IN THIS MESSAGE: Appendix B to Rambouillet Accord proposal; Kosovo's Glittering Prize Date: Tue, 4 May 1999 11:55:56 +0900 From: Hendrik Subject: [NS] Interpreting the Rambouillet Accord proposal Here are some excerpts from the Rambouillet accord proposal interspersed with some comments. (Acknowledgements to Richard Becker of the International Action Center, NY) We have heard much justification why NATO had no choice but to attack Yugoslavia because the Yugoslav government refused to negotiate over the issue of Kosovo. However, the Yugoslav government had indicated its willingness to accept the autonomy part of the Rambouillet proposal - what it rejected was the implied abdication of its national sovereignty and independence. The proposed status of autonomy for Kosovo would have meant that Kosovo would have received its own government, supreme court and security forces. The Kosovo government would have been able to negate laws passed by the federal legislature and to conduct its own foreign policy - both rights that neither the US states nor the states of Germany possess. Let us look at some excerpts of the accord proposal: Chapter 4a, Article I -- "The economy of Kosovo, shall function in accordance with free market principles." It is crystal clear whose interests are being advanced here: Kosovo has substantial mineral resources, including the richest mines for lead, molybdenum, mercury and other metals in all of Europe. Obviously one cannot leave the control over such resources to an independent Yugoslavia. Chapter 5, Article V -- "The CIM [*] shall be the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of the civilian aspects of this Agreement, and the Parties agree to abide by his determinations as binding on all Parties and persons." *Chief of the Implementation Mission Chapter 7, Article XV -- "The KFOR [NATO] commander is the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of this Chapter and his determinations are binding on all Parties and persons." In other words, two foreign commanders would have had the power to overturn elections, shut down organizations and media, and overrule any decisions made by a provincial or the federal governments regarding Kosovo. These are terms of occupation, not those of an agreement acceptable to a soveriegn state. Following is the complete text of Appendix B to the Rambouillet Accord proposal. The "meat" part begins with section 6. You may want to consider in particular the implications of sections 6a and 6b, as well as sections 7 to 11 and section 15. I am sure you will recognise that this accord proposal proves US and NATO diplomacy to be a means to conduct war, not a means to prevent war. Hendrik Appendix B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force 1. For the purposes of this Appendix, the following expressions shall have the meanings hereunder assigned to them: a. "NATO" means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), its subsidiary bodies, its military Headquarters, the NATO-led KFOR, and any elements/units forming any part of KFOR or supporting KFOR, whether or not they are from a NATO member country and whether or not they are under NATO or national command and control, when acting in furtherance of this Agreement. b. "Authorities in the FRY" means appropriate authorities, whether Federal, Republic, Kosovo or other. c. "NATO personnel" means the military, civilian, and contractor personnel assigned or attached to or employed by NATO, including the military, civilian, and contractor personnel from non-NATO states participating in the Operation, with the exception of personnel locally hired. d. "the Operation" means the support, implementation, preparation, and participation by NATO and NATO personnel in furtherance of this Chapter. e. "Military Headquarters" means any entity, whatever its denomination, consisting of or constituted in part by NATO military personnel established in order to fulfill the Operation. f. "Authorities" means the appropriate responsible individual, agency, or organization of the Parties. g. "Contractor personnel" means the technical experts or functional specialists whose services are required by NATO and who are in the territory of the FRY exclusively to serve NATO either in an advisory capacity in technical matters, or for the setting up, operation, or maintenance of equipment, unless they are: (1) nationals of the FRY; or (2) persons ordinarily resident in the FRY. h. "Official use" means any use of goods purchased, or of the services received and intended for the performance of any function as required by the operation of the Headquarters. i. "Facilities" means all buildings, structures, premises, and land required for conducting the operational, training, and administrative activities by NATO for the Operation as well as for accommodation-of NATO personnel. 2. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities under this Appendix, all NATO personnel shall respect the laws applicable in the FRY, whether Federal, Republic, Kosovo, or other, insofar as compliance with those laws is compatible with the entrusted tasks/mandate and shall refrain >from activities not compatible with the nature of the Operation. 3. The Parties recognize the need for expeditious departure and entry procedures for NATO personnel. Such personnel shall be exempt from passport and visa regulations and the registration requirements applicable to aliens. At all entry and exit points to/from the FRY, NATO personnel shall be permitted to enter/exit the FRY on production of a national identification (ID) card. NATO personnel shall carry identification which they may be requested to produce for the authorities in the FRY, but operations, training, and movement shall not be allowed to be impeded or delayed by such requests. 4. NATO military personnel shall normally wear uniforms, and NATO personnel may possess and carry arms if authorized to do so by their orders. The Parties shall accept as valid, without tax or fee, drivers, licenses and permits issued to NATO personnel by their respective national authorities. 5. NATO shall be permitted to display the NATO flag and/or national flags of its constituent national elements/units on any NATO uniform, means of transport, or facility. 6. a. NATO shall be immune from all legal process, whether civil, administrative, or criminal. b. NATO personnel, under all circumstances and at all times, shall be immune from the Parties, jurisdiction in respect of any civil, administrative, criminal, or disciplinary offenses which may be committed by them in the FRY. The Parties shall assist States participating in the operation in the exercise of their jurisdiction over their own nationals. c. Notwithstanding the above, and with the NATO Commander's express agreement in each case, the authorities in the FRY may exceptionally exercise jurisdiction in such matters, but only in respect of Contractor personnel who are not subject to the jurisdiction of their nation of citizenship. 7. NATO personnel shall be immune from any form of arrest, investigation, or detention by the authorities in the FRY. NATO personnel erroneously arrested or detained shall immediately be turned over to NATO authorities. 8. NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for support, training, and operations. 9. NATO shall be exempt from duties, taxes, and other charges and inspections and custom regulations including providing inventories or other routine customs documentation, for personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment, supplies, and provisions entering, exiting, or transiting the territory of the FRY in support of the Operation. 10. The authorities in the FRY shall facilitate, on a priority basis and with all appropriate means, all movement of personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment, or supplies, through or in the airspace, ports, airports, or roads used. No charges may be assessed against NATO for air navigation, landing, or takeoff of aircraft, whether government-owned or chartered. Similarly, no duties, dues, tolls or charges may be assessed against NATO ships, whether government-owned or chartered, for the mere entry and exit of ports. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft used in support of the operation shall not be subject to licensing or registration requirements, nor commercial insurance. 11. NATO is granted the use of airports, roads, rails, and ports without payment of fees, duties, dues, tolls, or charges occasioned by mere use. NATO shall not, however, claim exemption from reasonable charges for specific services requested and received, but operations/movement and access shall not be allowed to be impeded pending payment for such services. 12. NATO personnel shall be exempt from taxation by the Parties on the salaries and emoluments received from NATO and on any income received from outside the FRY. 13. NATO personnel and their tangible moveable property imported into, acquired in, or exported from the FRY shall be exempt from all duties, taxes, and other charges and inspections and custom regulations. 14. NATO shall be allowed to import and to export, free of duty, taxes and other charges, such equipment, provisions, and supplies as NATO shall require for the operation, provided such goods are for the official use of NATO or for sale to NATO personnel. Goods sold shall be solely for the use of NATO personnel and not transferable to unauthorized persons. 15. The Parties recognize that the use of communications channels is necessary for the Operation. NATO shall be allowed to operate its own internal mail services. The Parties shall, upon simple request, grant all telecommunications services, including broadcast services, needed for the Operation, as determined by NATO. This shall include the right to utilize such means and services as required to assure full ability to communicate, and the right to use all of the electromagnetic spectrum for this purpose, free of cost. In implementing this right, NATO shall make every reasonable effort to coordinate with and take into account the needs and requirements of appropriate authorities in the FRY. 16. The Parties shall provide, free of cost, such public facilities as NATO shall require to prepare for and execute the Operation. The Parties shall assist NATO in obtaining, at the lowest rate, the necessary utilities, such as electricity, water, gas and other resources, as NATO shall require for the Operation. 17. NATO and NATO personnel shall be immune from claims of any sort which arise out of activities in pursuance of the operation; however, NATO will entertain claims on an ex gratia basis. 18. NATO shall be allowed to contract directly for the acquisition of goods, services, and construction from any source within and outside the FRY. Such contracts, goods, services, and construction shall not be subject to the payment of duties, taxes, or other charges. NATO may also carry out construction works with their own personnel. 19. Commercial undertakings operating in the FRY only in the service of NATO shall be exempt from local laws and regulations with respect to the terms and conditions of their employment and licensing and registration of employees, businesses, and corporations. 20. NATO may hire local personnel who on an individual basis shall remain subject to local laws and regulations with the exception of labor/employment laws. However, local personnel hired by NATO shall: a. be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity; b. be immune from national services and/or national military service obligations; c. be subject only to employment terms and conditions established by NATO; and d. be exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to them by NATO. 21. In carrying out its authorities under this Chapter, NATO is authorized to detain individuals and, as quickly as possible, turn them over to appropriate officials. 22. NATO may, in the conduct of the Operation, have need to make improvements or modifications to certain infrastructure in the FRY, such as roads, bridges, tunnels, buildings, and utility systems. Any such improvements or modifications of a non-temporary nature shall become part of and in the same ownership as that infrastructure. Temporary improvements or modifications may be removed at the discretion of the NATO Commander, and the infrastructure returned to as near its original condition as possible, fair wear and tear excepted. 23. Failing any prior settlement, disputes with the regard to the interpretation or application of this Appendix shall be settled between NATO and the appropriate authorities in the FRY. 24. Supplementary arrangements with any of the Parties may be concluded to facilitate any details connected with the Operation. 25. The provisions of this Appendix shall remain in force until completion of the Operation or as the Parties and NATO otherwise agree. -- [...] ================================= Subject: The Balkan Prize To: Recipients of conference <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> X-Gateway: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Lines: 105 July 8, 1998 Kosovo War's Glittering Prize Rests Underground By CHRIS HEDGES NY Times TARI TNG, Yugoslavia-The metal cage tumbled to the guts of the Stari Tng mine, with its glittering veins of lead, zinc, cadmium, gold and silver, its stagnant pools of water and muck, its steamy blasts, its miles of dank, gloomy tunnels and its vast stretches of Stygian darkness. Half a mile underground, hissing rubber air hoses were looped along tunnel walls and small lights hooked on the hard hats of miners bobbed in the inky universe. Worm-like diesel loaders roared through the corridors, laden with sparkling ore, and huge drills snarled and spat at the rock. "There is over 30 percent lead and zinc in the ore," said Novak Bjelic, the mine's beefy director. "The war in Kosovo is about the mines, nothing else. This is Serbia's Kuwait-the heart of Kosovo. We export to France, Switzerland, Greece, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Russia and Belgium. "We export to a firm in New York, but I would prefer not to name it. And in addition to all this Kosovo has 17 billion tons of coal reserves. Naturally, the Albanians want all this for themselves." The sprawling state-owned Trepca mining complex, the most valuable piece of real estate in the Balkans, is worth at least $5 billion and has made millions of dollars for Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, according to his critics. Serbia and its junior partner, Montenegro, are what remains of Yugoslavia. In March 1989, Milosevic revoked the autonomous status given to the ethnic Albanians, who make up 90 percent of the 2 million people in Kosovo, and he has refused to return any kind of self-governance. He is trying to crush a mounting armed resistance to his rule, and it appears that the mines, at least for a while, will earn him even more money. The Stari Tng mine, with its warehouses, is ringed with smelting plants, 17 metal treatment sites, freight yards, railroad lines, a power plant and the country's largest battery plant. "In the last three years we have mined 2,538,124 tons of lead and zinc crude ore," said Bjelic, 58, "and produced 286,502 tons of concentrated lead and zinc and 139,789 tons of pure lead, zinc, cadmium, silver and gold." When the Nazis seized this corner of the Balkans in 1941, they handed over the hovels in Pristina, the provincial capital, to the Italian fascists. But they kept the British-built Trepca mines for the Reich, shipping out wagonloads of minerals for weapons and producing the batteries that powered the U-boats. Submarine batteries, along with ammunition, are still produced in the Trepca mines. The mining history reaches back to the Romans, who hacked out silver from the quarries. In 1988, as Yugoslavia began to disintegrate, the fiercest resistance to Milosevic's vision of a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia roared out of the shafts of the four Trepca mines. Angered by the growth of the Serbian nationalist movement led by Milosevic, the ethnic Albanian miners, who made up 75 percent of the 23,000 employees, shut down the mines and organized a 30-mile-long protest march to Pristina. They carried photos of the late communist leader, Josip Broz Tito, and Yugoslav flags adorned with the communist red star. Milosevic promised the strikers that he would respect the province's autonomy and remove nationalist Serbs from positions of power. The miners returned to the shafts. A year later the miners, realizing that they had been betrayed, began a series of hunger strikes and occupied the mines. The mine protests led to general strikes throughout Kosovo, making Trepca the nerve center of the resistance movement. Serbian special policemen eventually seized the mine, carrying weakened miners out on stretchers. When the province's autonomy was revoked, a state of emergency was declared. The ethnic Albanian miners were replaced with Poles, Czechs and-later-Muslim prisoners of war captured by the Serbs in Bosnia. These days, no more than 15 percent of the current 15,000 mine workers are of Albanian origin, the government says, and most ethnic Albanians insist that the figures vastly overestimate their numbers. Branimir Dimitrijevic, one of the mine's managers, waded through a corridor filled with water, slime and mud that reached up and wrapped itself around his black rubber boots. A huge Swedish iron-cutting machine, one of four in the mine, whirled and belched like some deep-sea monster. Spotlights mounted on its cab lit up a vein of ore, and as the minerals oxidized, creating a suffocating heat, the miners were left gulping for air. The workers, bare-chested and blackened with grime in the vast sweat house, stood aside when a trolley loaded with chunks of rock rumbled down a tunnel on the iron tracks. "We will never give up Trepca!" he shouted over the drilling. "Serbs will fight to defend the mine. It is ours. We know how to make war if this is what the Albanians want.
