/* Written  7:13 AM  Jan 25, 1995 by margross in igc:econ.saps */
/* ---------- "Happy New Year, IMF & World Bank..." ---------- */
From: Ross Hammond <margross>

/* Written  6:59 PM  Jan 24, 1995 by twn in igc:twn.features */
/* ---------- "New Global Order in Crisis" ---------- */
NEW GLOBAL ORDER IN CRISIS

The  advert of the New Year was supposed to usher in  a  new 
global  economic system with the IMF/World Bank and the  WTO 
at  its  helm. But recent events, particularly  the  Mexican 
crisis,  have  shown that cracks are already  developing  in 
this  system and that the foundations of this  global  order 
are  far from secure. The recent crisis in Mexico  has  also 
called  into question the development model held out by  the 
North as a panacea for the South's economic woes.

By Chakravarthi Raghavan
Third World Network Features

Geneva:  It was to have been the start of a new era  in  the 
Global Economic System, with the new `powerful',  rule-based 
World  Trade Organisation (WTO) in Geneva acting  in  tandem 
with   the  Washington-based  International  Monetary   Fund 
(IMF)and the World Bank, as its high priests.

By  the reckoning of some Biblical scholars, the New  Year's 
day of 1995 which ushered in the WTO (without any New Year's 
eve  party  or  New Year concert ala  Vienna)  is  also  the 
beginning of the third millennium Anno Domini -- despite the 
Papal  sanction  for the Gregorian  calendar,  according  to 
which the new millennium is six years away.

For  the prophets (and advocates) of Alliance Capitalism  in 
the  North -- for the South it increasingly looks more  like 
the  old  colonial-style capitalism -- in a  global  economy 
being fast knit together by the transnational Market System, 
it  would  have been both a throwback to the  laissez  faire 
order of the 18th and 19th centuries and a new assurance  of 
perpetual prosperity.

But,  instead of the usual cheer, bon homie and goodwill  to 
all  of  the holiday season, there were bad  news  and  rude 
shocks.

The  political system whose stability is vital  to  underpin 
any  economic and social order felt new tremors  across  the 
globe.  Neither Washington's sole-Superpowerdom nor  Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali's  valiant efforts at a New Agenda  for  Peace 
seemed to be of avail.

On the economic/trade front, it was business as before  with 
the United States already threatening new unilateral actions 
over the European Union's banana regime -- without even  the 
slightest attempt to go through the motions of invoking  the 
WTO  rules and dispute settlement. This further  dented  the 
credibility of the rule-based world trade system.

Cracks developed and deepened as well in some of the  basics 
of the economic philosophies and theories of the new system.


If the "investments" in financial derivatives by the little-
known   (outside  of  the  United  States)   Orange   county 
administration  that  went awry and made  that  county  seek 
protection  under the US bankruptcy laws, had  their  ripple 
effects  in  financial and bond markets  across  the  globe, 
Mexico  in  Latin  America (as in 1982)  set  off  a  global 
"financial earthquake".

There  had been enough warnings, but not the  identification 
of any epicentre, for quite a while.

As early as 1991, while the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) 
and   the  `mainstream'  economists  were  encouraging   and 
praising the new liberalisation policies in Mexico and Latin 
America  (and now China and India) pointing to  the  Mexican 
miracle,  others were raising cautionary warnings.  But  the 
BWIs ignored and ridiculed these warnings, and continued  to 
propagate  financial market liberalisation in the  South  as 
the new panacea.

But  other economists -- in the UN Conference on  Trade  and 
Development   (UNCTAD)  in  Geneva,   CEPAL   (ECLA-Economic 
Commission for Latin America) in Santiago, Chile and a  host 
of Latin American and other think tanks and academia -- were 
warning of the inevitable slowing down of short-term capital 
flows  to  Mexico and other Latin American centres  and  the 
other `emerging markets'. They predicted the likely  outflow 
from  the  new massive inflows (from pension  funds,  market 
players  chasing  arbitrages  across  countries,  and  other 
fickle  investors  of  the last few years)  as  the  US  and 
European short-term interest rates tightened and edged up.

These   warnings  of  the  unsustainability  of  the   Latin 
American/Mexican   model   of  capital   inflows   financing 
consumption rather than productive investments, had  largely 
been ignored by decision-makers in these capitals.

There is a strong deja vu flavour, reminiscent of the 1980s, 
about  the  reassuring  statements now  spewing  forth  from 
leading   financial  and  economic  journals,  and   leading 
officials  in  the  IMF,  World Bank  and  US  Treasury  and 
elsewhere  about  the temporary nature of the  Mexican  peso 
problem  (triggered by the failure of the  previous  Mexican 
administration  to  take  hard decisions in  time)  and  the 
governments  having to persevere in further  adjustments  to 
attract and retain foreign funds.

In  1982 too, the debt crisis was first described as a  cash 
flow and liquidity problem, and then a case of mismanagement 
of   the   economy  by  governments  and   only   ultimately 
acknowledged  as  a "bankruptcy" problem caused  largely  by 
external factors and needing debt write-off.

That Mexican debt crisis (itself triggered by the US Federal 
Reserve's high interest rate policy a year or more  earlier) 

in  1982  had set off a chain of events rolling  across  the 
developing   world:   the  saga  of  Structural   Adjustment 
Programmes  tutored and monitored by the Fund and the  Bank, 
with government after government in the South embracing  and 
ardently preaching the virtues of liberalism and the market.

The  belt-tightening of that era for the common  man  (still 
continuing  without  respite)  and  affluence  for  a  small 
percentage  of the upper middle class in the South  pursuing 
Northern  lifestyles,  the  liberalisation  of  markets  and 
increased    profitability   for   finance   capital,    the 
"disciplining"  of  the workers and the  unions  ---     all 
supposedly  set  Mexico off on a high upward  trajectory  of 
which  the outward symbols were its becoming a part  of  the 
North  American  Free  Trade  Area  and  a  member  of   the 
Organisation  for Economic Cooperation and Development  (and 
withdrawal from the Group of 77).

The  Mexican success story was being held out as an  example 
of  the path for others to follow -- and many of  the  Latin 
American countries to its South did.

There were some uneasy "facts" in the global economic  scene 
that  contradicted this rosy scenario -- not the  least  the 
rising  and  stubborn  figures  of  unemployment,  and   the 
decreasing  share of the benefits (and  increasing  poverty, 
and  even  hunger)  at  the  growing  bottom  and  the  high 
prosperity for the few at the top.

But  the  solution, according to the theoreticians  of  this 
neo-liberal economics -- securely ensconced in international 
secretariats  in  Paris, Washington and Geneva  --  was  the 
same:  "adjustment" and "more adjustment" and liberalisation 
of  labour  markets and reduction (if  not  elimination)  of 
labour-market  rigidities and freeing employers from  social 
security burdens.

It was in line with the so-called `medium-term strategy'  of 
bringing   down  inflation  (purportedly  caused  by   wage-
inflation  and  union-driven labour market  rigidities)  and 
restoring private sector profitability to encourage  private 
investments  and  private initiative  for  a  private-sector 
investment-led non-inflationary growth.

This same theme was most recently repeated in the 1994 year-
end  Economic Outlook of the Paris-based  OECD  secretariat, 
though  some  of its annexed tables seem to  bear  out  what 
economists   elsewhere  have  been  arguing,  namely,   that 
inflation is now profit-driven and not wage-driven.

The  OECD  data  show that, except  in  Japan,  real  public 
consumption expenditure in the G-7 countries has been coming 
down  from  the averages of the 1970s and the highs  of  the 
mid-80s.


Inflation  has come down very much from the high  levels  of 
the 1970s and 1980s, with the OECD average expected to  come 
down from the 4.1% in 1994 to about 3% in 1996.

Unit  labour  costs  in  manufacturing  industry  have  been 
dropping  fast, with the drops in the US being high, and  so 
has  been  the  compensation per employee  in  the  business 
sector.

The rates of return on capital have been going up with a G-7 
average  of 15.7% in 1993 and projected to rise to 18.1%  in 
1996.

In 1994, it is estimated at 18.4% in the US, 13.4% in Japan, 
13.8% in Germany, 14.7% in France, 15.2% in Italy, 11.5%  in 
the UK and 17.1% in Canada.

Three  elements  constituting the price  are  labour  costs, 
material costs and the profit margin.

But with unit labour costs going down, material costs rising 
a  bit but non-oil commodities in real terms accounting  for 
only  0.6%  of  the gross domestic  product  (GDP)  in  OECD 
countries,  the  inflationary  pressures  are  thus  clearly 
coming out of or are driven by higher profit margins.

Yet,  in a knee-jerk fashion, the economic apostles  of  the 
new order continue to call for further attacks on labour, to 
reduce   `labour-  market  rigidities'  and   reducing   the 
pressures on wages.

The post-war prosperity, the so-called golden age over which 
the  General  Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)  -  IMF-
World  Bank  presided, was postulated on not  only  economic 
elements, but a social and political order, with a  built-in 
distribution  system, for a fairer share of the benefits  of 
the system.

Unlike in Adam Smith-Ricardo capitalism theories, this post-
war order was postulated on capital accumulation, not by the 
private individuals, but by corporations.

The  full  employment  and  social  security  systems  freed 
individual  wage-earners and salary-earners from worries  of 
the future -- for themselves and their families -- and  they 
engaged  in a binge (aided by various credit mechanisms)  to 
pursue consumer-spending.

The corporations used the profits to further capitalise  and 
invest and produce more, to promote more consumerism and  so 
on and so on.

Whether or not the new awareness of ecology calls for a halt 
to  this,  the rising unemployment, and the  theory  of  the 
upwardly moving NAWRU (non-accelerating wage inflation  rate 

of unemployment) to ensure low-inflation, the whole  concept 
of reducing state provided social security and telling wage-
earners  and salary-earners to look also for private  social 
security is bound inevitably to put a spoke in the wheels of 
the earlier consumerist capital accumulation process.

Yet, the drive is all for cutting wages and staff costs, and 
thus  the  disposal  incomes  of  these  people,  and  still 
expecting  them  to fuel a consumerist economy in  a  deeply 
divided society -- with an increasingly marginalised growing 
poor and a very affluent upper-middle-class at the top.

And  with  the  new  ethos  putting  a  higher  premium   on 
speculative activities (of finance capital) over  industrial 
and  production activities, sanctioned and being pushed  now 
under  the  aegis of the WTO, the underpinnings of  the  new 
system based on the old are giving way.

And  there is nothing in the horizon to take its  place.  -- 
Third World Network Features


                            - ends -


About  the writer: Chakravarthi Raghavan is Chief Editor  of 
SUNS  (South-North Development Monitor), a  daily  bulletin, 
and the Geneva representative of the Third World network.



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