G'day Rod, I don't often disagree with your fine contributions, but I think I must here. Marx's materialism is not that of Feuerbach, and I think we'd benefit from exploring the gap Marx sought to open between the two. Marx thought Feuerbach's notion of human 'essence' (the springboard category for both his and F's notions of 'materialism') was of the type deployed by biologists - as 'genus', or 'an internal dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals' (thesis VI). This he opposed to his own notion of essence as 'the ensemble of the social relations'. When Marx comes to discuss Feuerbach's notion of 'religious sentiment' (for which I think we may, in the context of this thread, substitute 'racism'), he argues that Feuerbach's rather blunt physicalism (an insistence on limiting the 'material' to the realm of 'matter' does not allow the necessary anchoring of such in social relations (thesis VII). The price for Feuerbach's failure so to do is to take history (eg. the practical role played by religion or racism in organising and enabling a particular way of social being at a particular time in a particular place) out of the picture (thesis VI again). What I reckon Marx means by 'the material' in his 'materialist conseption of history' is the analytic foundation from which history is to be analysed, and which is conceived of as an integration of two dynamics: the way a society reproduces its physical existence and the relations that constitute that society. Matter alone is not a tenable basis - it is always in dialectical play with the social (we act within and upon it according to our perceptions within and of it - within our actions within and upon it). On this reading (and I might be talking crap, of course), racism is a function of certain social relations - to be seen as a particular *relation* momentarily conducive to the universal set of relations pertaining at that time (though, as Raymond Williams stresses, the particular complex of relations that spawned it need no longer pertain - there are ever residual and emergent cultural components complicating the fit between social relations and the apparent ideal practical optimum of the day) and a contributing factor to social change henceforth. So, racism can be a necessity or a convenience for a particular moment (say, the early days of capitalist imperialism), but it can retain an agentic role in societies well past that stage (like religion). It becomes a relation capable of fettering rather than enhancing the forces of production (rather like slavery or the lord/serf relation). In these cases, these anachronistic relations die out as a consequence of this misfit (they set a limit on the potential for accumulation). Sometimes they create a stress fracture that compromises the integrity of the new society (and I reckon racism might be becoming one of these - the benefits it offers [eg. splitting workers and validating imperialism] becoming outweighed by its costs to the system [internal and international belligerence, uneven development, untapped potentials, uniting potential antagonists abroad etc]). So I reckon: - that racism is a particular relation (of many potential forms); - that relations are an inextricable part of the material; - that these relations do not come and go in exact sympathy with transformations in how societies physically reproduce themselves (hence Engels's letter to Bloch about how the apparently superstructural can be seen as agentic at times - and hence much of Williams's writing); - and that the fact that the bourgeoisie seem no more or less consciously racist than workers these days indicates that capitalism does not particularly require that construct any more (which is not to say its unconscious manifestations won't have a strong hand in writing bits of the future yet). Waddyareckon? Cheers, Rob. ---------- > From: "Rod Hay" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: [PEN-L:12555] Re: Wilson > Date: Mon, 11 Oct 1999 17:40:51 PDT > >I think this confuses things. An idea is not matter. It seems as if someone >has made an ideological committment to "materialism" and then decides that >racism exists and is important therefore it must be matter. Racism is an >ideology (i.e., a system of ideas). Electricity is a material force. Human >labour is a material force. It is important to keep the two concepts >separate. I think Jim D. was trying to show that ideas and material forces >exist in a dialectical relation. I wouldn't argue with that. But an idea is >not matter!!!!! >Raymond Williams had many intelligent things to say but he got this one >wrong. > > >----Original Message Follows---- >From: "Mathew Forstater" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > >I (among others) have argued in the past on this list that racism is a >material force. I meant this in the same sense that all ideas (and >ideologies) are material. I have also pointed out that Oliver Cox made the >distinction between *racism* and *race antagonism*, and that I think this >distinction is useful, even if one views racism as material (which Cox >didn't). Rigby also makes the point that racism is *praxis*, which Jim D. >is also getting at. Raymond Williams (_Marxism and Literature_) is >excellent on the view that ideas and ideologies are material. They have >material sources and material implications (as Rod points out), but this >does go further in that ideas and ideologies are material. mf > > > > > >Rod Hay >[EMAIL PROTECTED] >The History of Economic Thought Archives >http://socserv2.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/index.html >Batoche Books >http://members.tripod.com/rodhay/batochebooks.html >http://www.abebooks.com/home/BATOCHEBOOKS/ > > > > >______________________________________________________ >Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com >
