Daily Times http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp
Thursday, February 16, 2006 VIEW:Balochistan: learning from 1971 -Dr Ayesha Siddiqa http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\02\16\story_16-2-2006_pg3_2 The army's calculation, perhaps, is that the resistance will die its own death. That is possible. But the scars it will leave behind could be enough to make it fundamentally ungovernable. By the time the conflict ends the smaller provinces' resentment of Punjab's domination may have grown hundred-fold. Unfortunately, armed forces do not recognise a hazard unless it is an existential threat A friend recently tried to explain the dynamics of the ongoing Balochistan crisis to me. It was, my friend said, primarily a fight between the socio-culturally regressive tribal leaders of the area and the army that has gone in as a harbinger of modernisation and development. Therefore, he said, he could not accept the 'fashionable' HRCP line on atrocities in Balochistan. The picture, he said, was far more complex. The problem, many high-powered people in Pakistan believe like my friend, is the thick-headedness and 'greed' of the Baloch sardars fighting the government to extract a greater price for cooperation. These sardars, they say, are no less brutal and selfish than the central government. So, the choice in Balochistan is like that between the devil and the deep blue sea. The devil (the central government) they imply is the natural choice given its promise of development and modernity. I might have agreed had I not visited Bangladesh and witnessed the politics and civil-military relations there. Talking to people and going through the common and then separate histories of Pakistan and Bangladesh, I realised the mistake we made then and are about to make now. The blinkered view that Islamabad alone knows what is best for the people and that the establishment is only fighting the enemies of modernity, development, and the nation-state can again result in a deeper crisis. Of course no two situations are identical. Given the factors peculiar to East Pakistan and Balochistan, one cannot predict that the current crisis will necessarily end like the previous one. What I am suggesting however is that we take another look at some of the mistakes we made in the past and try to avoid them in the future. The present day Bangladesh bears witness to the fact that the 1971 outcome could have been avoided. The Bengali leadership was clearly not prepared at the time for an independent state. It lacked the capacity to run a new state and realised this. Sheikh Mujeeb and his colleagues had not planned for an independent state. They got it due to the narrow vision of West Pakistan's pro-establishment political leadership and the military, and Indian efforts during the last days of East Pakistan. Furthermore, the regressive forces in the country were aligned with the Islamabad-based establishment. The struggle for greater autonomy and protest against unequal treatment and repression were clearly the slogans of the middle and the lower-middle classes. After the post-secession Bengali leadership failed to accommodate the left-of-centre ideology central to the struggle leading to independence, the regressive forces took charge of the country. The Awami League failed to punish those seen as 'collaborators' and Dhaka went out of its way to militarily curb the left in the north - exactly what it had accused West Pakistan of doing to the Bengalis. Clearly had Zulfikar Ali Bhutto been more conciliatory and had the army not launched its operation on March 25, there were sufficient reasons for East Pakistan to have remained Pakistan. Besides India's military onslaught, Bangladesh happened due to a massive intelligence failure and lack of appreciation of the political situation. Some of the reports indicate that those responsible for intelligence gathering were biased against Bengali people. Mr Rizvi, the Central Intelligence director, was said to have been unwilling to see the people's protest as anything but an Indian conspiracy. This disposed the military commanders to the idea of using force. Interestingly, some of the key military actors had trained with American forces and learnt to deal with mass unrest Vietnam-style. A large number of soldiers carrying out the operation were made to believe that they were fighting Hindus and not Muslims. The perceptions in handling Balochistan seem to be somewhat similar. The military operation (denied by the government but confirmed by other sources) is driven by the mindset that there is an Indian hand behind the political unrest. The tribal leaders are seen as getting funds and/or weapons from New Delhi. (There is no denying the fact that the resistance appears well funded so there may be multiple financial sponsors. Iran and the US could also be included in the list.) Perhaps, this reminds the GHQ of the Mukti Bahini funded and trained by India. But does this justify a military crackdown? It was after all the military handling of a political situation that cost the country its eastern wing. The fact is that the Baloch tribal leaders enjoy popular support in their area. Given the Baloch tradition, making the people sympathise with Islamabad's standpoint is difficult. While the religious parties and other conservative forces are still aligned with the central government (as they were in East Pakistan) supporting Islamabad will become increasingly harder as the province gets deeper into a fight. Towards the end in East Pakistan even the conservatives were forced to change sides. This is not meant to suggest that Balochistan is about to break away. Several factors, starting with the geographical proximity, are different from East Pakistan's case. East Pakistanis were far more volatile and exposed to alternative political ideologies. Bengalis, unlike the Baloch, had a large population. Balochistan, therefore, might not manage separation as easily. The army's calculation, perhaps, is that the resistance will die its own death. That is possible. But the scars it will leave behind could be enough to make it fundamentally ungovernable. By the time the conflict ends the smaller provinces' resentment of Punjab's domination may have grown hundred-fold. Unfortunately, armed forces do not recognise a hazard unless it is an existential threat. A bleeding wound, even if not life threatening, can be very painful. The situation demands political handling. Pushing it towards a point where a growing number join the conflict - as happened in East Pakistan - will be unwise. Those who argue against the "regressive" tribal leaders should consider two things. First, the one way to challenge the tribal leaders is to meet their demands and make the implementation transparent. Surely, there is nothing fundamentally wrong with creating a conscript army or allowing the provincial government to undertake development of Gwadar and other areas. Second, it must be remembered that the choice is between keeping the local leadership on board before it strays towards something unpleasant, and undertaking hugely unpopular actions. In East Pakistan we made the wrong choice. For those fighting the establishment, the fight is both military and political. The problem with the political dimension is that it can get out of control before the parties concerned realise it. While the Baloch tribal leaders have fattened on the largesse of the state their ability to manipulate the people has not been undermined. It would make sense to make peace and make them partners in development. Clearly, a political agreement and not deployment of military force is the safe way out of the crisis. Unless, as Asghar Khan says: we refuse to learn from history. Dr Ayesha Siddiqa is a military analyst and a freelance writer Daily Times - All Rights Reserved
