Date sent: Mon, 08 Feb 1999 11:37:26 -0800 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: Jim Devine <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: [PEN-L:3035] Re: Re: Re: Ernest Mandel on long waves Send reply to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Jim and Sam, I think there is some confusion and misunderstanding about long wave/swing theory. The term wave or swing was substituted for cycle precisely because of the debate over whether the process was sinusoidal (cyclical) or sigmoidal (series of upswings followed by stagnations with different and non-endogeous causes). As I understand Mandel, the upswing was induced by exogenous causes (technological change or more usually, war) while the stagnation phase was endogenous caused by the falling rate of profit a la Marx. For the Schumpeterians, the upswing was caused by major innovations -- technological or market (e.g. imperialism/ change in labour process, etc.) Others saw in it batches of invention accumulating until a critical mass was achieved at which the innovation of one brought a flood of new products/processes/technology unto the market promoting bursts of investment etc. (The principle is that of the septic tank.) Others (Forrester I think) approach it more, as I understand it, from the Sante Fe approach based on swings in capital formation, if I remember correctly, tied to long term infrastructure investment. (a kind of long term accelerator.) Many of these are laid out in several issues of FUTURES Journal some years ago and collected in a book edited, if my memory serves me correctly, by Williamson. However, I think the most useful variant of long swing theory is that developed by the French regulation school and the American Social Structures of Accumulation school, both of which have strong marxist underpinnings. For statistical evidence see Gordon, Edwards and Reich, Segmented Work, Divided Workers or the Van Dijn volume, The Long Wave. For a succinct statement of the SSA/ Marxian theory of "stages of accumulation", see David Gordon, "Stages of Accumulation and Long Economic Cycles" in T. Hopkins and I Wallerstein, eds, PROCESSES OF THE WORLD- SYSTEM, Sage 1980. Louis wonders why we spend our time and effort investigating such things. Well, capitalism is a relationship that is in constant flux and unless we understand how and why it is changing, we will not be very effective in opposing it or countering its effects on people. After all, isn't that why Marx developed his whole theoretical analysis of the origin and the laws of motion of capitalism? Paul Paul Phillips, Economics, University of Manitoba > At 10:07 AM 2/8/99 -0800, Sam P. wrote: > >I don't know much about long wave theory, but from the summary accounts > >I've read there is some empirical evidence for it. But, what exactly > >hinges on the existence of long waves? Just the ability to explain and > >predict economic growth? > > As a non-believer in long waves, I guess I shouldn't answer this. But I > will anyway. The usual long-wave argument is that we're starting a > long-wave upturn because of one of the periodic technological revolutions > is taking hold. This means that we'll enjoy more supply-side growth > (increases in labor productivity) than in recent decades, even if we go > into a demand-side depression in the near future (with the US joining most > of the rest of the world in stagnation) and/or global warming destroys > civilization. The supply side should be booming even though people's lives > are being disrupted and AIDS is killing large numbers in Thailand, India, > and Africa. > > But while one could argue that there's empirical evidence for _past_ waves > (mostly concerning price changes) that doesn't mean that the waves will > continue in the future. Just because a clock is ticking now doesn't mean > that it will tick forever; it could wind down or the batteries could die. > And given the complexity of the economy and incomplete information about > it, it's really unclear whether it's "ticking" or not. It's a little like > those gestalt pictures: is it a picture of two people facing each other -- > or is it a goblet? But it's worse: we're seeing the gestalt picture through > a dense fog. The picture might be a third thing, or nothing at all. Until > we get a good theory for what's behind the perceived long waves, a good > understanding of what's behind them, I think that long-wave thinking is > deceptive, a snare and a delusion. > > It's true that there are forces like technology that develop out of human > control, but once we understand them better, we might use that > understanding (if we had the power) to end the wave-like effects that some > see as resulting from perceived waves of technological change. Similarly, > technology doesn't simply drop from the sky; it's not exogenous. It's a > societal product and is thus affected by class relations and the like. (As > Braverman argued, because we live in a capitalist society, there's a > technological bias towards increasing management control over labor via > deskilling.) A changed society would change the process that generates the > waves (presuming that such a process actually exists, which I doubt). > > In any event, I think it's much better to try to figure out if > technological change is accelerating (returning to its rate of the "good" > old days of the 1950s & 1960s), based on evidence about what's happening > now and logical analysis concerning the generation and effects of > technology. The fact that there were technology waves in the past isn't > evidence about anything happening in the future. History doesn't repeat > itself, even as a farce. > > In studying the past, I think it's useful to talk about long _periods_ of > time as sharing certain characteristics. In the 19th century (or roughly > 1815-1914), the UK was the world capitalist hegemon. In the 1920s and > 1930s, there was an interregnum. From 1945 until 1989, the US had hegemony > within capitalism but was involved in Cold War competition with the USSR. > Now there's only one superpower. It's hard to see these phases as part of a > wave. It's more like a process of concentration and centralization of > political capital. > > Following the lead of Maurice Dobb, I posit that different periods of US > history enjoy what I term "labor scarcity" and "labor abundance" (where > this "scarcity" refers not just to supply and demand issues but the extent > and form of labor's organization). In the 1960s, labor was relatively > scarce, so that capital accumulation pulled up wages and the majority of > the US workers were able to share in prosperity. But in the 1920s and > 1980s-90s, labor was relatively abundant, so that capital accumulation did > not pull up real wages except for short cyclical blips (like 1998). Is this > a wave? I don't think so. One problem is that the labor abundance in the > 1920s was different from that of the 1990s. Nowadays, the international > mobility of productive fixed capital is important, whereas it was > unimportant in the 1920s. In general, it's progressively getting harder to > treat the US as separate from the rest of the world. > > In the pen-l debate, someone referred to a class struggle theory of long > waves. This seems to assume that class struggle has a rhythm that is > totally independent of our wills. But Marxism is supposed to tell us how to > get the class struggle to beat according to our wishes (the working class' > wishes) rather than simply following some natural or pseudo-natural cycle > (like the tides). > > I guess the big problem with long-wave thinking is its naturalism. It > assumes that people don't make history, so that history makes us with no > causation running the opposite way. But causation goes both ways. > > For fans of my long article on the 1930s Depression, I've added all sorts > of comments to update it. (It was orginally written in about 1992.) Related > to the issue of "cycles" or "stages" of world hegemony referred to above, > I've changed my mind a bit. As I wrote: > > As seen sporadically above, one key issue came up in the process of my > writing comments on this paper in 1999. Is the problem of international > instability in the 1990s that of the hegemon being "too weak" as in the > 1920s or that of it being "too strong"? Thinking in these terms can be > misleading, since power is not a one-dimensional variable. The hegemon's > power can be measured (1) relative to that of nonhegemonic capitalist > powers or (2) relative to noncapitalist elements. > > The original paper emphasized the first, following the lead of the global > Keynesians like Kindleberger. But it is the second that is crucial to the > present question: the key difference between the hegemon's role in the > 1960s and that of the 1990s should be seen more in terms of the relative > strength of the hegemon vis-à-vis labor and other forces preventing > unfettered capitalism and pushing to share in productivity gains. In the > 1960s, unlike the 1990s, the power of the U.S., the I.M.F., and the World > Bank was moderated by competition from the U.S.S.R., the power of social > democracy in Western Europe, and the more anemic might of the U.S. labor > movement, together with "labor scarce" conditions in the core countries. In > the 1960s, these forces encouraged the general sharing of prosperity in the > core countries. But the problem of the 1990s is that the hegemon does not > face such political limits, while labor abundance prevails due to capital > mobility. In this sense, we might conclude that the key issue is that of > the relative power of labor versus capital on a world scale, with the 1990s > being an era of global labor abundance and weakness encouraging the > reassertion of underconsumption tendencies. We need to strengthen labor. > > (see http://clawww.lmu.edu/Faculty/JDevine/subpages/depr/D0.html and > http://clawww.lmu.edu/Faculty/JDevine/subpages/depr/nushortdepr.html ) > > Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & > http://clawww.lmu.edu/Faculty/JDevine/jdevine.html >
[PEN-L:3085] Re: Re: Re: Re: Ernest Mandel on long waves
ts99u-1.cc.umanitoba.ca [130.179.154.224] Tue, 9 Feb 1999 11:12:41 -0600
