Imperial history repeats itself Once again, Indians are being asked to fight Iraqis for empire's sake
Randeep Ramesh Thursday July 3, 2003 The Guardian The blood has barely dried on the British empire than it has already begun to seep over its American successor. The US occupation of Iraq is proving a messier task than Washington had hoped or planned for. On average, US troops have been dying at a rate of one a day since George Bush proclaimed "mission accomplished". Bodybags are tangible proof that the war has not finished: it has only just started. The six British military policemen shot dead at Majar al-Kabir last week, and the grenades pounding the US military in Fallujah, signal a deep unease that much of the killing is organised, and coalition forces are too thinly spread to stop it. This saps the imperial strength of America and highlights its greatest weakness: despite overwhelming military might, US troops in Iraq - like the British empire's before them - are vulnerable in a war fought among the shadows of a people chafing under foreign rule. The answer for Washington in the first years of the 21st century is the same as London's at the beginning of the 20th: call for reinforcements from those content to fulfil the role of loyal provider of brave soldiers for a war not of their making. Seventy countries have been asked to supply troops - from as far afield as Mongolia, whose forces were last seen in the Middle East more than seven centuries ago when they sacked Baghdad. So far, President Bush's request has been answered by 5,000 troops, mostly from new Europe and the new world. This is not enough. What Washington needs is a "reserve of military strength [capable of] ... supplying an army always in a high state of efficiency and capable of being hurled at a moment's notice upon any point". These words are not those of an American neo-conservative in 2003, but were articulated by the British viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, in 1909. A century later, the subcontinent's role as a source of auxiliary cohorts for the expansion of empire is being reprised by President Bush. New Delhi and Islamabad are considering American requests for a total of 30,000 soldiers to be sent to Iraq. India and Pakistan, historic rivals who have fought three wars in 50 years, would not meet in Iraq. Dangled in front of both, instead, is the command of sizeable parts of Iraq, and a warming of the Bush administration's new strategic relationship with the subcontinent. However tempting the offer of aid, arms and a new engagement with Washington may be to both nations, both are acutely aware of the lessons of imperial history. During the days of the British Raj, Indian soldiers were used to put down nationalist rebellions, at home and abroad. Blood was spilt all across the empire - much of it in Iraq. During the first world war, what was then the Ottoman province of Mesopotamia became a battleground between Turkish and British empires. The low point of Britain's Middle East campaign came when 12,000 soldiers - more than half composed of Indian divisions - surrendered the garrison to Turkish forces in May 1916 after a siege which lasted 147 days. Of the troops who left Kut with their captors, more than 4,000 died either on their way to captivity or in prisoner-of-war camps. In four years of fighting, 31,000 British and Indian lives were lost, pockmarking the country with graves and pyres. The birth of what would become modern-day Iraq was a painful one. Mesopotamia was Britain's prize after the first world war - and like today, its peoples struggled against the occupying forces. Indian troops were used to suppress the country's nationalist uprising in the summer of 1920. Like today's American forces, the 60,000 British and Indian troops securing Mesopotamia were never engaged in battle, facing instead hit-and-run raids from the desert. More than 1,000 Indian soldiers and 8,000 Arab fighters were either killed or captured in a few weeks. Despite Britain's military prowess, Iraq slowly slipped from its grasp. But Washington appears indifferent to the lessons of history. The subtle shift from hegemony to empire could again see troops from the subcontinent becoming the tools of a great power's foreign policy. America refuses to believe in the empirical evidence of its own empire. Its people are suspicious of foreign entanglements - witness the declining support for the Iraqi occupation. Sizeable numbers of Pakistani and Indian troops would enable thousands of American soldiers to return home. Left to face the growing anger engendered by the chaos that has replaced the power vacuum brought about by the fall of Saddam, troops from India and Pakistan - countries that opposed the war - will be left to secure the peace in the face of guerrilla attacks and organised resistance. If it looks, sounds and feels like empire redux, that is because it is. · Randeep Ramesh edited The War We Could Not Stop: The Real Story of the Battle for Iraq, published by Guardian Books [EMAIL PROTECTED]
