I saw Steve Cullenberg's posting on overdetermination and see that he is now a subsciber to pen-l. So: Steve Cullenberg writes, > Overdetermination . . . is a theory of existence which states that > nothing exists in and of itself, prior to and independent from > everything else. . . I understand (and 75% accept) the post-modernist claim that there is no "reality" out there. All we have are different knowledges of what we call "reality." (Skipping lots of steps), this then implies a two-way relationship between our knowledge of reality and what's out there: K and R are mutually constituting. Yet, I've always wondered where the notion of overdetermination comes from. This notion posits not only a two-way relationship between K and R but also many-fold relationships between ALL aspects of SOCIETY: all aspects of society mutually constitute all other aspects of society. This is a step that is not implied by post-modernist thinking (as far as my imperfect knowledge of it goes) , but takes the metaphor of the K-R mutual relationship and applies it to all aspects of reality/society without clear rationale. Further, the notion of overdetermination has a second side: it posits that all aspects of society have "equal" weight in that all processes play a part in constituting all other processes. This claim of "equal weight" also has no clear justification. We certainly could have an essentialist version of overdetermination in which all things affect everything else, but some things are "more important." That is, while the Amherst School notion of overdetermination certainly can be placed within the post-modernist framework, it is merely one type of post-modernist theory. In particular, accepting the pomo notion of there being "no reality out there independent of our knowledge of it" in NO WAY implies we should accept the AS notion of overdetermination. I've posted messages about the material below but but it has been deemed to be "low level thinking" so perhaps those who are more erudite than me should stop reading at this point). How does one, in the AS approach, actually go about generating a narrative about one "concrete reality." Steve writes, > It does imply, I think, an attention to case study and the specificity of > each analysis What tools does one use to generate "case studies"? And, why would a case study of a particular capitalism in 1890 differ from a case study of a particular capitalism in 1996? What has changed over this 106 year period? Certainly one cannot within this framework invoke a change in reality. That is, what exactly is the difference between a case study and the general theory of OD? Both are merely knowledges "about reality" yet neither can be said to be "better" or "more true". If this is the case, why produce case studies? Yet, there is the clear sense within the AS that case studies have a special status. Or, are they just a bunch of words and no better guide to social/political action than swimming? As interesting is this: > The reason we don't is not because we really know what caused > the accident (because all these factors overdetemined the accident) >but because of what think is politically feasible/desirable. How do you determine what is "political feasible"? This seems to imply something about "reality". One particular consitution of what is "politically feasible" has no special status than any other: both are merely knowledges of reality. How then reject certain strategies by invoking "political feasible" which seems to slip in claims about "reality" in the back door. If OD is no more "true" than any other knowledge of reality, why should we depend on this one theory for political guidance? Steve rejects classical statistical inference and econometric studies invoking, again, overdetermination. > Or even argue that "X" explains, say 46% percent of "Y", so > obviously there is an implicit critique here of classical statisical inference. First, according to pomo notions, one knowledge of reality is not necessarily more true than other. Saying that econometric studies would not be done within AS says nothing about whether others should do it. I suppose Steve has a theory indicating why econometric studies fail to do what they claim: capture reality. Yet, such a critique inherently implies that some knowledges are more true (there is no reality out there) than others. Such a move is not valid within pomo. In any case, econometric work has moved far beyond any simple claims that econometric results capture reality or say anything about the "real world". Oddly enough, pomo ways of thinking has started to creep into the econometric literature. Most sophisticated users (well, at least one or two) of econometrics know they are saying nothing about "reality" but are merely making rhetorical interventions into debates about "preferred" knowledges about reality. > For example, RM folks generally focus on class analysis not because it > necessarily explains or underlies other important opperessions or > indignities in society . . . but primarily because changing the class structure > is an end in itself that is desired and desirable. Ah, here we go finally. This is what I've been asking. Why is "changing the class structure . . . desired and desirable"? What impacts will such changes in class structure have? How are these changes desireable? I understand that these questions--which appear so simple to socialists outside the AS school--bring major difficulties to those within the AS school. I won't presume to know exactly the range of approaches the AS has offered to answer these questions. One thing is key: The answer to the question, why desire socialism, must refer to the social construction of the individual who participates in AS. There are no "external" justifications for desiring socialism/help the AS, merely local and personal justifications. A nearly infinite number of social processes have collectively constituted particular individuals so that these individuals participate in AS. None of these processes are "more important" than any other. As a consequence, you can't just go up to an individual within AS and ask them, "what is the ONE reason you want socialism?" as the answer requires a whole life history. The story could end there. Two downsides: this seems like a cheap way to avoid the question of why desire socialism. More important there is the danger that these individual members of AS might invoke something forbidden: humanist essences, predictions of the impact of socialism on the rest of society, etc.. Therefore, the AS school needs to some up with a justification for socialism that avoids these dangers. One (failed attempt) is this: We desire socialism because socialism is desired in and of itself. It is an aesthetic thing. The answer to the question, why desire socialism, is really no different in kind than the answer to the question, why do you like Rembrandt? This answer avoids claiming that socialism will have any necessary (or even good) impact on society. Yet, while the operation was a success, the patient died. That is, a particular socialist transformation might lead to horrible consequences for the rest of society, but according to the socialism as "beautiful" approach, so what? Obviously, no one within the AS could feel comfortable with this sort of situation. Yet, there is a simple way out. One could delve again into the local/personal justifications of those within the AS. An individual might say, one of the processes that made me into an ASer is that I have historically specific beliefs about the impact of a socialist transformation on people: a socialism transformation will have predictable impacts and these impacts will make people better off. Now, this belief is not "true" but merely the result of all the social processes that have constituted me. (But to be non-essentialist the ASer would say that humans don't have an essence that capitalism denies but I merely desire certain things for people and I think socialism will bring these things). But in any case, this belief that socialism will make people better off is one of the things (out of 1000s) that made me into an ASer. In this case, essentialism is not part of the theory, but is an aspect of the (culturally determined) motivations of individuals. Of course, this is all a bit strange: the personal motivations of the individuals seem directly to contradict the whole theory the individuals use to analyze society. While this can be defended intellectually, it does seem kind of silly. Perhaps I'm wrong on the above. If so, Steve might set me straight. Eric Eric Nilsson Department of Economics California State University San Bernardino, CA 92407 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
