Re: [HACKERS] Insecurity in MD5 authentication (again)

2004-10-07 Thread Bruce Momjian
This seems to have shown two problems. First is using the constant username 'postgres' for postgres login salt, but if we use something variable we would have to pass that constant on the wire so everyone will see it. We can't encrypt the random salt with the password because the server doesn't

[HACKERS] Insecurity in MD5 authentication (again)

2004-08-29 Thread Richard van den Berg
I'm sorry to bring this up again. From the archives I found that the current md5 authentication scheme of postgres was designed in 2001. I found a debate about it's security from 2002. http://archives.postgresql.org/pgsql-hackers/2001-06/msg00511.php

Re: [HACKERS] Insecurity in MD5 authentication (again)

2004-08-29 Thread Greg Stark
Richard van den Berg [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: My problem is this: we have ODBC users working from home, so they cannot use SSL unless we buy the commercial drivers. We decided that encrypting the data is not required, but we do need to strictly protect access to our database. You could