"Philippine Daily Inquirer", 25/1/02

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The twin debacles of
globalization

Posted:0:24 AM (Manila Time) | January 24, 2002

By Walden Bello
Inquirer News Service


IT is said that in politics and in war, fortune smiles all too briefly.
After allowing it to briefly savor the success of its Afghanistan campaign,
history, cunning and inscrutable as usual, has suddenly dealt the Bush
administration two massive body blows: the Enron implosion and the Argentine
collapse. These towering twin disasters threaten to push the global elite
back to the crisis of legitimacy that was shaking its hegemony globally
prior to September 11.

Enron forcefully reminds us that free market rhetoric is a corporate con
game. Neoliberalism loves to couch itself in the language of efficiency and
the ethics of the greatest good for the greatest number, but it is really
about promoting corporate power. Enron loved to extol the so-called merits
of the market to explain its success, but in fact, its path to becoming the
US’ seventh largest corporation was paved not by following the discipline
imposed by the market but by strategically deploying cold cash, lots of it.
Enron literally bought its way to the top, throwing around hundreds of
millions of dollars in less than a decade to create what one businessman
described to the New York Times as the “black hole” of deregulated energy
markets in which its financial shenanigans could thrive unchecked.

To make sure government would look the other way and allow the “market” to
have its way, Enron was generous with those willing to serve it, and few
earned more Enron dollars than George W. Bush, who received some 623,000
dollars for his political campaigns in both Texas and nationally from his
friend Kenneth Lay, CEO of Enron.

The deep enmeshing of Bush and a number of his key lieutenants—Vice
President Dick Cheney, Attorney General John Ashcroft, US Trade
Representative Robert Zoellick, top presidential economic adviser Larry
Lindsey, to name just the most prominent--in Enron's corporate web has
shaken off George W’s post-September 11 image of being President of all
Americans and brought back the reality of his being the chief executive
officer of corporate America. The Enron scandal pulls Americans right back
to the bitter sozialepolitik of the nineties when, as Bush himself put it in
his inaugural speech, “it [seemed] we share a continent but not a country.”
It brings back the ideological context of the landmark electoral campaign of
2000, when Bush’s fellow Republican, John McCain, made an almost successful
bid to become the presidential standard bearer by focusing on one issue:
that the massive corporate financing of elections that had transformed US
democracy into a plutocracy was gravely undermining its legitimacy.

Corporate-driven globalization, we have always held, is a process that is
marked by massive corruption, and one that is deeply subversive of
democracy. Shell was a good case study in Nigeria. Scores of TNCs and the
World Bank were implicated with the Suharto political economy in Indonesia.

Now Enron strips the veil from what Wall Street used to call the “New
Economy,” which showered rewards on sleazy financial operators like Enron
while sticking the rest of the world with the costs, not least of which is
what is shaping up to be the worst global downturn since the 1930’s.

Which is why we have always told World Bank types who want to lecture us on
good governance that they should first tell Washington to get its house in
order. Corporate corruption is central to the US political system, and the
fact that it is legal and assumes the form of "campaign finance" funneled to
pols by “political action committees” does not somehow make it less immoral
than crony capitalism of the Asian variety. Indeed, corruption of the
Washington variety is much more damaging, because momentous decisions
purchased with massive cash outlays have not only national but global
consequences. Corrupt Third World politicians ought to be hung, drawn, and
quartered, but let's face it, the amounts of cash and the quotient of power
they deal in are peanuts compared to the scale and impact of influence
peddling in Washington.

If Enron illustrates the folly of deregulation cum corruption, Argentina
underlines that of another facet of the corporate globalist project: the
liberalization of trade and capital flows. With 140 billion dollars in debt
to international institutions, its industry in chaos, and an estimated 2000
people daily falling below the poverty line, Argentina is in a truly
pitiable state.

Argentina brought down its trade barriers faster than most other countries
in Latin America. It liberalized its capital account more radically. And in
the most touching gesture of neoliberal faith, the Argentine government
voluntarily gave up any meaningful control over the domestic impact of a
volatile global economy by adopting a currency board, that is, pegging the
peso to the dollar. Dollarization, some technocrats promised, was right
around the corner, and when that happened, the last buffers between the
local economy and the global market would disappear and the nation would
enter the nirvana of permanent prosperity.

Now all of these measures were taken either at the urging of or with the
approval of the US Treasury Department and its surrogate, International
Monetary Fund. In fact, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, when
capital account liberalization was increasingly seen by most observers as
the villain of the piece, Larry Summers, then Secretary of the Treasury,
extolled Argentina’s selling off of its banking sector as a model for the
developing world: “Today, fully 50 per cent of the banking sector, 70 per
cent of private banks, in Argentina are foreign-controlled, up from 30 per
cent in 1994. The result is a deeper, more efficient market, and external
investors with a greater stake in staying put.”

The Argentine technocrats seemed determined to outdo their Chilean rivals in
their obeisance to the market—interestingly enough, just as the Chileans
were beginning to question its efficacy in the volatile area of capital
flows.

As the dollar rose in value in the mid-1990’s, so did the peso, making
Argentine goods uncompetitive both globally and locally. Raising tariff
barriers against imports flooding in was regarded as a no-no. Borrowing
heavily to fund the dangerously widening trade gap, Argentina spiraled into
debt, and the more it borrowed, the higher the interest rates rose as
creditors grew increasingly alarmed at the consequences of the unbridled
market freedom they had benefited from initially.

Foreign control of the banking system was no help, contrary to the Summers
doctrine. In fact, foreign control simply facilitated the outflow of much
needed capital by banks that became increasingly reluctant to lend to both
government and local businesses. With no credit, small and medium
enterprises, and not a few big ones, closed down, throwing thousands out of
work.

Cap in hand, Argentina went to its mentor, the IMF, for a
multibillion-dollar loan to meet payments on the 140 billion dollars
external debt coming due. The Fund refused unless the government made cuts
in public expenditures and imposed a tight money policy. As Joe Stiglitz has
noted, this was precisely the mistake the IMF made in Asia in the wake of
the financial crisis: instead of re-inflating the economy, you impose an
inflation-fighting program that accelerates the contraction of the economy.
It seems that the Fund is institutionally—and intentionally--incapable of
learning from its mistakes, and Argentina is one more reason for why it
should be abolished.

Reginald Dale, the doctrinaire free-market columnist at the International
Herald Tribune worries that the Argentine debacle may have negative
consequences beyond Argentina, chief of which are the erosion of the
legitimacy of the globalization project and a resurgence of populism, making
it impossible for the Bush administration to bring to a successful
conclusion Washington’s projected Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA).

It is up to the movement against corporate-driven globalization to prove
Dale and the Wall Street-Washington-Houston mafia right, and not only in
Latin America. The debacles of Enron and Argentina are so clear in their
causes and so easily explained to ordinary people throughout the world that
they provide the perfect handle with which the movement can regain globally
the momentum it lost on September 11. As they say in Texas, “let’s git ‘em
buzzards.”
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