A Hazy Target
 Before going to war over weapons of mass destruction, shouldn't we be sure
Iraq has them?



By William M. Arkin, William M. Arkin is a military affairs analyst who
writes regularly for Opinion. E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] .org.


SOUTH POMFRET, Vt -- For all their differences, proponents and opponents of
war with Iraq agree on one thing: The paramount threat posed by Saddam
Hussein is his possession of chemical and biological weapons.

"The one respect that we think most about and worry most about is an enemy
with weapons of mass destruction," Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D.
Wolfowitz said last month. Opponents of war with Iraq have much the same
view.

Administration leaders argue that only war can smoke out Hussein's hidden
biochemical capabilities. Doves argue that we must rely on inspections
because attacking Hussein could provoke him to use chemical or biological
weapons; if Israel were hit, they warn, the result could be nuclear war. By
different routes, the two sides arrive at an almost obsessive focus on
Iraq's chemical and biological weapons.

Each side has practical as well as principled reasons for doing so. For the
administration, equating chemical and biological weapons with nuclear
weapons -- and warning that, sooner or later, Iraq's weapons will find their
way into terrorists' hands -- has become a way of making the case that war
with Iraq is essential to protecting American lives at home.

For those who oppose the U.S. position, treating chemical and biological
weapons as weapons of mass destruction akin to nuclear weapons justifies
diplomacy and brinkmanship because of the seeming horrendous consequences of
failure.

The question is whether these weapons in fact form a foundation sufficient
to support all the weight being placed on it.

Instructively, the one place where policy is not being driven by the focus
on chemical and biological weapons is inside the American armed forces.

For one thing, while not dismissing the seriousness of chemical and
biological warfare, most field commanders are reasonably confident they can
handle any such attacks Hussein can mount. For another, they understand all
too well the mass destruction a full-scale war might inflict.

Moreover, most know that, after nearly four months of renewed weapons
inspections by the United Nations and the most intensive effort in the
history of the U.S. intelligence community, American analysts and war
planners are far from certain that chemical and biological weapons even
exist in Iraq's arsenal today.

Incredible as it may seem, given all the talk by the administration --
including Secretary of State Colin L. Powell's discourse last week about
continuing Iraqi deception -- there is simply no hard intelligence of any
such Iraqi weapons.

There is not a single confirmed biological or chemical target on their
lists, Air Force officers working on the war plan say.

No one doubts that Iraq has consistently lied and cheated about its
proscribed arms capabilities. This is a country that has used chemical
weapons against Iran and against its own population, a country that fired
missiles at Israel and its Arab neighbors in 1991.

And the rundown of Iraqi weapons that remain incompletely accounted for
since the 1991 Gulf War is daunting: 6,500 bombs filled with chemical
agents, 400 bombs filled with biological agents, 31,500 chemical munitions,
550 artillery shells loaded with mustard gas, 8,500 liters of anthrax.

Moreover, CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency analysts believe that
Hussein's forces could launch two types of short-range missiles, rockets or
artillery that are capable of carrying chemical agents. The analysts say
Iraqi aircraft or unmanned drones could mount sprayers to disperse chemicals
or biological agents.

Analysts also think it possible for Iraqi commandos to penetrate coalition
lines with small quantities of these weapons.

And U.S. intelligence has received reports that Special Republican Guard
units, as well as secret police and security services charged with defending
the regime, have been given bio-chem protective gear. President Bush, in his
Feb. 8 radio address, said the administration had intelligence "that Saddam
Hussein recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons."

"We cannot rule out of course that Saddam might try in some kind of
desperation to use chemical or biological weapons," National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice said, echoing the administration line.

Yet, in fact, there is as much uncertainty as certainty about Iraq's
capabilities, as well as about the military effectiveness of any 11th-hour
resort to chemical and biological weapons. So much of what the U.S. believes
is based upon Iraq's history, not knowledge of current conditions.

Vice Adm. Lowell Jacoby, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said
as much when he told Congress last month that U.S. beliefs were "based on
... past patterns and availability ... that he will in fact employ them."

But the thinking that lies behind such statements when made by military
professionals is quite different from that underlying the pronouncements of
Rice and Wolfowitz.

When Maj. Gen. John Doesburg, the Army's top biological and chemical defense
commander, says the United States must assume Hussein thinks "it's OK to use
chemical agents, because he's done it," the general is simply engaging in
the kind of worst-case thinking that professional soldiers are trained to
do.

"What does he plan to do? I have no idea," Brig. Gen. Stephen Reeves, Army
program officer for chemical and biological defense, said at a Pentagon news
conference last month.

Military leaders like Doesburg and Reeves do not mean to suggest that
chemical and biological weapons are the battlefield equivalent of nuclear
weapons. And they certainly do not mean to suggest such weapons are so
uniquely horrific that they should drive the nation's policy decisions --
either toward or away from war.

Among other things, using chemical and biological weapons effectively is so
difficult that this alone has always been considered a major impediment for
Iraq. The weapons are unpredictable. Weather conditions are a major factor.
Chemical and biological agents also have to avoid exposure to heat, light or
severe cold.

When U.N. weapons inspectors were in Iraq during the 1990s, they found it
had turned toward unmanned ground vehicles and sprayers as platforms for
delivering chemical and biological weapons because Iraqi engineers could not
master the technology for delivering such weapons in missiles or artillery
shells; loaded into the warheads, the chemical and biological material was
usually incinerated when the warhead exploded.

Moreover, "it takes a lot of chemicals to have a significant effect on the
battlefield," Doesburg told Bloomberg News. "We don't suspect he has the
stockpile."

According to war planners, three aspects of U.S. military strategy are
specifically related to preventing the use of such weapons once open
hostilities begin.

First, initiating the use of force across all fronts, with simultaneous air
and ground operations, will communicate what Wolfowitz calls "the
inevitability" of Hussein's demise. "No one wants to be the last one to die
for Saddam Hussein," he said.

Second, the war plan itself favors smaller and more highly dispersed
formations to limit exposure to the kinds of brute-force chemical attacks
that occurred in Iraq's war with Iran.

Third, early air and special operations assaults, particularly in western
Iraq, will seek to disrupt any potential attacks on Israel.

Despite so little hard evidence of Iraq's capabilities, U.S. troops have
been vaccinated, trained, equipped and dressed to prepare for chemical and
biological war. For military units, all this is no more than prudent
planning.

For the rest of us, we must take care that apprehension about weapons of
mass destruction -- whether generated from hawks or from doves -- does not
become a substitute for thinking through the justification to go to war, a
decision that could have consequences for years to come.

There have been recent reports that U.S. Marines in Kuwait were literally
using "sentinel" chickens to aid in the early detection of chemical and
biological weapons.

"I just have to tell you from personal experience," said Reeves, "having had
a great-uncle with a chicken farm, chickens are spectacularly nervous
animals. They will literally worry themselves to death."

Exactly.



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