(Fareastern Economic Review) High Stakes in Post-Tsunami Aceh
by James Van Zorge Aceh is now officially on the world’s radar screen. During most of the decades-long separatist war between the Aceh Freedom Movement (otherwise known as GAM, or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) and the Indonesian military, the media either took little interest in Aceh or were forbidden to enter the province. The Boxing Day tsunami changed that overnight. Hundreds of international print and electronic journalists are filing daily stories from the provincial capital, Banda Aceh. Then there are the foreign military: 1,300 soldiers, naval ships, aircraft and military helicopters have been deployed from the United States, France, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia and Japan, assisting the Indonesian armed forces with distributing emergency food supplies, clearing debris and providing survivors with medical assistance. Finally, there are the international organizations. Under the umbrella of the United Nations alone, there are more than 1,100 relief workers representing 60 organizations in Aceh. There is no doubt that Indonesians in general and the Acehnese in particular are grateful for what will prove to be the largest relief effort in history. Public and private aid pledged for the countries hit by the tsunami now exceeds $10 billion in cash donations, debt relief and low-interest loans; a large portion of the global aid package is expected to be channeled towards Aceh, whose tsunami victims constitute more than two-thirds of the total. However, the Indonesian government and military, or TNI, have already started to send mixed signals about tolerating the presence of foreigners on Aceh’s soil. At first overwhelmed by the magnitude of the crisis, Indonesia’s President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his cabinet quickly went to work in earnest with the international community. Now, Jakarta is telling aid workers that they must register with the government and obtain permission to go outside the confines of Banda Aceh and Meulaboh, in some cases with TNI escort, ostensibly to protect them from GAM. Likewise, foreign military personnel are required to report their whereabouts to government officials, or face expulsion. Vice President Jusuf Kalla told the media, in no uncertain terms, that he wants foreign troops out of Aceh as soon as possible: “I think three month are enough, and the sooner they leave the better.” Almost immediately, international NGOs and foreign governments started posing questions about Jakarta’s ulterior motive in asserting strict controls over the movements of foreign aid workers. Government officials say that such restrictions are necessary for the safety of its guests, but human rights organizations familiar with the TNI’s dealings in Aceh in the past are suspicious that military hardliners are using security concerns as an excuse to keep prying eyes away from its operations in the field. Of immediate concern is that restrictions could impede the flow of aid to the more remote areas of Aceh. Relief organizations also worry that the TNI wants to resell aid on the black market. These doubters have a legitimate point. Logically, GAM as a separatist movement would have little to gain and much to lose by attacking aid workers. With worldwide media attention now on Aceh, the GAM leadership must be anxious to bolster its credibility with the foreign community; undermining relief efforts would be a disaster for the guerrillas, and only strengthen Western support for TNI to wage its war in Aceh. Hence the efforts by GAM to stitch together a cease-fire agreement. Since this is one of the world’s forgotten wars, most outsiders are not aware of the TNI’s terrible reputation in Aceh. Besides numerous instances of gross human rights abuses against Acehnese civilians, TNI has also reportedly been involved in war profiteering: Car smuggling, illegal logging, marijuana trading and protection rackets aimed against foreign companies have been part of the TNI black-market business portfolio in Aceh for many years. For senior military officers, a posting in Aceh is considered to be one of the more lucrative assignments. Knowing this, fears of corrupt officers making designs on humanitarian aid are well-founded, and could partly explain why dishonest players inside TNI are anxious to reassert control. Finally, there is the radical Muslim part of the calculus. Not long after relief workers started appearing, there have been reports of extremist Islamic organizations starting to mass their cadres in Banda Aceh. Two groups in particular— the Islamic Defender’s Front and Laskar Mujahidin—are known to have anti-Western sentiments and a track record of violence. Although there have been no clashes yet with the foreign community, this possibility can’t be discounted. As much as hardliners inside the TNI would feel more comfortable with the exit of foreigners, so the Islamic extremists would like to take a leading role in filling the void left by the collapse of local governments and have greater influence in the province. In fact, there should be little doubt that Islamic extremists would prefer Western aid efforts to fail. Whereas the Bush administration sees its work in Aceh as a grand opportunity to improve its image in the Muslim world, extremists view Washington’s success as a threat in the war for co-religionists’ hearts and minds. Following a resounding victory in last year’s presidential elections, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is now facing his first critical test of leadership. Should he manage the Aceh crisis skillfully, he will be assured of an even stronger mandate to lead and enjoy considerable prestige on the international stage. If he fails, however, not only will Indonesia’s reputation suffer, but the president will find himself cornered by his political opponents at home, and find it difficult to deliver on his pledges of political and economic reform. Handling the Aceh crisis will not be easy. But a couple of steps can be taken to enhance the national government’s chances of success: * President Yudhoyono must sideline the military hardliners based in Aceh and replace them with officer diplomats to lead the troops. Preferably, the Indonesian president would also rotate soldiers who were based in Aceh during the separatist conflict—who mostly come from the Army—and replace them with the more highly respected and professional troops of the Marines, Navy and Air Force. By doing so, President Yudhoyono would not only lessen the chances of corruption and improve the delivery of aid, but also send the signal to GAM that the national government is serious about seeking a cease-fire. * The government should use this opportunity to negotiate not only a cease-fire but a lasting peace accord with GAM, as well.With their homeland in tatters, GAM should now be more accommodating at the negotiating table and be willing to forsake their demands for an independent state. On Jakarta’s side, the leadership should realize that what the Acehnese need most now is to rebuild their province and get back to earning a livelihood. It is estimated that the destructive forces of the tsunami have thrown one million Acehnese into poverty. If the government takes positive steps towards ensuring Aceh a better future, then the entire local community—GAM included—will surely embrace a formula for peace. * Measures should be taken to expel radical Muslim groups from Aceh as soon as possible. Although they purport to have a humanitarian mission, their history suggests otherwise. Nor is their presence necessarily welcomed by the Acehnese or GAM. In the worst-case scenario, they will prove to be a spoiler in the government’s efforts to stabilize Aceh, and will mar Jakarta’s reputation with its Western allies. For its own political interests and the future of Aceh, Indonesia should realize that the stakes are simply too high in taking a soft line towards these extremist groups that represent only a tiny fraction of the Muslim population. Mr. Van Zorge runs an independent political and risk consultancy in Jakarta. ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> Give the gift of life to a sick child. 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