Re: [HACKERS] Proposed GUC Variable

2002-08-27 Thread ngpg
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Tom Lane) wrote Ross J. Reedstrom [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I agree that a 'trimmed' query is likely to be useless, but the idea of printing the query on ERROR is a big win for me: Certainly. I think though that an on-or-off GUC option is sufficient. We don't need a

Re: [HACKERS] @(#)Mordred Labs advisory 0x0007: Remove DoS in PostgreSQL

2002-08-26 Thread ngpg
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bruce Momjian) wrote Sir-* does have a point. A valid host in pg_hba.conf can cause DOS by just connecting over and over, but allocating almost all of the memory on the machine would affect other applications running on the machine, even non-networked applications, as

Re: [HACKERS] [SECURITY] DoS attack on backend possible

2002-08-21 Thread ngpg
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Florian Weimer) wrote [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: if you are going to be passing any user input to the database, you must/should validate in some manner before blindly passing it to the db. The db can and should guarantee data integrity, but the database cannot read

Re: [HACKERS] [SECURITY] DoS attack on backend possible

2002-08-20 Thread ngpg
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Curt Sampson) wrote in On Mon, 19 Aug 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: $input = user'name; INSERT INTO db (name) VALUES ('$input'); will fail because the ' in the input needs to be escaped with a backslash. It will fail because you're doing this a very, very, very bad

Re: [HACKERS] @(#) Mordred Labs advisory 0x0001: Buffer overflow in

2002-08-20 Thread ngpg
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Greg Copeland) wrote Time and time again I've read what basically amounts to, ...if someone can crash it it's because someone is stupid enough to allow someone to be able to do it in the first place... Maybe you're right. After all, if core developers continue to turn a

Re: [HACKERS] [SECURITY] DoS attack on backend possible

2002-08-19 Thread ngpg
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Florian Weimer) wrote Alvar Freude [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: What about checking the input for backslash, quote, and double quote (\')? If you are not taking care of those in input then crashing the backend is going to be the least of your worries. with Perl and

Re: [HACKERS] Open 7.3 items

2002-08-18 Thread ngpg
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Tom Lane) wrote * If a connection request has a username with a trailing '@' (and no embedded '@'), then the '@' is stripped and connection proceeds. * Otherwise, '@dbname' is appended to the given username and connection proceeds. snip It might be worth recalling the

Re: [HACKERS] Open 7.3 items

2002-08-16 Thread ngpg
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bruce Momjian) wrote I know the trailing @ is ugly, but it prevents surpises when connecting to the database. if you would make the magic character a variable then perhaps you could prevent the ugly... if/when you turn off the feature, you could set the

Re: [HACKERS] OOP real life example (was Re: Why is MySQL more

2002-08-14 Thread ngpg
Summary: 1. The current implementation is broken. 2. We have no proper description of how a fixed implementation should work. 3. It's hard to fix the current implementation without such a description. 4. Thus, we are in other messages here trying to work

Re: [HACKERS] Open 7.3 items

2002-08-14 Thread ngpg
OK, the vote is not shifting from '.' to ''. Is that how we want to go? I like the pg_user enhancement. Marc, comments? This was your baby. Would it be hard to setup an internal PG variable for the actual character to be used? ---(end of

Re: [HACKERS] Open 7.3 items

2002-08-14 Thread ngpg
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bruce Momjian) wrote: Tom Lane wrote: Bruce Momjian [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: I don't know where else to go with the patch at this point. I think increasing the number of 'global' users is polluting the namespace too much, Why? If the installation needs N global

Re: [HACKERS] [SECURITY] DoS attack on backend possible (was: Re:

2002-08-12 Thread ngpg
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Florian Weimer) wrote in [EMAIL PROTECTED]:">news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]: Gavin Sherry [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Yes, but if you just check that the date given by the user matches the regular expression [0-9]+-[0-9]+-[0-9]+, it's still possible to crash the backend.