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The US is ruining its relationship with Russia.
An interview with Stephen Cohen
December 4, 2003

Stephen Cohen is a Professor of Russian studies at New York University,
Professor Emeritus of Russian politics at Princeton University, and the
author of several books on Russia and the USSR.

Q:What is your view of the Yukos affair?

There are many aspects of the Yukos affair, and there are many motives
behind it. The single most important element of the Yukos affair is the
instability of the oligarchic economic system created in the 1990s. As I see
it today, the oligarchic economic system in Russia had no legal legitimacy ­
everyone agrees that it was done without any real law. Secondly, it lacks
popular legitimacy. And thirdly, it hasn t been able to achieve economic
legitimacy, in the sense of pulling the country out of poverty and
depression.

And it didn t necessarily have to be Khodorkovsky, whom I actually know, and
whatever he s done, he s certainly a charming and likeable man. But the
arrest of Khodorkovsky and the freezing of his shares, and the continuing
investigation of Yukos and now Sibneft are the beginning of a struggle over
the future of this oligarchic system, and I think it was inevitable.  I
think it didn t have to be Khodorkovsky, but it was Khodorkovsky because he
more than anyone else in Russia today symbolizes the system ­ he s the
richest, he was the politically most active, and he was the best-connected
to the West, with ties to the White House, and he was personally charming.
When you arrest the most charming, richest, and most connected oligarch,
that means you re talking about the system, not one person.

Q: What about political motivations?

Let me say that I believe that it was a factor. I don t think it was the
main factor. Let s begin with the charitable explanation that the American
media does not do a very good job of reporting on Russia. They tend to get
an idea and stick with it. And where do they get the idea? They get it from
people in Moscow who can speak English, because so many of the
correspondents don t speak Russian well enough to speak to a wide range of
people. Look how often they quote Gaidar, Nemtsov, this whole
English-speaking crowd that has a vested interest in the system. Nemtsov is
in a panic, saying that millions of people will be arrested, that this is
Stalinism. This is all hyperventilating ­ he is very worried because he is a
child of the oligarchic system.
After the arrest of Lebedev, on July 2, by chance I saw Khodorkovsky the
next morning at the American embassy. I went immediately to him and said, is
this serious? He made it clear he thought this was a turning point. He
didn t think this was just games, or a warning, he thought that something
big had begun.

I think he was arrested, and his shares frozen, because the faction in the
Kremlin behind this believed that at any moment he was going to sell a
blocking equity share ­ a large enough share that control of Yukos in Russia
would be lost. I believe that this involved the highest strategy of the
Putin group, which was that Russia s only chance of economic development is
to use its natural resources as it wants to use them at home. And that if
you sold 40% of Russia s largest oil company, it would remove not only part
of today s wealth, but that you would lose the future wealth that this oil
would create. That was a strategic economic decision. And when they thought
that Khodorkovsky was going to do it anyway, the Kremlin became convinced
that they need to stop this, and they only way the could stop him was to
arrest him and take his shares. That s what I think precipitated the arrest.

But the American media view that this is all about democracy and politics
seems to be nonsense, for several reasons. First, democracy in Russia, and I
lived there during a good part of democratization of 1988-91, began to be
turned back when Yeltsin destroyed the parliament in 1993. That was the
turning moment. And in addition, the destruction of the Parliament enabled
Yeltsin to go forward with this oligarchic privatization. The connection
between the two events was well known, because the parliament was against
it. Many of the things we lament about Putin today ­ control of the press,
the war in Chechnya, the rise of security officials in the government ­ all
this began under Yeltsin. The press was controlled in a different way ­
Gusinsky was given NTV on the condition that he support Yeltsin. Berezovsky
was given ORT on the condition that he support Yeltsin. These trends began
under Yeltsin, and they ve intensified under Putin. So to say that it s
about democracy is nonsense.

Secondly, to say that Khodorkovsky represented some kind of political threat
to Putin I think is also nonsense. The two little parties that he was giving
money to ­ SPS and Yabloko ­ he could have given them a trillion dollars,
and they re still not going to get more than 12% of the vote between them.
They simply don t have a constituency in Russia. SPS is the party of the
oligarchs, and people hate the oligarchs. Yabloko might have had some
possibilities, but its problem is not money but leadership. The notion that
somehow Khodorkovsky s money would somehow keep Duma from Putin is complete
nonsense. Moreover, let s be grown-ups ­ the Kremlin, if it wants to, has
the ability to falsify elections. We know this. Nobody believes that Yeltsin
beat Zyuganov in 1996 by that big a margin. Nobody believes that the 1993
constitution actually passed. The notion that a few dollars will change the
elections is naïve. Money is a factor, but it s a side factor that American
journalists who talk to the English-speaking pro-oligarchic intelligentsia
in Moscow pick up.  Oh, it s about democracy. Khodorkovsky was fighting for
democracy.

And this idea that Khodorkovsky was going to run for president ­ let s be
serious. Russia is not going to make an oligarch the president, it s not
going to make a Jewish oligarch the president ­ this is just complete
nonsense put out by gullible American journalists in Russia. Khodorkovsky
himself has said that he could not get elected. So we have to strip away
these factors that angered the Kremlin ­ the fact that he was giving money
to parties, he was breaking the rules of the game. If it hadn t been for the
impending sale of Sibneft to the Americans, I doubt very seriously if the
Kremlin would have cared very much if Khodorkovsky wanted to waste his money
on Chubais and Nemtsov.

Q: How will this affect the US-Russian relationship?

Subjectively, it pains me greatly that so many Russians believe that the US
government is a leading supporter of the hated oligarchic system. Why do so
many Russians believe this? Because it s true. Everyone remembers that when
the system was being created in 1993-97 by Yeltsin, the Clinton
administration called it reform and said it was good. They applauded his
destruction of the Parliament, they applauded the loans-for-shares, they
applauded the creation of oligarchic capitalism. And whenever an oligarch is
treated badly, the American government protests ­ sometimes loudly,
sometimes softly. Did you ever hear the American government protest the
amount of poverty in Russia, the unlivable pension, the so-called minimum
wage which is really a starvation wage? My educated friends who are not
Communists are curious why the US is only interested in the fate of the
oligarchs.

The US, Ambassador Vershbow for example, has quietly protested
Khodorkovsky s arrest and treatment. How was that received in Russia? Well,
we know that the overwhelming majority of people in Russia support his
arrest, so obviously 80% of Russians resent Vershbow s statements. I believe
that given our history in participating in the creation of the oligarchic
system, the American government should keep its mouth closed. This is, in
fact, an internal Russian affair. The US has been deeply involved in
Russia s internal affairs since the end of the Cold War, which has not done
anything except make things bad between the US and Russia. The US has to get
out of Russia. It has to shut up and go home and fix its own problems and
let Russia sort this out.

The main danger to the American-Russian relationship is not Khodorkosvsky.
It s two things. First, it s the twelve year pattern of American policy
toward Russia in which the US takes very large concessions from Russia and
giving nothing in return. It began when Gorbachev agreed to the
re-unification of Germany and Germany s membership in NATO. He was promised
by the first president Bush that NATO would not expand eastward. But of
course, under Clinton NATO expanded ­ first to the former Soviet bloc
countries in Eastern Europe, and now it s expanded to the former Baltic
republics. Russia caved in to the American bombing of Serbia. It went along
with the abolition of the ABM treaty, which was the centerpiece of Russia s
nuclear security. It agreed to sign a fake nuclear reductions treaty ­
according to this treaty, you put the missiles in a closet, and with a 90
days notice you say you don t want to belong to the treaty anymore and get
out. After September 11, Russia agreed to American use of its air space, its
intelligence, it allowed bases in Central Asia. And what has Russia gotten
in return? Not a single thing. The US has not even gotten rid of the
meaningless but symbolic Jackson-Vanick amendment. Have they helped Russia
with its national debt? No. Are they worried about Russia s national
security? No. Anybody who knows anything about international relations or
human relations knows that a ferocious backlash is going to come from
Russia.

Secondly, if you look at a map, and I m sure the Kremlin looks at the map
every day, a literal American-NATO encirclement of Russia is underway. NATO
is now in the Balkans. American bases are in Central Asia. There is a
growing American military force in Georgia. There will probably be American
troops in Azerbaijan very soon. Rumsfeld has announced that many of the
troops that have been in Germany since WWII are now going to move closer to
Russia ­ Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria. In other words, the whole might of NATO
and America is coming closer to Russia and encircling Russia. I have a
friend in Russia who was in the Gulag under Stalin, who hates Stalin, who
said to me not long ago,  You know, Stalin was right about one thing ­ you
really will encircle us if you have a chance.  This is so unwise. The lack
of concessions from the US and the ongoing encirclement of Russia is
guaranteeing a very bad relationship with Russia in the very near future.
And this is terrible, and tragic, and this is the real danger, not
Khodorkovsky s arrest.

Sergei Ivanov said a few weeks ago that it s time for American troops to
leave Asia. Now of course, they re not going to leave. And he said a week
ago that Russian natural resources belong to the state. Now that s a policy
statement, because at the moment they belong to the oligarchs. These are bad
times for Russia, bad times for the Russian-American relationship, and I
don t see anything getting better. I really worry about our American policy
­ I think it s stupid beyond belief. It s counterproductive. It s almost
like we have a death wish when it comes to Russia, and we don t care.

Q: If Bush loses the election next year, will this policy change?

Hope dies last, that s the proverb. So I hope that if there s a different
president, there will be a different policy, but I don t think it will be
so. This policy toward Russia began under Clinton. If you look at Strobe
Talbot s memoirs, it s clear they knew exactly what they were doing ­
treating Yeltsin as a big ol  friend, old Boris, and getting everything out
of him that they could without giving anything in return. They were doing it
unwisely, they embedded a time bomb in the Russian-American relationship,
but they knew they were doing it. I don t see a fundamental change, because
there is very little wisdom in the political elite, particularly about
Russia.

We still think about Russia in cold war terms ­ what s good for Russia is
bad for America. That s stupid, reckless, and dangerous. But look at the
reaction of the Democratic candidates after Khodorkovsky s arrest. Some of
them have said,  Well, we have to crack down on Putin.  They re criticizing
Bush for admiring Putin and Putin s vision of a democratic Russia. Every
American president mistakenly thinks, and for many years now, that the way
you have a valuable productive relationship with Russia is to have a good
personal relationship with the Russian leader. But that s only a personal
relationship ­ this is about state interests. Yeltsin s close relationship
with Clinton only brought grief to the US-Russian relationship, and now we
see that Bush s relationship with Putin has not gotten Bush what he wants ­
it didn t get him support in Iraq, or prevent the arrest of Khodorkovsky, or
end the wear in Chechnya.

I worry that the Democrats will decide that the way to run against Bush is
to run against his Russia policy. Remember, Russia is going to be important
in this election. Everyone in the US agrees that for the first time in
years, foreign policy is going to be important in a presidential election,
because of Iraq. Bush doesn t have many foreign policy successes ­ he is
hated in Europe, he is booed in London, and the American occupation of Iraq
is a complete nightmare ­ there s no way out. The war was a big mistake, and
they know it. So what can he say he s done good ­  Well, look at my
relationship with Putin  The trouble is the Democrats will go after that and
say that Putin is bad, that Russia is bad, and that s the wrong thing to do,
but that s the way the political pendulum will swing. So I m not optimistic,
but there s always hope.

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