Awhile back on pen-l, Justin Schwartz (JS) and I (JD) had a friendly
little dialogue about G.A. Cohen's technologically-determinist (TD)
theory of historical materialism. Justin's last comment was long,
while my reply was even longer, so I've held it back from pen-l.
However, people may be interested in a short version, which follows.
I. One of the main *irrelevancies* in our discussion should be
noted: my main tack is to eschew technological determinism of any
sort, whether it is Cohen's or whoever's. (BTW, "technology" is
short-hand for the forces of production.) On the other hand, Justin
seems concerned with defending Cohen's honor (or at least that of
"analytical philosophy," a topic I cannot discuss since I do not
know that school's thought well at all). He argues that Cohen's
theory has evolved, becoming _less_ deterministic.
I try to present a simple alternative theory, which of course has
its limits, being simple (see below). On the other hand, Justin
never presents his own theory over these wires. That is why I was a
bit confused, thinking that he was defending Cohen and/or a TD
theory of historical materialism.
II. Main points of agreement:
A. Neither of us is interested in reducing the materialist
conception of history (MCH) to simply quotes from Marx; after an
initial discussion, we agreed that simply going against Marx did not
prove a theory wrong. Neither of us is interested in extensive
quotation from Marx. Instead, it is the substantive theory that
counts. In the below, I left out all references to Marxology, except
on one major point. (BTW, to make one nod to marxology, Marx never
wrote about the historical materialism; the "MCH" is his phrase.)
B. further:
JS: a lot of Hegelians and Marxists tend to use "dialectics" as
an excuse for conceptual fuzziness and tolerance of outright
inconsistency. I don't think that Marx did, at least not often."
JD: agreed.
JS: It is in the imprecise, ill-defined, sloppy use of wooly
concepts, inexplicit enthemymic ((not in my dictionary!)) arguments
which conceal ad hockery that can be used to make a theory
unfalsifiable, and other carelessness and intellectual
disreputability which has characterized too much Marxist theorizing.
JD: I share these goals. But as Lakatos points out, most or all
theoretical programs involve unfalsifiable aspects. Cohen's theory
of the transhistorical goal of minimizing labor time seems
unfalsifiable.
C. Cohen's theory has major flaws.
1. JS: he has a non-technological account of the fettering relation
that is supposed to bring about the transition to socialism. (I
think this is a weakness in his theory, on its own terms.)
2. the inadequacy of Cohen's "functional explanation":
JD: for each of Cohen's functional mechanisms that push societies to
develop technology, one can find a reasonable dysfunctional
mechanism. ...
JS: We agree then--in _my_ paper on Cohen and Elster, "Functional
Explanation and Metaphysical Individualism," Philosophy of Science,
June 1993, I make the same point about dysfunctionality by way of
arguing against the adequacy of Cohen's account of functional
explanation....
JD: if you accept the notion of dysfunctionality, then Cohen's
theory falls apart.
3. >JD: As I said before, the point is to find those
>aspects of the historical process that are "law like" in their
>dynamics (e.g., certain aspects of crisis theory such as the
>tendency toward over-accumulation) and those which are not rather
>than trying to reduce everything to the former.
JS: I agree. I think that a lot of sociological explanation is not
law-like and does not invoke laws. That's a point of disagreement I
have with Cohen. See my paper again: evolutionary explanations are
often non-lawlike and a lot of sociological explanation is of that
pattern.
JD: I don't understand this and I look forward to reading your
paper.
4. JS: Sure. I'm no defender of Cohen's theory.
JD: you fooled me!
III. I view a "theory of history" as being more a set of questions
that guides one in the examination of empirical history (i.e., a
heuristic), while Justin seems to view a "theory of history" as a
set of substantive answers. But I don't know what his answers are.
One way of saying this is that a "clear and logical theory of
history" can never be enough.
JD: ... it's the internal nature of a theory as clear and logical
can only be _part_ of an argument for its validity. "Clearness and
logic argument" may be necessary, but they're not _sufficient_. We
must also ask about the validity of its assumptions and how well it
compares to other theories in terms of empirical relevence. I would
also add the issue of whether the theory goes beyond superficial
appearances to give us an understanding of what's going on.
Further, I think that there is an important role for heuristics,
pre-analytic insights, and illuminative metaphors, which need not be
totally clear and logical as long as they provoke thought and
insight. (Of course, these must be recognized as such.)
This gets us into:
IV. Justin and I disagreed on the issue of whether Marx a
completely different methodology from modern social science. What he
see's as Marx's alleged "inconsistency," I see as a symptom of
Marx's use of dialetical heuristics.
In line with the so-called "analytical Marxist" view, Justin thinks
that Marx's Hegelian-dialectical language is superficial and
inessential to Marx's argument and conclusions. I disagree, favoring
books such as Derek Sayer's THE VIOLENCE OF ABSTRACTION. I think
that one cannot really understand Marx's work without understanding
his method (so I favor Sayer's marxology over Cohen's). However,
since I don't want to get into marxology (that not being my cup of
tea) and since I believe that Marx's theory _can be_ restated in
other terms, this is not a big substantive issue.
V.A. JD's alternative ("dialectical") vision of the MCH.
(btw, I have an unpublished ms. on this if anyone wants it.)
JD: I would say that the "primary" aspect is Marx's vision of
capitalism as a contradictory system (a mode of exploitation) that
generates technological change (amongst other things) that conflicts
with its own structure. It's the "structure" of the relationship
between forces and relations of production that's "primary" rather
than either of the two elements.
>JD: The fact is ... causation goes _both ways_. (from technology to
social form and from social form to technology.)
JS: Cohen _INSISTS_ on this point ... For Cohen, the productive
forces, or their development, create productive relations which are
in turn functional for them, i.e. causally affect them.
JD: this is simply saying that technology _basically_ causes social
institutions even if there's some minor feedback, an epiphenomenon.
Since I reject functionalism, I can't accept this "basic" causation
and so the feed-back becomes a major phenomenon. Since you reject
functional explanation as the sole way in which the world works,
since dysfunctional mechanisms play a role (see above), then you
have to agree.
JS: In general, the way I understand dialectic, a d-contradiction
occurs where a system (...mode of production for Marx) reaches a
point where, due to internally generated forces, it cannot solve the
problems it generates in its own operation. Obviously this will not
help Marx reconcile TD and SD.
JD: nothing is obvious. I don't see why Marx can't start with
social determination (society --> tech) and see a system as
developing a technology that goes against its own grain. There's a
difference, for example, between what's good for individual
capitalists (who develop technology) and what's good for the system
as a whole (and for the class of capitalists).
>JD: My "in a nutshell" understanding of Marx's ... theory of
>history is as follows (dealing only with modes of production here):
>a societal mode of production (mode of exploitation) generates
>certain types of development of the forces of production
>(technology, etc.) which then come into conflict with the social
>structure that generated them. This in turn leads to qualitative and
>quantitative change, the nature of which depends on class and other
>struggles. In short, the operations of a mode of exploitation fouls
>its own nest (eventually).
JS: OK, but this is just to throw out the TD claim that the forces
determine the relations of production.
JD: It throws out technological determinISM (and justly so), but not
technological determinATION (the real relevance of technology).
Technological change (resulting from the nature of the mode of
exploitation) leads to all sorts of societal changes and might
_contribute_ to (but can't be the sole cause of) the end of
capitalism as a mode of production.
>JD: The capitalist mode ... generates over-accumulation
>tendencies, which leads to crises which intensify the possibility of
>social change. The feudal mode of exploitation tends to generate too
>little technical change to feed the people, leading to starvation
>crises and the possibility of change.
On the latter, JS writes: This can't be historically right:
capitalism didn't arise out of famines in England, and anyway, the
feudal mode of exploitation (serfdom) had been long gone in England
before the rise of capitalism.
JD: how _could_ a short sketch like that be correct? Serfdom was
indeed long gone when capitalism arose in England. But the
"demographic" crisis of circa 1350 destabilized the old order and
provided a fertile field for the later development of capitalism, at
least in England. In France, where the peasants got a better deal
out of the class conflicts after the crisis, small-farmer production
dominated and formed a barrier to capitalist development. I'll let
Brenner do further argument.
>JD: BTW, this theory of feudalism is based on that of Robert
Brenner ... who developed a very anti-t-d theory, which seems as
logically rigorous as anything Cohen has spawned.
JS: Bob's a friend and comrade and I like his work--I've used it
against Cohen. I am certain that you have mischaracterized his
theory, where starvation due to lack of technological
progressiveness has no role and the structure of land ownership a
very strong one.
JD: Brenner's argument is very clear: the nature of land ownership
gave lords the incentive to squeeze the farm-workers rather than to
be technologically progressive. The two are clearly linked, with
social relations being dominant.
B. a subpoint arises:
JS; However, unhappily for those of us who are skeptics about
transhistorical individual rationality ... Brenner's account depends
on assuming just such IR existing before the rise of capitalism (at
least). So while we can use his theory as an ad hominem critique of
Cohen on the rise of capitalism, we cannot endorse it without
qualification until we get an account of the origin of this IR.
JD: In no way was I using Brenner as an ad hominem critique of Cohen
or technological determinism. And I never rejected IR _per se_.
It's a basically tautological (though usually value- and
ideology-laden) perspective which sometimes poses some useful
questions. Anyway, one might see the lords as being pushed into
their version of IR by the competition among lords.
VI. We disagreed on the nature of Marx's "economic determinism"
which refers not to the determination of the "economic base" by
technology (Cohen's TD theory) but to the determination of the
"superstructure" by the "economic base."
To me, the so-called "base" includes the technology (in a
dialectical relationship with the relations of production, see
above). Getting beyond the abstraction that society is nothing but
capitalism, I include patriarchy and relations of racial supremacy
as parts of the "base."
I also argued that the whole/base superstructure distinction is
historically specific to capitalism, especially 19th century liberal
capitalism (to which we seem to be returning if we're not already
there).
>JD: First, we should remember that the base/superstructure
>distinction is specific to capitalism (though I can imagine some
>other system might have that distinction). Under feudalism, for
>example, the lord was both the economic boss and the political and
>legal boss.
JS: The identity of the individuals who occupy different social
roles doesn't mean the identity of the roles. Marxs says, and he's
right, that what explains why lords occupy the political and legal
boss roles is the fact that they occupy the economic boss roles...
JD: He also saw so-called "extra-economic" violence (which many see
as "political") as central to feudal "economics." My reference to
the roles of individuals is only one way of stating that. I was not
talking about the actual people, but about their roles.
Beyond that, I don't want to bore people. This is already too long.
in pen-l solidarity,
Jim Devine
[EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ., Los Angeles, CA 90045-2699 USA
310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950
"Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti."
(Go your own way and let people talk.) -- K. Marx, paraphrasing
Dante.
