I previously sent out a comment appended to a story in which I corrected the
author regarding applicability of the Railway Labor Act to FEDEX.  I feel
compelled to share this correction as well.  If my shakey recollection
serves me, Iain is correct.  Perhaps someone else knows more.

M.E.
-------------------------------------------------------------------

Just a side note on Michael's note:
Somebody can correct me if I am wrong but I believe Federal Express 
secured its Railway Labor Act designation through a rider on a major 
piece of federal legislation (I think it was the 1996 budget bill).  In 
essence it wasn't just a ruling but some "friends in high 
places" legislative assistance which ultimately determined that Federal 
Express employees fall under the jurisdiction of the RLA.


In solidarity,
Iain Gold
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------

Howdy!

Saw your comment's about a recent article about Robert Samuelson. Thought 
you might be interested in a review I wrote of a recent book he wrote.

By the way, I'm also a member of the NWU, Santa Cruz/Monterey Local 7, I 
think.


-- Charlie Reid  
                
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
"Salus populi suprema est lex" (Cicero)
The welfare of the people is the highest law.
---------------------------------------------

---------- Forwarded message ----------

                        By Charles J. Reid
                

 
        In his book "The Good Life and Its Discontents," Robert Samuelson cites 
a poll showing that American confidence in the press declined by 55% since 
1964.
        While he provides no clear explanation for why only one in eight
Americans today trust the press, read his book and you'll understand 
why.
        "The Good Life" is terribly flawed.  What makes it worse is that
Samuelson is a journalist and a business analyst for Newsweek.  One 
would think he'd have the professionalism to produce more than an 
intellectually unreliable work of analytical smoke and distorted 
mirrored selections of historical data. But he didn't. Presumably he let 
his agenda get the best of him.
        The first hint at Samuelson's lack of solid analysis is an early 
footnote, arguing that it is a "misreading of history" to suggest the 
Cold War had an overwhelming influence on postwar America. Who could deny 
that the Cold War influenced every significant foreign and domestic 
policy after 1945 until the dissolution of the Soviet Union? Which cave
was the author hiding in?
        "Big government" (a catch phrase of the day) is his whipping 
boy. How did it emerge? According to Samuelson, Big Government grew out 
of the Keynesian New Deal in the 1930s. "The Keynesians played the 
decisive role in the transformation," he writes, yet, "None of 
Roosevelt's policies had really worked." For the author, this explains 
why "today's America is indeed a mess." (Needless to say, his analysis of 
Keynesianism is far off the mark.)
        "The Good Life" begins by asking the reader to accept a strawman
argument, based on a spurious set of assumptions. "[In] our era--from 
the end of the Second World War until now--the Age of Entitlement," he
writes, "we have transformed the American Dream into the American
Fantasy." Of course, it's easy to argue against stupid assumptions you 
set up yourself!
        His "American Fantasy" presumes Americans believe business 
cycles would end; we would solve all social problems; and the choices 
supplied by postwar prosperity would guarantee happiness.  Out of these 
supposed beliefs emerged impossibly "utopian" expectations and 
entitlements. According to Samuelson, this explains our national 
frustration and discontent (hence the title). 
        "Most Americans are prisoners of entitlement and its
disappointments," he concludes. So he sets out to explain this theory,
looking for the data in a pseudo-scientific effort to prove its 
validity.
        On the other hand, Samuelson also writes that more Americans are
experiencing "the good life" today than ever before.  Increases in
productivity, along with new products, as well as higher absolute incomes 
have caused a higher standard of living.  Yet "our societal performance is
judged against impossible standards."  In short, because of the slowdown
in the expansion of entitlements (made possible by postwar prosperity), 
we have become a nation of whiners.  
        Ironically, Samuelson provides a lot of information to refute 
his own arguments.  Where the data is lacking, an informed reader will
intuitively pick up on the inconsistencies in his reasoning.
        For instance, he cites at least ten recessions since 1945.  
Every economics student learns about business cycles.  It's highly 
doubtful they would conclude that Americans seriously believe they could 
and can stop the natural ebb and flow of economic activity (although he 
does cite President Lyndon Johnson saying, "I do not believe recessions 
are inevitable.").
        In fact, just before the 1929 crash, President Herbert Hoover
believed "poverty would be banished from the nation."  And pre-
Keynesian, pre-Depression American economists actually announced they 
had solved the problem of the business cycle.  So we can justifiably 
conclude the "American Fantasy" started out as a conservative one before 
the era of "Big Government." Alas! Many Americans are still mesmerized by 
stupid conservative economic fantasies.
        "The Good Life and Its Discontents"--the very title is an 
oxymoron. One could argue the absence of discontent is the only defining 
attribute of the good life Samuelson describes as "utopian."  Yet the 
author includes data disproving his point.  The income gap between the 
rich and poor is getting larger every day. Growth in productivity has 
declined since 1970. Although real incomes doubled between 1950 and 
1970, in the next 20 years, they grew by only roughly 15 percent.  And
while the tax burden has increased for most Americans, Samuelson never 
tells us that taxes for corporations have declined by over 60% since 
1960.
        Deterioration of the good life might well be a just cause for
discontent.
        Linguistically, Samuelson also falls short.  He has trouble
defining 'entitlement.' On the one hand, entitlement refers to 
government benefits promised to people, if they meet certain legal 
standards.  On the other hand, he says the word has acquired a broader 
meaning: "a firm popular expectation that some specific or general 
outcome will occur."
        "Entitlement denies choices, ignores limits, and muddles
accountability," he concludes.
        Of course, semantically, Samuelson only succeeds in obfuscating
the sense of the word.  We can just as easily conclude that entitlement
makes choices possible, expands limits, and enhances accountability.  
What matters are the context, the program, and the outcome.
        Samuelson's book is well documented.  Yet there are flaws in the
empirical argument, because some of the data Samuelson refers to is
suspect.
        In a paragraph on the homeless, he suggests, "Even the poor
generally live better than they once did." Noting the  
"deinstitutionalization" of mental patients that put people on the 
street, he suggests, "It is arguable whether they are better or worse 
off today." It seems he would argue that being homeless and on the street 
might be better than being housed in an underfunded institution. I admit 
he might have an agrument here.
        But how many homeless are we talking about?  He settles on 
one conservative 1994 estimate that "the number of homeless probably 
increased from about 100,000 to 300,000 or 400,000" in the 1980s.
        A 1994 HUD study estimated that between four and nine million
people were homeless at one time or another in the late 1980's.  One 
1989 study suggested that between 500,000 and 600,000 were homeless 
during one point in time in 1988.  In short, when it suits his argument, 
Samuelson selects the data to fit his theory with little critical 
analysis.
        Samuelson denies political bias. "The ideas I am describing here
don't belong exclusively to the liberal or conservative camp," he 
writes. But the bottom line is that "The Good Life and Its Discontents" 
is an apology for the self-proclaimed Republican Revolution.
        Samuelson defends supply-side economics; he accepts six percent
unemployment as full employment and calls for a balanced budget; he
disparages affirmative action; suggests ending federal funding for the
arts, public broadcasting, and federal job training.  He also wants 
Social Security and Medicare cut and, of course, calls for "individual
responsibility," the clarion call of the Contract With America.
        The ultimate contradiction occurs in his penultimate chapter.
Parroting Newt Gingrich, he writes, "What comes after entitlement is, or
ought to be, responsibility. It ought to be the animating ideal of 
public conduct and private behavior."  Replacing entitlement with 
"individual responsibility" certainly seems to be a policy objective of 
conservative Republicans today.
        But Samuelson never defines responsibility.  Instead he 
concludes "Responsibility is a worthy ideal, but it is not a panacea."  
Why? Because "some people can't or won't be more responsible; some 
economic, social, or personal conditions defeat the greatest individual 
exertions." This is one of the assumptions of post-Keynesian liberalism: 
systems are more powerful than individuals in a mass market economy.
        So, Mr. Samuelson, what should we do to improve our society? 
Judging from the contents of his book, you would think Mr. Samuelson wants 
us all to suck up to the Republican Congress, on the assumption they'll 
win in 1996.
        Any way you look at it--logically, linguistically, empirically,
or politically--there is very little saving intellectual value in this
book.  After all the initial hype, this pseudo-analytical tome will 
probably end up gathering dust on a library shelf, far away from the 
Social Science section. 

                               -30-








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