Title: Message
Frances on Gilles to listers...
 
These semiotic diagrams in the posted message and in the linked website are a welcome addition to the trichotomic topic, and will surely be the cause of much more reflection.
 
The positing of "réel" for the "real" object is assumed here an adjective or label that holds the dynamic object to be an indirect thing inaccessible to sense, until it is related to a sign. This use of the term "real" however might be misleading, if it broadly means phenomenal or essential or existential, or even if it is a mere synonym that means factual or actual or material. My understanding of the term real and reality in Peirce is that if any phenomenal existent fact that may also be actually concrete is not sensed, then it is not yet real, at least not real to the mind that senses. The reality of a fact or object therefore is only as real as sense. If an object as a fact is not given to sense, then it is not real. Now, while it is true Peirce claims that an object must determine a sign, because signs after all are themselves simply objects, it is not clear to me whether it is the referring object in semiosis that does this, or does it for its own referent sign only, or must be real to do it, or must be sensible and sensed to do it. It seems the position here in the presented diagram is that the dynamic object of semiosis and semiotics is indeed real and the object that determines the very existence of the sign as related to the object.
 
To speculate on Peircean intentions, one way around this problem of objects determining signs, whether the objects are sensed and real or not, might be to differentiate between synechastic objects and semiosic objects.
 
This is for me to suggest that phenomenal synechastic objects continue to exist outside and even prior to acts of semiosis, thereby having the disposed potential for determining signs to exist as objects themselves but as signs of other semiosic objects, and this by the process of phenomenal representation. These synechastic objects might be held as representamen that are not signs. The phenomenal semiosic objects that are then found by sense to really exist inside acts of semiosis, thereby are referred by their own referent signs, and this also by the process of phenomenal representation. These semiosic objects might be held as representamen that are signs.
 
The initiate synechastic object in acts of evolution thus has the purpose to determine the mere existence of the sign. The immediate semiosic object in semiosis, acting variously as a qualisign and sinsign and legisign, thus has the further purpose to determine the very real presence of a probable representing representamen or sign, acting variously as a potisign and actisign and famsign. The dynamic semiosic object in semiosis thus has the still further purpose to determine the main kind a real representamen or sign will be, as an icon or index or symbol.
 
The act of determination, by an object towards itself as a sign of itself or another object, or by an object towards another object as a sign of itself or another object, is here understood by me to mean a determinate limit or a ground, but not a cause or a source. The purpose to act by any phaneron is here understood by me to mean a disposed tendency or inclined trait that the phenomenon is naturally compelled to conform with.
 
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Wednesday, June 14, 2006 5:29 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] RE : Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

bonjour,
ma conception spéculative sur ce sujet :
 
 
Les treillis de R.Marty :
 
Cordialement
ARNAUD Gilles
 
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