On the story stuff: at the risk of sounding like an idealist from hell--and respectfully, Jim--I think the great merit of the story formulation is in its suggesting a parallel between social "science" and the story we tell of our lives. This last is a funny thing: part creation, part discovery. There's something out there to be true to--we can get it wrong, the notion of correctness has a place here--while at the same time our narrative articulation of who we are partially shapes (is partly "constitutive" of, to use the jargon) what it is "about"--see Taylor and Sandel on "self-understanding". What about economics conceived along these lines? We try to articulate our practices, in the same, part shaping, part discovering, way we seek self-understanding. Who can doubt the constitutive role that the NC picture of maximizing instrumentally-rational atoms and the story of linear progress has had on the practices of the modern agent, however innocent of NC economics. Alternative pictures claim that this story distorts our practices and hinders us--that our practices (think of politics, especially) would "go better" (this is Taylor's phrase--see "Social science as practice") if they were articulated differently. Conceived as attempts at self-understanding, social-scientific "theory" *does* shape the "facts" it is about--without creating them, though. Well: that's my story and I'm stickin' to it-- Kevin Quinn [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Wed, 15 Feb 1995, Jim Devine wrote: > With a realist epistemology, on the other hand, we are > trying to tell the best stories (or make the best similes > about) the dimly-perceived empirical reality (the shadows > on the wall of the cave). In addition to elegance and > logical coherence, we have to care about the correspondence > between the model or theories and the empirical world. > We also have to find the model or theories that help us > understand what's going on the best, in order to help us > attain our goals. A good theory can be tested in practice. > > BTW, unlike Plato (with the shadows on the cave-wall metaphor) > I am a materialist: the elements of the dimly received reality > are not dim reflections of some ideal forms, but are instead > real objects that may vary tremendously. (the "typical" > object is an average of a variety havving some shared > characteristics rather than being a reflection of some hidden > ideal.) >
