On 25 December 2014 at 18:27, Noah Misch n...@leadboat.com wrote:
On Thu, Dec 25, 2014 at 03:55:02PM +1300, David Rowley wrote:
f6dc6dd seems to have broken vcregress check for me:
FATAL: no pg_hba.conf entry for host ::1, user David, database
postgres
...
FATAL: no pg_hba.conf
On Thu, Dec 25, 2014 at 11:35:31PM +1300, David Rowley wrote:
On 25 December 2014 at 18:27, Noah Misch n...@leadboat.com wrote:
This needs to be conditional on whether the platform supports IPv6, like
we do
in setup_config(). The attached patch works on these configurations:
64-bit
On 30 November 2014 at 15:02, Noah Misch n...@leadboat.com wrote:
On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 02:31:15AM -0400, Noah Misch wrote:
It then dawned on me that every Windows build of PostgreSQL already has
a way
to limit connections to a particular OS user. SSPI authentication is
essentially the
On Thu, Dec 25, 2014 at 11:55 AM, David Rowley dgrowle...@gmail.com wrote:
f6dc6dd seems to have broken vcregress check for me:
Having a look at the pg_hba.conf that's been generated by pgregress, it
looks like it only adds a line for IPv4 addresses.
Indeed. I can see this problem as well on my
On Thu, Dec 25, 2014 at 03:55:02PM +1300, David Rowley wrote:
f6dc6dd seems to have broken vcregress check for me:
FATAL: no pg_hba.conf entry for host ::1, user David, database
postgres
...
FATAL: no pg_hba.conf entry for host ::1, user David, database
postgres
Thanks. I bet this is
On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 02:31:15AM -0400, Noah Misch wrote:
It then dawned on me that every Windows build of PostgreSQL already has a way
to limit connections to a particular OS user. SSPI authentication is
essentially the Windows equivalent of peer authentication. A brief trial
thereof
On Sun, Mar 02, 2014 at 11:36:41PM +0100, Magnus Hagander wrote:
On Sun, Mar 2, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Tom Lane t...@sss.pgh.pa.us wrote:
Noah Misch n...@leadboat.com writes:
One option that would simplify things is to fix only non-Windows in the
back
branches, via socket protection, and
Re: Noah Misch 2014-07-12 20140712170151.ga1985...@tornado.leadboat.com
Thanks. Preliminary questions:
+#ifdef HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS
+/* make_temp_sockdir() is invoked at most twice from pg_upgrade.c via
get_sock_dir() */
+#define MAX_TEMPDIRS 2
+static int n_tempdirs = 0; /* actual
On Fri, Jul 11, 2014 at 12:40:09PM +0300, Christoph Berg wrote:
I believe pg_upgrade itself still needs a fix. While it's not a
security problem to put the socket in $CWD while upgrading (it is
using -c unix_socket_permissions=0700), this behavior is pretty
unexpected, and
Re: Bruce Momjian 2014-07-08 20140708202114.gd9...@momjian.us
I believe pg_upgrade itself still needs a fix. While it's not a
security problem to put the socket in $CWD while upgrading (it is
using -c unix_socket_permissions=0700), this behavior is pretty
unexpected, and does fail
Re: To Bruce Momjian 2014-07-11 20140711093923.ga3...@msg.df7cb.de
Re: Bruce Momjian 2014-07-08 20140708202114.gd9...@momjian.us
I believe pg_upgrade itself still needs a fix. While it's not a
security problem to put the socket in $CWD while upgrading (it is
using -c
Re: Noah Misch 2014-06-08 20140608135713.ga525...@tornado.leadboat.com
Here's an update that places the socket in a temporary subdirectory of /tmp.
The first attached patch adds NetBSD mkdtemp() to libpgport. The second,
principal, patch uses mkdtemp() to implement this design in pg_regress.
On Tue, Jul 08, 2014 at 07:02:04PM +0200, Christoph Berg wrote:
Re: Noah Misch 2014-06-08 20140608135713.ga525...@tornado.leadboat.com
Here's an update that places the socket in a temporary subdirectory of /tmp.
The first attached patch adds NetBSD mkdtemp() to libpgport. The second,
Re: Noah Misch 2014-07-08 20140708174125.ga1884...@tornado.leadboat.com
On Tue, Jul 08, 2014 at 07:02:04PM +0200, Christoph Berg wrote:
Re: Noah Misch 2014-06-08 20140608135713.ga525...@tornado.leadboat.com
Here's an update that places the socket in a temporary subdirectory of
/tmp.
On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 08:21:48PM +0200, Christoph Berg wrote:
Re: Noah Misch 2014-07-08 20140708174125.ga1884...@tornado.leadboat.com
On Tue, Jul 08, 2014 at 07:02:04PM +0200, Christoph Berg wrote:
Re: Noah Misch 2014-06-08 20140608135713.ga525...@tornado.leadboat.com
Here's an update
On Sun, Mar 23, 2014 at 07:04:20PM -0400, Noah Misch wrote:
On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 11:52:22PM -0500, Noah Misch wrote:
On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 12:44:34PM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
I'm inclined to suggest that we should put the socket under $CWD by
default, but provide some way for the user
On Fri, Apr 04, 2014 at 02:36:05AM +, YAMAMOTO Takashi wrote:
Thanks. To avoid socket path length limitations, I lean toward placing the
socket temporary directory under /tmp rather than placing under the CWD:
y...@netbsd.org (YAMAMOTO Takashi) writes:
On Fri, Apr 04, 2014 at 02:36:05AM +, YAMAMOTO Takashi wrote:
openvswitch has some tricks to overcome the socket path length
limitation using symlink. (or procfs where available)
iirc these were introduced for debian builds which use deep CWD.
Thanks. To avoid socket path length limitations, I lean toward placing the
socket temporary directory under /tmp rather than placing under the CWD:
http://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/20121129223632.ga15...@tornado.leadboat.com
openvswitch has some tricks to overcome the socket path
On Fri, Apr 04, 2014 at 02:36:05AM +, YAMAMOTO Takashi wrote:
Thanks. To avoid socket path length limitations, I lean toward placing the
socket temporary directory under /tmp rather than placing under the CWD:
On Sun, Mar 30, 2014 at 3:52 PM, Christoph Berg c...@df7cb.de wrote:
Re: Noah Misch 2014-03-30 20140330014531.ge170...@tornado.leadboat.com
On Sat, Mar 29, 2014 at 10:04:55AM +0100, Christoph Berg wrote:
Fwiw, to relocate the pg_regress socket dir, there is already the
possibility to run
Robert Haas robertmh...@gmail.com writes:
On Sun, Mar 30, 2014 at 3:52 PM, Christoph Berg c...@df7cb.de wrote:
Oh, right. There's this other patch which apparently works so well
that I already forgot it's there:
Enable pg_regress --host=/path/to/socket:
Re: Tom Lane 2014-03-31 22183.1396293...@sss.pgh.pa.us
Enable pg_regress --host=/path/to/socket:
https://alioth.debian.org/scm/loggerhead/pkg-postgresql/postgresql-9.4/trunk/view/head:/debian/patches/60-pg_regress_socketdir.patch
Wasn't this patch submitted for inclusion in PostgreSQL at
On Mon, Mar 31, 2014 at 3:19 PM, Tom Lane t...@sss.pgh.pa.us wrote:
Robert Haas robertmh...@gmail.com writes:
On Sun, Mar 30, 2014 at 3:52 PM, Christoph Berg c...@df7cb.de wrote:
Oh, right. There's this other patch which apparently works so well
that I already forgot it's there:
Enable
Re: Noah Misch 2014-03-30 20140330014531.ge170...@tornado.leadboat.com
On Sat, Mar 29, 2014 at 10:04:55AM +0100, Christoph Berg wrote:
Fwiw, to relocate the pg_regress socket dir, there is already the
possibility to run make check EXTRA_REGRESS_OPTS=--host=/tmp. (With
the pending fix I sent
Re: Noah Misch 2014-03-24 20140323230420.ga4139...@tornado.leadboat.com
On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 11:52:22PM -0500, Noah Misch wrote:
On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 12:44:34PM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
I'm inclined to suggest that we should put the socket under $CWD by
default, but provide some way
On Sat, Mar 29, 2014 at 10:04:55AM +0100, Christoph Berg wrote:
Fwiw, to relocate the pg_regress socket dir, there is already the
possibility to run make check EXTRA_REGRESS_OPTS=--host=/tmp. (With
the pending fix I sent yesterday to extend this to contrib/test_decoding.)
That doesn't work for
On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 11:52:22PM -0500, Noah Misch wrote:
On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 12:44:34PM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
I'm inclined to suggest that we should put the socket under $CWD by
default, but provide some way for the user to override that choice.
If they want to put it in /tmp, it's
On Sun, Mar 23, 2014 at 07:04:20PM -0400, Noah Misch wrote:
On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 11:52:22PM -0500, Noah Misch wrote:
On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 12:44:34PM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
I'm inclined to suggest that we should put the socket under $CWD by
default, but provide some way for the user
Noah Misch n...@leadboat.com writes:
Thanks. To avoid socket path length limitations, I lean toward placing the
socket temporary directory under /tmp rather than placing under the CWD:
I'm not thrilled with that; it's totally insecure on platforms where /tmp
isn't sticky, so it doesn't seem
On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 12:44:34PM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
Noah Misch n...@leadboat.com writes:
Thanks. To avoid socket path length limitations, I lean toward placing the
socket temporary directory under /tmp rather than placing under the CWD:
I'm not thrilled with that; it's totally
Noah Misch n...@leadboat.com writes:
On Thu, Mar 06, 2014 at 12:44:34PM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
I'm inclined to suggest that we should put the socket under $CWD by
default, but provide some way for the user to override that choice.
If they want to put it in /tmp, it's on their head as to how
On Tue, Mar 04, 2014 at 07:10:27PM -0500, Bruce Momjian wrote:
On Sat, Mar 1, 2014 at 01:35:45PM -0500, Noah Misch wrote:
Having that said, I can appreciate the value of tightening the socket mode
for
a bit of *extra* safety:
--- a/src/test/regress/pg_regress.c
+++
On Sun, Mar 02, 2014 at 05:38:38PM -0500, Noah Misch wrote:
Concerning the immediate fix for non-Windows systems, does any modern system
ignore modes of Unix domain sockets? It appears to be a long-fixed problem:
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-1999-1402
On Mon, Mar 03, 2014 at 08:15:41PM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
Noah Misch n...@leadboat.com writes:
On Mon, Mar 03, 2014 at 01:29:00AM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
What I was envisioning was that we'd be relying on the permissions of the
containing directory to keep out bad guys. Permissions on the
On Sat, Mar 1, 2014 at 01:35:45PM -0500, Noah Misch wrote:
Having that said, I can appreciate the value of tightening the socket mode for
a bit of *extra* safety:
--- a/src/test/regress/pg_regress.c
+++ b/src/test/regress/pg_regress.c
@@ -2299,4 +2299,5 @@ regression_main(int argc, char
On 03/03/2014 02:00 AM, Tom Lane wrote:
Josh Berkus j...@agliodbs.com writes:
The only way I can see this being of real use to an attacker is if they
could use this exploit to create a wormed version of PostgresQL on the
target build system. Is that possible?
It's theoretically possible,
On Mon, Mar 03, 2014 at 01:29:00AM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
Noah Misch n...@leadboat.com writes:
Concerning the immediate fix for non-Windows systems, does any modern system
ignore modes of Unix domain sockets? It appears to be a long-fixed problem:
What I was envisioning was that we'd be
Noah Misch n...@leadboat.com writes:
On Mon, Mar 03, 2014 at 01:29:00AM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
What I was envisioning was that we'd be relying on the permissions of the
containing directory to keep out bad guys. Permissions on the socket
itself might be sufficient, but what does it save us to
I wrote:
Placing the socket anywhere besides the default location will require
setting PGHOST anyway, so I don't see that this argument holds much water.
The cleanup aspect is likewise not that exciting; pg_regress creates a lot
of stuff it doesn't remove.
There's another point here, if you
On Sun, Mar 2, 2014 at 6:20 AM, Noah Misch n...@leadboat.com wrote:
On Sat, Mar 01, 2014 at 05:51:46PM -0500, Andrew Dunstan wrote:
On 03/01/2014 05:10 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
One other thought here: is it actually reasonable to expend a lot of
effort
on the Windows case? I'm not aware that
* Dave Page (dp...@pgadmin.org) wrote:
It's not that rare in my experience - certainly there are far more single
user installations, but Terminal Server configurations are common for
deploying apps Citrix-style or VDI. The one and only Windows server
maintained by the EDB infrastructure
Noah Misch n...@leadboat.com writes:
One option that would simplify things is to fix only non-Windows in the back
branches, via socket protection, and fix Windows in HEAD only. We could even
do so by extending HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS support to Windows through named pipes.
+1 for that solution, if
On 02/03/2014 15:30, Magnus Hagander wrote:
Terminal Services have definitely become more common over time, but
with faster and cheaper virtualization, a lot of people have switched
to that instead, which would remove the problem of course.
I wonder how common it actually is, though, to
On 03/02/2014 01:27 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
Also, to what extent does any of this affect buildfarm animals? Whatever
we do for make check will presumably make those tests safe for them,
but how are the postmasters they test under make installcheck set up?
Nothing special.
bin/initdb -U
* james (ja...@mansionfamily.plus.com) wrote:
Well, the banks I've contracted at recently are all rather keen on
virtual desktops for developers, and some of those are terminal
services. We're a headache, and packaging up all the things we need
is a pain, so there is some mileage in buying
On 03/02/2014 12:17 PM, Stephen Frost wrote:
The issue here is about how much effort to go to in order to secure the
PostgreSQL system that is started up to do the regression tests. It's
already set up to only listen on localhost and will run with only the
privileges of the user running the
* Josh Berkus (j...@agliodbs.com) wrote:
The only way I can see this being of real use to an attacker is if they
could use this exploit to create a wormed version of PostgresQL on the
target build system. Is that possible?
I don't see why it wouldn't be- once the attacker is on the box as any
On Sun, Mar 2, 2014 at 7:27 PM, Tom Lane t...@sss.pgh.pa.us wrote:
Noah Misch n...@leadboat.com writes:
One option that would simplify things is to fix only non-Windows in the
back
branches, via socket protection, and fix Windows in HEAD only. We could
even
do so by extending
On Sun, Mar 02, 2014 at 01:27:18PM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
Noah Misch n...@leadboat.com writes:
One option that would simplify things is to fix only non-Windows in the back
branches, via socket protection, and fix Windows in HEAD only. We could
even
do so by extending HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS
Noah Misch n...@leadboat.com writes:
Concerning the immediate fix for non-Windows systems, does any modern system
ignore modes of Unix domain sockets? It appears to be a long-fixed problem:
What I was envisioning was that we'd be relying on the permissions of the
containing directory to keep
Josh Berkus j...@agliodbs.com writes:
The only way I can see this being of real use to an attacker is if they
could use this exploit to create a wormed version of PostgresQL on the
target build system. Is that possible?
It's theoretically possible, since having broken into the build user's
* Tom Lane (t...@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote:
Noah Misch n...@leadboat.com writes:
Concerning the immediate fix for non-Windows systems, does any modern system
ignore modes of Unix domain sockets? It appears to be a long-fixed problem:
What I was envisioning was that we'd be relying on the
I didn't check the patch in detail, but it seems to me that both the
encode stuff as well as pgrand belong in src/common rather than
src/port.
--
Álvaro Herrerahttp://www.2ndQuadrant.com/
PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training Services
--
Sent via pgsql-hackers
On Sat, Mar 01, 2014 at 12:48:08PM -0300, Alvaro Herrera wrote:
I didn't check the patch in detail, but it seems to me that both the
encode stuff as well as pgrand belong in src/common rather than
src/port.
Since src/common exists only in 9.3 and up, that would mean putting them in
different
Noah Misch n...@leadboat.com writes:
As announced with last week's releases, use of trust authentication in the
make check temporary database cluster makes it straightforward to hijack the
OS user account involved. The prerequisite is another user account on the
same system. The solution we
On 03/01/2014 12:29 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
In the case of Unix systems, there is a *far* simpler and more portable
solution technique, which is to tell the test postmaster to put its socket
in some non-world-accessible directory created by the test scaffolding.
+1 - I'm all for KISS.
Of
On Sat, Mar 1, 2014 at 7:09 PM, Andrew Dunstan and...@dunslane.net wrote:
On 03/01/2014 12:29 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
In the case of Unix systems, there is a *far* simpler and more portable
solution technique, which is to tell the test postmaster to put its socket
in some non-world-accessible
On Sat, Mar 01, 2014 at 12:29:38PM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
There are two big problems with the lets-generate-a-random-password
approach. Noah acknowledged the portability issue of possibly not having
a strong entropy source available. The other issue though is whether
doing this doesn't
* Tom Lane (t...@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote:
In the case of Unix systems, there is a *far* simpler and more portable
solution technique, which is to tell the test postmaster to put its socket
in some non-world-accessible directory created by the test scaffolding.
Yes, yes, yes.
Of course that
Magnus Hagander mag...@hagander.net writes:
For a one-off password used locally only, we could also consider just using
a guid, and generate it using
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa379205(v=vs.85).aspx.
Not sure if that API is intended to create an unpredictable
On 03/01/2014 05:10 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
One other thought here: is it actually reasonable to expend a lot of effort
on the Windows case? I'm not aware that people normally expect a Windows
box to have multiple users at all, let alone non-mutually-trusting users.
As Stephen said, it's
Andrew Dunstan and...@dunslane.net writes:
On 03/01/2014 05:10 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
BTW, a different problem with the proposed patch is that it changes
some test cases in ecpg and contrib/dblink, apparently to avoid session
reconnections. That seems likely to me to be losing test coverage.
On Sat, Mar 01, 2014 at 05:51:46PM -0500, Andrew Dunstan wrote:
On 03/01/2014 05:10 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
One other thought here: is it actually reasonable to expend a lot of effort
on the Windows case? I'm not aware that people normally expect a Windows
box to have multiple users at all, let
On Sat, Mar 01, 2014 at 09:43:19PM -0500, Tom Lane wrote:
Andrew Dunstan and...@dunslane.net writes:
On 03/01/2014 05:10 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
BTW, a different problem with the proposed patch is that it changes
some test cases in ecpg and contrib/dblink, apparently to avoid session
On 2 Mar 2014, at 05:20, Noah Misch n...@leadboat.com wrote:
On Sat, Mar 01, 2014 at 05:51:46PM -0500, Andrew Dunstan wrote:
On 03/01/2014 05:10 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
One other thought here: is it actually reasonable to expend a lot of effort
on the Windows case? I'm not aware that people
As announced with last week's releases, use of trust authentication in the
make check temporary database cluster makes it straightforward to hijack the
OS user account involved. The prerequisite is another user account on the
same system. The solution we discussed on secur...@postgresql.org was
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