The bourgeoisie has, through its exploitation of the world market, given 
a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. 
To the great chagrin of reactionaries, it has drawn from under the feet 
of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established 
national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. 
They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life 
and death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no 
longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the 
remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at 
home, but in every quarter of the globe.

Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto

===

NY Times Magazine, Aug. 18, 2002

The Free-Trade Fix
By TINA ROSENBERG

If there is a showcase for globalization in Latin America, it lies on 
the outskirts of Puebla, Mexico, at Volkswagen Mexico. Every New Beetle 
in the world is made here, 440 a day, in a factory so sparkling and 
clean that you could have a baby on the floor, so high-tech that in some 
halls it is not evident that human beings work here. Volkswagen Mexico 
also makes Jettas and, in a special hall, 80 classic Beetles a day to 
sell in Mexico, one of the last places in the world where the old Bug 
still chugs.

The Volkswagen factory is the biggest single industrial plant in Mexico. 
Humans do work here -- 11,000 people in assembly-line jobs, 4,000 more 
in the rest of the factory -- with 11,000 more jobs in the industrial 
park of VW suppliers across the street making parts, seats, dashboards 
and other components. Perhaps 50,000 more people work in other companies 
around Mexico that supply VW. The average monthly wage in the plant is 
$760, among the highest in the country's industrial sector. The factory 
is the equal of any in Germany, the product of a billion-dollar 
investment in 1995, when VW chose Puebla as the exclusive site for the 
New Beetle.

Ahhh, globalization.

Except . . . this plant is not here because Mexico has an open economy, 
but because it had a closed one. In 1962, Mexico decreed that any 
automaker that wanted to sell cars here had to produce them here. Five 
years later, VW opened the factory. Mexico's local content requirement 
is now illegal, except for very limited exceptions, under W.T.O. rules; 
in Mexico the local content requirement for automobiles is being phased 
out and will disappear entirely in January 2004.

The Puebla factory, for all the jobs and foreign exchange it brings 
Mexico, also refutes the argument that foreign technology automatically 
rubs off on the local host. Despite 40 years here, the auto industry has 
not created much local business or know-how. VW makes the point that it 
buys 60 percent of its parts in Mexico, but the ''local'' suppliers are 
virtually all foreign-owned and import most of the materials they use. 
The value Mexico adds to the Beetles it exports is mainly labor. 
Technology transfer -- the transmission of know-how from foreign 
companies to local ones -- is limited in part because most foreign trade 
today is intracompany; Ford Hermosillo, for example, is a stamping and 
assembly plant shipping exclusively to Ford plants in the United States. 
Trade like this is particularly impenetrable to outsiders. ''In spite of 
the fact that Mexico has been host to many car plants, we don't know how 
to build a car,'' says Huberto Juarez, an economist at the Autonomous 
University of Puebla.

Volkswagen Mexico is the epitome of the strategy Mexico has chosen for 
globalization -- assembly of imported parts. It is a strategy that makes 
perfect sense given Mexico's proximity to the world's largest market, 
and it has given rise to the maquila industry, which uses Mexican labor 
to assemble foreign parts and then re-export the finished products. 
Although the economic slowdown in the United States is hurting the 
maquila industry, it still employs a million people and brings the 
country $10 billion a year in foreign exchange. The factories have 
turned Mexico into one of the developing world's biggest exporters of 
medium- and high-technology products. But the maquila sector remains an 
island and has failed to stimulate Mexican industries -- one reason 
Mexico's globalization has brought disappointing growth, averaging only 
3 percent a year during the 1990's.

In countries as varied as South Korea, China and Mauritius, however, 
assembly work has been the crucible of wider development. Jeffrey Sachs, 
the development economist who now directs Columbia University's Earth 
Institute, says that the maquila industry is ''magnificent.'' ''I could 
cite 10 success stories,'' he says, ''and every one started with a 
maquila sector.'' When Korea opened its export-processing zone in Masan 
in the early 1970's, local inputs were 3 percent of the export value, 
according to the British development group Oxfam. Ten years later they 
were almost 50 percent. General Motors took a Korean textile company 
called Daewoo and helped shape it into a conglomerate making cars, 
electronic goods, ships and dozens of other products. Daewoo calls 
itself ''a locomotive for national economic development since its 
founding in 1967.'' And despite the company's recent troubles, it's true 
-- because Korea made it true. G.M. did not tutor Daewoo because it 
welcomed competition but because Korea demanded it. Korea wanted to 
build high-tech industry, and it did so by requiring technology transfer 
and by closing markets to imports.

Maquilas first appeared in Mexico in 1966. Although the country has gone 
from assembling clothing to assembling high-tech goods, nearly 40 years 
later 97 percent of the components used in Mexican maquilas are still 
imported, and the value that Mexico adds to its exports has actually 
declined sharply since the mid-1970's.

Mexico has never required companies to transfer technology to locals, 
and indeed, under the rules of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
it cannot. ''We should have included a technical component in Nafta,'' 
says Luis de la Calle, one of the treaty's negotiators and later 
Mexico's under secretary of economy for foreign trade. ''We should be 
getting a significant transfer of technology from the United States, and 
we didn't really try.''

Without technology transfer, maquila work is marked for extinction. As 
transport costs become less important, Mexico is increasingly competing 
with China and Bangladesh -- where labor goes for as little as 9 cents 
an hour. This is one reason that real wages for the lowest-paid workers 
in Mexico dropped by 50 percent from 1985 to 2000. Businesses, in fact, 
are already leaving to go to China.

http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/18/magazine/18GLOBAL.html

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