Re: linux/iptables/proxy arp to pf/redundant firewall

2007-10-27 Thread Henning Brauer
* [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2007-10-26 16:11]: > so u said that u could inject bad things on some level to give trouble and > shake > on stp ? yeah sure. just send a bpdu which makes the switch think it needs to blocksome rather important link. there is no kindof authentication in

Re: linux/iptables/proxy arp to pf/redundant firewall

2007-10-26 Thread Can Erkin Acar
On Fri, Oct 26, 2007 at 01:59:57PM +0200, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > so u said that u could inject bad things on some level to give trouble and > shake > on stp ? This is right, you can have fun with most L2 protocols out there check out http://www.yersinia.net/ for instance. > Selon Henning Br

Re: linux/iptables/proxy arp to pf/redundant firewall

2007-10-26 Thread Dylan Martin
I'm going to repeat myself here because this has caused me countless headaches: Understand how switches figure out which port goes to which host. This can really bite you. Here's an example Packet from SERVERS intended for INTENET Hits SW2, SW2 learns which port SERVERS is on SW2 does a discov

Re: linux/iptables/proxy arp to pf/redundant firewall

2007-10-26 Thread secucatcher
so u said that u could inject bad things on some level to give trouble and shake on stp ? Selon Henning Brauer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > * Russell Fulton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2007-10-25 10:09]: > > Henning Brauer wrote: > > > so get a little transfer net and make your upstream adjust his routes > >

Re: linux/iptables/proxy arp to pf/redundant firewall

2007-10-26 Thread secucatcher
thank u PEOPLES for all the advices i will do a documentation if i had a bit of time and for the firm. it is just simple, i u have the schematics in the head fW --- - ---INTERNET[SW |pfsync SW]-SERVERS -FW I t

Re: linux/iptables/proxy arp to pf/redundant firewall

2007-10-26 Thread Henning Brauer
* Russell Fulton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2007-10-25 10:09]: > Henning Brauer wrote: > > so get a little transfer net and make your upstream adjust his routes > > > > otherwise you need a bridge indeed, but you really want to avoid that > > if you have a chance to go for regular routed with carp etc.

Re: linux/iptables/proxy arp to pf/redundant firewall

2007-10-25 Thread Russell Fulton
Henning Brauer wrote: > so get a little transfer net and make your upstream adjust his routes > > otherwise you need a bridge indeed, but you really want to avoid that > if you have a chance to go for regular routed with carp etc. > > we also run redundant bridges -- we have two physical pat

Re: linux/iptables/proxy arp to pf/redundant firewall

2007-10-24 Thread Jeremie Le Hen
t access to all the servers > and no alarm cause the nagios was behind the firewall. > the box had linux iptables and proxy arp. > > > [internet]---public IP--[linux box]-all the servers(public ip's) > > the ip of the box, is in the same subnet that the servers >

Re: linux/iptables/proxy arp to pf/redundant firewall

2007-10-24 Thread Dylan Martin
all the servers > and no alarm cause the nagios was behind the firewall. > the box had linux iptables and proxy arp. > > > [internet]---public IP--[linux box]-all the servers(public ip's) > > the ip of the box, is in the same subnet that the servers > a

Re: linux/iptables/proxy arp to pf/redundant firewall

2007-10-24 Thread secucatcher
it works with stp and pfsync it takes me just less than one hour just cheap switch without stp then stp on the openbsd interfaces in the bridge.. ifconfig, brconfig and pf :) the failover works well between 30s and a few minutes needs more test but nice start.

Re: linux/iptables/proxy arp to pf/redundant firewall

2007-10-24 Thread Henning Brauer
* [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [2007-10-24 13:06]: > Selon "Peter N. M. Hansteen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: > > > > > i was thinking at a bridge firewall with openbsd, and maybe carp to be > > redundant > > > but carp is not working with bridge > > > > I'd think

Re: linux/iptables/proxy arp to pf/redundant firewall

2007-10-24 Thread secucatcher
king (filtering and redundant maybe with QOS) and keep it simple as we can. i have a class A/public ip's subnet with /24 xx.xxx.xxx.1 the GW of the datacenter xx.xxx.xxx.252 our proxy ARP/iptables xx.xxx.xxx.2->xx.xxx.xxx.254 (public servers) (xx.xxx.xxx is the same number here)

Re: linux/iptables/proxy arp to pf/redundant firewall

2007-10-24 Thread Stuart Henderson
On 2007/10/24 12:29, Peter N. M. Hansteen wrote: > [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: > > >> then. Bridges generally makes it harder to debug and as you say it > >> takes your main redundancy feature off the table. Why not just a > >> carp/pfsync setup? > > > > cause i'm in the same subnet > > if not, ca

Re: linux/iptables/proxy arp to pf/redundant firewall

2007-10-24 Thread secucatcher
Selon "Peter N. M. Hansteen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: > > > i was thinking at a bridge firewall with openbsd, and maybe carp to be > redundant > > but carp is not working with bridge > > I'd think really hard about why you would want to make it a bridge > then. Bridges gen

Re: linux/iptables/proxy arp to pf/redundant firewall

2007-10-24 Thread Peter N. M. Hansteen
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: >> then. Bridges generally makes it harder to debug and as you say it >> takes your main redundancy feature off the table. Why not just a >> carp/pfsync setup? > > cause i'm in the same subnet > if not, carp will be the solution no ? still don't see how a bridge would

Re: linux/iptables/proxy arp to pf/redundant firewall

2007-10-24 Thread Peter N. M. Hansteen
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: > i was thinking at a bridge firewall with openbsd, and maybe carp to be > redundant > but carp is not working with bridge I'd think really hard about why you would want to make it a bridge then. Bridges generally makes it harder to debug and as you say it takes your m

linux/iptables/proxy arp to pf/redundant firewall

2007-10-24 Thread secucatcher
iptables and proxy arp. [internet]---public IP--[linux box]-all the servers(public ip's) the ip of the box, is in the same subnet that the servers and all the interfaces on the linux has the same public ip. i was thinking at a bridge firewall with openbsd, and maybe carp to be redu

Re: Top 10 reasons IPTABLES is better than PF

2004-10-23 Thread Ed
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Thu, 21 Oct 2004 10:37:56 -0700 Jeff Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Well, someone DID mention porting PF to Linux. (Just for grins, take a > look at the Linux QOS/traffic shaping subsystem, and then imagine > getting PF to interface with THAT

Re: Top 10 reasons IPTABLES is better than PF

2004-10-23 Thread R. Payne
I guess the lesson here is: No more witty cynicisms unless you intend to also translate it into other languages to make sure everyone knows you are only joking. A couple of people now have spent god-knows how long responding to your every point to prove how wrong you are. IOW: It was only a jo

Re: Top 10 reasons IPTABLES is better than PF

2004-10-22 Thread mzozd
Jeff Simmons wrote: 10. Parsing IPTABLES config files excellent preparation for subsequent learning of Asian pictograph-based languages. 9. Standard logging via syslogd helps eliminate clutter in /var/log. We should probably log everything to one file, right? Many people need the files

Re: Top 10 reasons IPTABLES is better than PF

2004-10-21 Thread Jeff Simmons
On Thursday 21 October 2004 01:23, eric wrote: > > 8. GPL prevents Steve Jobs from stealing your code. > > What's wrong with making the computer industry better? Have you > contributed to this project? Probably not. So what does it matter to > you? Hopefully Microsoft would use pf one day; it mean

Re: Top 10 reasons IPTABLES is better than PF

2004-10-21 Thread A
Gold Jerry.. GOLD! Andrew "Why do they call it ovaltine.. the cup is round, the tin is round... they should call it round-tine." --- Jeff Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > 10. Parsing IPTABLES config files excellent preparation for > subsequent > learning

Re: Top 10 reasons IPTABLES is better than PF

2004-10-21 Thread eric
On Wed, 2004-10-20 at 20:33:57 -0700, Jeff Simmons proclaimed... > 9. Standard logging via syslogd helps eliminate clutter in /var/log. Right. > 8. GPL prevents Steve Jobs from stealing your code. What's wrong with making the computer industry better? Have you contributed to this project? Prob

Top 10 reasons IPTABLES is better than PF

2004-10-21 Thread Jeff Simmons
10. Parsing IPTABLES config files excellent preparation for subsequent learning of Asian pictograph-based languages. 9. Standard logging via syslogd helps eliminate clutter in /var/log. 8. GPL prevents Steve Jobs from stealing your code. 7. Simplistic man pages encourage development of social

Re: Weird iptables logs from servers behind pf transparent bridge

2003-12-12 Thread Daniel Hartmeier
On Sat, Dec 13, 2003 at 01:47:28AM +0200, Toni Riekkinen wrote: > $IPT -A FLAGS -m state --state INVALID -m limit --limit 5/minute -j > LOG --log-level debug --log-prefix "INVALID: " As far as I understand iptables, this will block packets invalid in context of state lookups,

Weird iptables logs from servers behind pf transparent bridge

2003-12-12 Thread Toni Riekkinen
This is a cross pf/iptables related problem: These are logs from linux servers with iptables, what I started getting after I added openbsd fw (transparent bridge) to protect those servers (DMZ): INVALID: IN=eth0 OUT= MAC= SRC= DST= LEN=56 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=57 ID=60965 PROTO=ICMP TYPE=3 CODE

RE: pf <---> iptables

2003-12-10 Thread Dom De Vitto
AIL PROTECTED] - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Philipp Buehler Sent: Wednesday, December 10, 2003 7:08 AM To: Arno Hechenberger Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: pf <---> iptables On 09/12/2003, Arno H

Re: pf <---> iptables

2003-12-10 Thread Philipp Buehler
On 09/12/2003, Arno Hechenberger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote To [EMAIL PROTECTED]: > Is anyone out there who knows real arguments for iptables or pf ? I > should evaluate a packet filter for acompany with 73 internet accesses > points where one of this should become suitable. > &

Re: pf <---> iptables

2003-12-09 Thread Henning Brauer
On Tue, Dec 09, 2003 at 09:04:46PM +0100, Arno Hechenberger wrote: > - iptables is mostly always more performant if you're stateless, yes. > - pf (former ipf) is inspecting every packet 2 times pf is not former ipf. > - iptables (now, not ipchains) is now also stateful and

pf <---> iptables

2003-12-09 Thread Arno Hechenberger
hello ! i' read "all the available on line material" which is available on the web regarding these two (stateful) packet filters. - iptables is mostly always more performant - pf (former ipf) is inspecting every packet 2 times - linux ip stack is not as robust as the obsd pen

Re: iptables

2003-02-06 Thread Dries Schellekens
On Thu, 6 Feb 2003, Daniel Hartmeier wrote: > On Thu, Feb 06, 2003 at 07:05:26PM +0100, Dries Schellekens wrote: > > > Does PF protect against the "Crikey CRC Flood" (described in > > http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/539363)? I know that protection against > > p60-0x0c.txt was add; does this protect

Re: iptables

2003-02-06 Thread Michiel van Baak
checks. > > I can't help but giggle when people start comparing iptables/ipf/pf on > the basis of how "slow" they are. Do you people (the ones asking these > stupid questions) realize _just_how_FAST_ this code is? Just how little > resources you need to saturate your

Re: iptables

2003-02-06 Thread Daniel Hartmeier
On Thu, Feb 06, 2003 at 07:05:26PM +0100, Dries Schellekens wrote: > Does PF protect against the "Crikey CRC Flood" (described in > http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/539363)? I know that protection against > p60-0x0c.txt was add; does this protect against this C2 Flood as well? A "C2 flood" is nothi

Re: iptables

2003-02-06 Thread Dries Schellekens
On Thu, 6 Feb 2003, Daniel Hartmeier wrote: > > Stateful is not a solution because it introduces a strong flaw inside > > your firewall... The connection table (used to remember the state of > > each connection) is using a limited ressource of the kernel: memory. > > Of course. See > > http://ww

Re: iptables

2003-02-06 Thread Jason Dixon
low (I might be wrong!!!). > > pf is not close to beeing slow. in fact, it's bleeding fast. > they are a bit faster in some areas because they leave out the sequence > number checks. I can't help but giggle when people start comparing iptables/ipf/pf on the basis of how "

Re: iptables

2003-02-06 Thread Daniel Hartmeier
On Thu, Feb 06, 2003 at 03:22:35PM +0100, Emmanuel Fleury wrote: > What are the arguments in favor of having two separate interfaces better > than one forward chain ? It gives the admin more options to express a filter policy. You can decide what interfaces a forwarded connection may arrive in th

Re: iptables

2003-02-06 Thread Emmanuel Fleury
On Thu, 2003-02-06 at 15:37, Henning Brauer wrote: > > of course, "optimized representation" is such a meaningless word that > everything can be claimed to fit ;-) I was meaning this sort of representation: http://www.brics.dk/RS/02/43/BRICS-RS-02-43.ps.gz Regards -- Emmanuel Fleury Computer Sc

Re: iptables

2003-02-06 Thread Henning Brauer
On Thu, Feb 06, 2003 at 03:22:35PM +0100, Emmanuel Fleury wrote: > Stateful is not a solution because it introduces a strong flaw inside > your firewall... The connection table (used to remember the state of > each connection) is using a limited ressource of the kernel: memory. this is pretty irre

Re: iptables

2003-02-06 Thread Emmanuel Fleury
st consisted of exactly, and what > reasons possibly explain the result. The stateful test didn't involve > iptables at all, so we're talking about stateless filtering with an > increasing number of rules, which were chosen in such a way that each > packet caused a full evaluation

Re: iptables

2003-02-06 Thread Henning Brauer
On Thu, Feb 06, 2003 at 01:42:45PM +0100, Emmanuel Fleury wrote: > But, I wonder why they are faster than pf ! > Because, there is no obvious relation between the fact that pf is more > secure and the fact that it is slow (I might be wrong!!!). pf is not close to beeing slow. in fact, it's bleedin

Re: iptables

2003-02-06 Thread Daniel Hartmeier
d come to this conclusion. It's mostly brought up by people who didn't read the text but were looking only at the graphs. The text explains what the two test consisted of exactly, and what reasons possibly explain the result. The stateful test didn't involve iptables at all, so

Re: iptables

2003-02-06 Thread Emmanuel Fleury
On Thu, 2003-02-06 at 13:20, Daniel Hartmeier wrote: > On Thu, Feb 06, 2003 at 01:12:37PM +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > Any info/URL about that ? > > http://www.sns.ias.edu/~jns/security/iptables/iptables_conntrack.html > http://www.netfilter.org/documentation/HOWTO

Re: iptables

2003-02-06 Thread Daniel Hartmeier
On Thu, Feb 06, 2003 at 01:12:37PM +0100, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Any info/URL about that ? http://www.sns.ias.edu/~jns/security/iptables/iptables_conntrack.html http://www.netfilter.org/documentation/HOWTO/netfilter-extensions-HOWTO-5.html#ss5.10 http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=netfil

Re: iptables

2003-02-06 Thread przemolicc
On Thu, Feb 06, 2003 at 11:15:22AM +0100, Dries Schellekens wrote: >[...] but iptable doesn't do proper > statefull firewalling. [...] Any info/URL about that ? przemol

Re: iptables

2003-02-06 Thread Daniel Hartmeier
On Thu, Feb 06, 2003 at 11:15:22AM +0100, Dries Schellekens wrote: > benzedrine.cx was temporary unreachable. The problem seems to be solved > now (because this mailing list seems to work again). Wednesday 6:15pm, uplink dies. Router says PPP authentication fails. Of course, all staff of the 'ISP

Re: iptables

2003-02-06 Thread Attila Nagy
Hello, > I was recently pointed to a paper on the internet that talked about the > speed improvments of iptables vs pf. UNfortunatelly the paper is no > longer there. The paper was linked from deadly.org here > http://www.deadly.org/article.php3?sid=20020617203813 I think you are t