I agree completely with what Jim says below. There are always some substantive constraints on the interpretation of preferences being employed, and the economist, whether neo-classical or analytically marxist, typically denies this, maintaining that they are only employing innocuous formal principles: consistency, transitivity and the independence of irrelevant alternatives. I also agree with Peter Dorman that the substantive assumptions typically, albeit unwittingly, made are adequate for understanding lots of what we do in our narrowly economic lives. But they are patently inappropriate when thinking about choice outside this realm--especially in our political lives. Recognizing what we are doing would make economic imperialism presumptively invalid. Rational choice theory is *not* the science of choice it pretends to be. On Wed, 11 Jan 1995, Jim Devine wrote: > I think that a lot of economists play a disingenuous game: > they take a non-tautological version of rationality, i.e., > one that assumes that people are atomistically individualistic > with fixed tastes -- and all sorts of convenient ideological > overtones, since this sociopathic behavior is seen as > "rational," in some sense good -- but THEN defend this > concept and its ideological content by invoking the tautological > version. > > in pen-l solidarity, > > Jim Devine > [EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ., Los Angeles, CA 90045-2699 USA > 310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950 > "Who'll stop the rain?" -- John Fogarty. >
