period
is roughly 1879-1884. The anchor was two references by Irving (the historian of
logic) to Van Heijenhoort and Sluga as worthy start poin
Ben,
Just to give a prototypical example, one of the ways that the distinction
between concepts and judgments worked its way through analytic philosophy
and into the logic textbooks that I knew in the 60s was in the distinction
between a "conditional" ( → or -> ) and an "implication" ( ⇒ or => ).
JW = Jim Willgoose
JW: I followed up on two paper suggestions by Irving (Sluga and Van Heijenoort)
in
the context of the language or calculus topic. With Sluga, I detect the
idea
that the Begriffsshrift is a universal language because it is meaningful in
a way that the Boolean logi
Jim, Jon, list,
I'm following this with some interest but I know little of Frege or the
history of logic. Peirce readers should note that this question of
priority regarding concept vs. judgment is, in Peirce's terms, also a
question regarding rheme vs. dicisign and, more generally, First vs.
John, I followed up on two paper suggestions by Irving (Sluga and Van
Heijenoort) in the context of the languge or calculus topic. With Sluga, I
detect the idea that the Begriffsshrift is a universal language because it is
meaningful in a way that the Boolean logic is not. Sluga sees his pap
o~o~o~o~o~o
I began to be curious about the recurrence of the following passage
from Peirce in internet discussions over the last dozen years or so.
Syllabus : Classification of Sciences (1.180-202, G-1903-2b)
• http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/cl_o_
Re: Jim Willgoose
At: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/8141
JA = Jon Awbrey
JW = Jim Willgoose
JA: Just to be sure we start out with the same thing in mind, are you talking
about
the notion of judgment that was represented by the "judgment stroke" in
Frege's
“Beg
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