Re: [ADMIN] brute force attacking the password

2005-05-12 Thread Bruno Wolff III
On Thu, May 12, 2005 at 00:23:05 +0200, Enrico Weigelt <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > * Bruno Wolff III <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > Maybe you can use client side certificates. > > how can they be used w/ psql ? You should be able to get PAM to do this, but I haven't tried it to make sure.

Re: [ADMIN] brute force attacking the password

2005-05-11 Thread Enrico Weigelt
* Wim Bertels <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > since brute force attacks are quit traceable (targetting one and the > same user eg..), > one could a script to check: > - the percentage of failed logins/user, depending on the percentage (eg > 75% or more failed, this should be configurable), these e

Re: [ADMIN] brute force attacking the password

2005-05-11 Thread Enrico Weigelt
* Bruno Wolff III <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Maybe you can use client side certificates. how can they be used w/ psql ? cu -- - Enrico Weigelt== metux IT service phone: +49 36207 519931 www: http:

Re: [ADMIN] brute force attacking the password

2005-04-21 Thread Wim Bertels
Bruno Wolff III schreef: On Tue, Apr 19, 2005 at 22:54:32 +0200, Wim Bertels <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: not an easy problem: it always seems to end up in DoS vs Brute Force Cracking. So the only good and simple solution i can think of: use the best possible password encrytion (or sufficient,

Re: [ADMIN] brute force attacking the password

2005-04-20 Thread Bruno Wolff III
On Tue, Apr 19, 2005 at 22:54:32 +0200, Wim Bertels <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > not an easy problem: it always seems to end up in DoS vs Brute Force Cracking. > So the only good and simple solution i can think of: use the best possible > password encrytion (or sufficient, a statistically ze

Re: [ADMIN] brute force attacking the password

2005-04-19 Thread Wim Bertels
On Tuesday 19 April 2005 22:37, Bruno Wolff III seinde rooksignalen: > On Tue, Apr 19, 2005 at 17:00:15 +0200, > > Wim Bertels <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > >Can't people use PAM to get this effect if they want it? > > > > what if u use pam with ldap, then u can use pg brute force cracking to >

Re: [ADMIN] brute force attacking the password

2005-04-19 Thread Bruno Wolff III
On Tue, Apr 19, 2005 at 17:00:15 +0200, Wim Bertels <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >Can't people use PAM to get this effect if they want it? > > what if u use pam with ldap, then u can use pg brute force cracking to > obtain the ldap password, which is probably a bigger problem You don't have to

Re: [ADMIN] brute force attacking the password

2005-04-19 Thread Wim Bertels
Can't people use PAM to get this effect if they want it? what if u use pam with ldap, then u can use pg brute force cracking to obtain the ldap password, which is probably a bigger problem For most people password guessing isn't going to be a big problem as the database won't be accessible from to

Re: [ADMIN] brute force attacking the password

2005-04-19 Thread Wim Bertels
Bruce Momjian schreef: Wim Bertels wrote: LS, is there a way of securing the postgresql-server against brute force password cracking ? iow: is there a way of setting eg a maximum number of login attempts, or using a time-out or ..? + securing on server level No, there is not. Does anyo

Re: [ADMIN] brute force attacking the password

2005-04-19 Thread Bruno Wolff III
On Mon, Apr 18, 2005 at 16:55:45 -0400, Bruce Momjian wrote: > > I would like to pick something that matches what a typical Unix system > does because I think the _fancy_ solutions actually cause weird problems > like denial-of-service attacks by just trying to log in. > > How do typical open

Re: [ADMIN] brute force attacking the password

2005-04-18 Thread Tom Lane
Dawid Kuroczko <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Anyway, a simple 'sleep 2 seconds before telling that password > was wrong' would be a good addition anyhow. Seems pretty useless, unless we change things to also delay 2 seconds before telling the password was good, which I doubt anyone will like ;-) O

Re: [ADMIN] brute force attacking the password

2005-04-18 Thread C. Bensend
> And dangerous. Imagine a system with say, apache accound used > from some Apache application. And a maluser who purposefully > tries to log in to "apache" account and fails, thus causing a DoS > on the web application. :) Yes, I absolutely agree. Any scheme of the sort would have some risks.

Re: [ADMIN] brute force attacking the password

2005-04-18 Thread Dawid Kuroczko
> > No, there is not. Does anyone want to suggest a possible implementation > > for the TODO list? > I would like to see a combination of number of login failures and a > timeout, configurable via the conf file. Say, X login failures > disables further logins for that account for Y minutes. > >

Re: [ADMIN] brute force attacking the password

2005-04-18 Thread Bruce Momjian
C. Bensend wrote: > > > No, there is not. Does anyone want to suggest a possible implementation > > for the TODO list? > > I would like to see a combination of number of login failures and a > timeout, configurable via the conf file. Say, X login failures > disables further logins for that acco

Re: [ADMIN] brute force attacking the password

2005-04-18 Thread C. Bensend
> No, there is not. Does anyone want to suggest a possible implementation > for the TODO list? I would like to see a combination of number of login failures and a timeout, configurable via the conf file. Say, X login failures disables further logins for that account for Y minutes. That would b

Re: [ADMIN] brute force attacking the password

2005-04-18 Thread Bruce Momjian
Wim Bertels wrote: > LS, > > is there a way of securing the postgresql-server against brute force > password cracking ? > iow: is there a way of setting eg a maximum number of login attempts, or > using a time-out or ..? > > + securing on server level No, there is not. Does anyone want to sug

[ADMIN] brute force attacking the password

2005-04-14 Thread Wim Bertels
LS, is there a way of securing the postgresql-server against brute force password cracking ? iow: is there a way of setting eg a maximum number of login attempts, or using a time-out or ..? + securing on server level tnx, ---(end of broadcast)--- T