On Sun, 7 May 2006, Andrew Jorgensen wrote:
On 5/7/06, Wade Preston Shearer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I seem to have hosed my Linksys WRT54G router (version 1).
It's really too bad the boot_wait option isn't enabled on these things
by default. If it were enabled then you'd be able to recover
On 5/7/06, Wade Preston Shearer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I seem to have hosed my Linksys WRT54G router (version 1).
I found the link. Now use this at your own risk but as I said, it
worked to save one of mine. After shorting the pins, the unit
responded to ping and tftp for that new firmware.
Anybody know what the lights on the front of the WRT54G behind the word
Cisco are used for? I get an orange sometimes and a white light
sometimes. Also what is that button behind the word Cisco used for?
Chris Carey wrote:
On 5/7/06, Wade Preston Shearer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I seem
On Sun, 7 May 2006, Michael Halcrow wrote:
On Sun, May 07, 2006 at 05:35:32PM +, Jason Holt wrote:
I've never been able to nail down a case of a non-evil use of this
technology that couldn't be done purely in software or with a much
simpler piece of hardware. Could you describe one or two,
On Mon, May 08, 2006 at 09:17:01PM +, Jason Holt wrote:
On Sun, 7 May 2006, Michael Halcrow wrote:
On Sun, May 07, 2006 at 05:35:32PM +, Jason Holt wrote:
I've never been able to nail down a case of a non-evil use of this
technology that couldn't be done purely in software or with a
On Mon, 8 May 2006, Michael Halcrow wrote:
Well, with eCryptfs, which, of course, is the crypto app I have in
mind in my examples, you don't really think in terms of an entire disk
being encrypted -- rather, you have individual files being encrypted
according to various policies. So yes, in
On Mon, 8 May 2006, Michael Halcrow wrote:
Well, with eCryptfs, which, of course, is the crypto app I have in
mind in my examples, you don't really think in terms of an entire disk
being encrypted -- rather, you have individual files being encrypted
according to various policies. So yes, in this
Kip Lawrence wrote:
I had this problem too... the solution for me was to have a correct
reverse dns from the domain from where I sent the email. Once I got that
corrected aol customers started getting email from me just fine. Maybe
your having the same problem?
It might also be this, from
On Mon, May 08, 2006 at 09:41:49PM +, Jason Holt wrote:
You're talking about multiple machines being able to decrypt, so is
it a shared secret across the machines?
Yes -- a shared private key, but that key is only available to the
operating environment of each machine when the machine is
On Mon, 8 May 2006, Ross Werner wrote:
It seems really unlikely to me that an attacker who is able to get (a) the
encrypted files and (b) the passphrase will be unable to (c) get past
whatever hardware requirement I have in place.
CEO Alice or Grandma Carol are probably going to end up
On Mon, 8 May 2006, Michael Halcrow wrote:
On Mon, May 08, 2006 at 09:41:49PM +, Jason Holt wrote:
You're talking about multiple machines being able to decrypt, so is
it a shared secret across the machines?
Yes -- a shared private key, but that key is only available to the
operating
Jason Holt wrote:
If I didn't have TPM, I could still do all that, but you're talking
about the TPM ensuring that not only does the machine *have* the private
key, but that the machine is in a certain state. So it saves us from an
attacker who has the ciphertext *and* access to one of the
On Mon, 2006-05-08 at 16:10 -0600, Jordan Gunderson wrote:
Kip Lawrence wrote:
I had this problem too... the solution for me was to have a correct
reverse dns from the domain from where I sent the email. Once I got that
corrected aol customers started getting email from me just fine.
On Mon, May 08, 2006 at 04:33:48PM -0600, Shane Hathaway wrote:
Jason Holt wrote:
If I didn't have TPM, I could still do all that, but you're talking
about the TPM ensuring that not only does the machine *have* the
private key, but that the machine is in a certain state. So it
saves us from
On Mon, May 08, 2006 at 05:57:03PM -0500, Michael Halcrow wrote:
As soon as my team finishes with the PKI support in eCryptfs this
summer, I *will* be using the TPM in my laptop to cryptographically
lock my files to my machine; that's the sort of thing for which I
personally find the TPM to
On Mon, May 08, 2006 at 05:22:26PM -0600, Andrew McNabb wrote:
On Mon, May 08, 2006 at 05:57:03PM -0500, Michael Halcrow wrote:
As soon as my team finishes with the PKI support in eCryptfs this
summer, I *will* be using the TPM in my laptop to
cryptographically lock my files to my machine;
On Mon, 8 May 2006, Michael Halcrow wrote:
So it saves us from an attacker who has the ciphertext *and* access
to one of the machines, but who can't login as me or otherwise
convince the OS to ask the TPM for the key
You have the basic idea.
Okay, so for that threat, the TPM's protection is
On Mon, 8 May 2006, Michael Halcrow wrote:
So if your motherboard dies you have to reformat your hard disk? Am
I understanding this correctly?
Only if you have encrypted each and every file on your hard disk with
the same key, since eCryptfs works on a per-file basis. If your
hardware
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