Iran: A land of paradoxes
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Shlomo Avineri February, 08 2002 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (February 8) - In his recent State of the Union speech, US President George W. Bush identified Iran, together with Iraq and North Korea, as belonging to the "axis of evil," involved in terrorism and the production of weapons of mass destruction. Iran certainly deserves to be classified as aregional and possibly global destabilizer, and its support for the fundamentalist Islamic terrorism of Hizbullah in Lebanon is aimed at further undermining the ever-diminishing chances of Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation. But internal developments in Iran are complex, and any demonization of the Islamic republic as such is simplistic, as is a dichotomous polarity between "conservatives" and "moderates," the latter led by President Mohammed Khatami, is not very helpful in what is a multi-faceted context. In many respects, Iran is perhaps the most interesting country in the region, with the greatest potential for a development which may lead, not to a Western-style democracy, but to greater opening and liberalization. The paradox is that this potential is embedded in its ideology as an Islamic state. The last few years have shown some remarkable developments. Among them: Holding of elections: These are limited within an Islamic discourse, and in order to run in the elections, parties and individuals have to get an imprimatur from the highest Islamic authority in the land. Hence they are obviously not free (an anti-Islamic candidate cannot run). But within this Islamic discourse, there is a fierce contest between various groups and interpretations. Women have the vote, and participate actively in political life. Because elections to the majlis (parliament) and the presidency are contested, they are meaningful. It is, for example, clear that Khatami was elected with the support of women and younger people, and the "establishment" candidate was not elected. There is nothing like this in any Arab country: In Egypt or Syria (just as in Belarus) there is virtually only one candidate, and he receives between 97-98% of the vote. Debates in parliament are real, with different views expressed (again, in a limited Islamic context), with real voting taking place (again, not like the rubber-stamp sham parliaments in country such as Egypt and Syria). To the Western eye, the extreme image of women in black chadors is the only picture one has of women in Iran. While this is an obvious mark of the discrimination of women, the picture is more complex. For example, in medicine: Because male doctors are not allowed by strict Islamic law to treat women patients, for years the government has encouraged crash courses to train women doctors. As a consequence, there are today many more women doctors in Iran than under the shah, and the number of women dying in childbirth is among the lowest in the region. Similarly, the government has instituted a very active birth control program, and has found a way of legitimizing it within an Islamic context ("we want educated Islamic families, not just large Islamic families"). Iran has consequently one of the lowest birth rates in the region. All this also has consequences for foreign policy. As an Iranian political scientist recently put it at a seminar in Germany, younger people in Iran do feel themselves as Muslims, and Iran will not become a secular society. But they view their Islam as part of their Iranian identity, whereas the older clerics viewed their Islam as a universal revolutionary identity. These younger people, the Iranian scholar claimed, are first of all Iranian nationalists, and would like to dissociat themselves from Middle Eastern politics, including the Arab-Israeli conflict. They will continue, of course, to give verbal support to the Palestinian cause, but it is not at the top of their agenda. It is a complex, and perhaps confusing picture. But anyone who knows European history will perhaps identify a parallel: the Calvinist, Puritan revolution. The Calvinists in Geneva, or Cromwell's Puritans, were - like the clerics in Teheran - biblio-centric, with a Hol Book as their model for an idealized society. Their society was supposed to be puritanical, frugal, non-permissive, with laws against conspicuous consumption and luxuries. It was also anti-feminist, anchored in patriarchal family structures. But because the Calvinists did not accept a Church hierarchy, they based - like the Iranian Shi'ites who are not part of the Sunni majoritarian universalism - their legitimacy on the community of believers and introduced elections. And once you introduce elections - and different modes of interpretation of the Holy Book ar possible and legitimate - there exists a mechanism for participation, control, dissent (limited as it may be) and the introduction of innovativ strategies which try to legitimize change within a traditional context. In Europe, after all, Calvin's Geneva - an autocratic theocracy, more similar to the Ayatollah Khomeini's Teheran than to any other regime - eventually developed, through English Puritanism, towards modern parliamentarianism. Will Shi'ite Iran follow a road similar to that on the European Calvinists? Nothing is predetermined, but the parallel is striking, and for all the present involvement of some Iranian authorities in terrorism, the picture is more complex, more interesting - and perhaps more promising. (The writer, professor of political science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, is a former director-general of the Foreign Ministry.) _________________________________________________________________ Chat with friends online, try MSN Messenger: http://messenger.msn.com