I want to add to the growing and interesting discussion of East Asian development, in particular the recent posting by Mark Selden. Explanations for the growth and industrialization of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan usually focus on a number of key factors: the existence of strong states (relative to private capital), state direction of national economic activity (largely through state regulated or owned banking systems), state regulation of international trade, restrictions on foreign direct investment, etc. South Korea and Taiwan are considered to be late industrializers who have followed, in general terms, the Japanese model. Obviously somewhat unique historical conditions stand behind many of these factors. There are those who now argue that Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia are following in the footsteps of South Korea and Taiwan in terms of their rapid export led growth. It seems to me however that there is a different process driving their industrialization. At the risk of oversymplifying, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malyasia are experiencing rapid industrial growth largely because of the regionalization of Japanese production. While South Korea and Taiwan also benefited from US and Japanese policies, growth in those countries was far more nationally centered and directed. Chinese growth is, in a sense, the result of both experiences. On the one hand it seems to be following a South Korean development model, on the other hand, a lot of its growth is the result of greater chinese regional investment activities. Now regionalization, which is driving southeast Asian and to a lesser but still significant extent Chinese growth is also impacting South Korea and Taiwan. The growing pressures of regionalization [advanced Japanese capital and cheap southeast aisan labor] are forcing companies in South Korea and Taiwan to regionalize their own activities. What is the significance of all of this: First, does the current phase of regionalization mean the end of national development strategies? Japanese capital and now South Korea and Taiwanese capital are regionalizing to stay competitive. The result is that nation states no longer appear able to direct corporate activities within a national framework. Has the Asian development model exhausted its potential? Second, does the current phase of regionalism signify the eventual creation of new forms of regional economic regulation? If regionalization is weakening state control will regulation be provided by new geographically centered entities or will the result be regional economic instability and crisis. In other words are there contradictions inherent in the process? Third, to what extent is regionalization in Asia cause and effect of regionalization in Europe and North America? Can we understand Asian regionalization in isolation of the logic of global capitalism? Fourth, to the extent that regionalization is now shaping economic activity, what are the implications for popular movements? Can an alliance of nationally based popular movements resist or reverse regionalization and should they or should they build new political movements that seek political transformation on a regional basis? Looking forward to PEN comments. Marty Hart-Landsberg
