http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GE10Ak01.html
May 10, 2005 
  

 No room for political Islam in Syria 
By Sami Moubayed 


DAMASCUS - At the gates of the popular as-Sehour Mosque in Aleppo (north Syria) 
a sign reads, "No to explosions!" showing a bomb with a red line going through 
it. This is a sign of Syria's willingness to cooperate with moderate Islam that 
does not encourage terrorism. It is also a signal that Washington and Damascus 
have a common enemy in Islamic fundamentalism. 

Further south in the capital Damascus, a regime-friendly moderate Muslim cleric 
named Mohammad Habash stands as a member of the Syrian parliament, advocating 
the abolition of law No 49, which says that membership in the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood is a capital offense, punishable by death. 

This law was passed when in June 1980 members of the Brotherhood tried to 
assassinate president Hafez Assad. By calling for a rapprochement, Habash wants 
to absorb the Brotherhood, and other Muslim groups, to make them 
regime-friendly. Ending the extremism of yet another radical Islamic group 
would serve the interests of both Syria and the United States. Habash, who came 
to parliament in March 2003 while war was raging in neighboring Iraq, has 
served as a liaison between the Syrian government and the Islamic opposition, 
embodied by the outlawed Brotherhood. His calls on the government so far have 
been responded to favorably, and it is expected that law 49 will be abolished 
during the upcoming Ba'ath Party conference, scheduled for June. 

Syria, which is facing increased pressure from the US, realizes that the only 
way to avoid isolation is to create a united front at home, where the 
Ba'athists and all their traditional enemies (the Brotherhood included) can 
work together for a united and strong Syria. Since pressure increased on 
Damascus in 2003, Syria has stressed that it wants to reach out to what it 
describes as "nationalist opposition", men who are not funded, allied, or in 
support of a US-engineered regime change in Syria, like the US-based Farid 
al-Ghadri. One week after the fall of Baghdad, the Doha-based al-Jazeera TV 
interviewed members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, and all of them called 
for dialogue with the regime, rather than confrontation, stressing that there 
was no Ahmad Chalabi among the Syrian opposition, and pointing out that they 
would never side with the US against Syria, despite their history of conflict 
with the Ba'athists. The message was noted, and highly appreciated by the 
Syrian government. 

Reconciliation with the Brotherhood
When President Bashar Assad came to power in July 2000, long before Syria's 
relations plummeted with Washington, he raised the motto: "More friends for 
Syria, and less enemies." On July 22, five days into his constitutional term as 
president, 40 Islamic leaders in the Arab world published an open letter to 
Assad in the Jordanian daily al-Dustur, calling on him to turn a new page in 
his relations with the outlawed Muslim groups in Syria. It was signed by the 
leaders of the Syrian, Egyptian, and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. Five days 
later, on July 27, Assad responded promptly and released 30 members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood from jail, who had tried and failed to launch a rebellion 
against his father in 1982. He also released members of the Brotherhood's 
allies, the Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami) and the 
Lebanese Islamic group Haraket al-Tawhid al-Islami (Movement of Islamic 
Unification), which had launched an insurrection against the Syrian army 
stationed in Tripoli in 1986. 

Other gestures included the return of Abu al-Fateh Baynouni, the brother of the 
Brotherhood's leader, Ali Sadr al-Din al-Baynouni, from exile in September 2001 
and permission to publish and sell some of the books of the Syrian 
Brotherhood's founder, ideologue, and scholar, Mustapha al-Sibaii, after having 
been on the Ba'ath blacklist for over four decades. 

Assad's greatest gesture was a general amnesty in which 600 political prisoners 
were set free in 2000, 90% of whom were from the Brotherhood. In November 2001, 
Assad released another 113, most of whom had been arrested in 1979 for a 
massacre conducted on Ba'ath Party cadets in Aleppo. In December 2004, Assad 
released another 112 members of the Brotherhood, and most recently, 55 
prisoners were set free, mostly from the Brotherhood, on February 12. In turn, 
the Brotherhood supported the new leader by issuing statements praising his 
promised reforms, claiming that he was not responsible for the mistakes of the 
past. In May 2001, they issued a National Honor Pact, articulating their 
demands, but also recognizing the legitimacy of the Ba'athist regime, something 
they had refused to do since the party came to power in 1963. 

The Brotherhood found more reason to cooperate when in 2001, Assad refused to 
join in the US-led war on Afghanistan, and in 2003, in the war on Iraq. They 
hailed his commitment to the uprising in Palestine, and his support for Hamas, 
Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Brotherhood also hailed Assad's 
refusal to abide by US terminology on terrorism, vis-a-vis Hezbollah and the 
Palestinian resistance, and his declared commitment to restore the Golan 
Heights to Syria, and Jerusalem to the Palestinians. Both Assad and the Muslim 
Brotherhood believe and often said that democracy cannot be imported to Syria 
by the US, nor can it be imposed by President George W Bush. The only way to 
democratize is from within, they say. 


New fear of political Islam in Syria

Assad continues to promote moderate Islam through regime-friendly clerics like 
Mohammad Habash and the Aleppo-based preacher Mohammad Kamil al-Husayni, who 
are free to preach, teach and tutor students as they please, with no 
intervention from the government. Through men like these, he hopes to curb the 
influence of the Brotherhood and other Islamic groups in Syria. Assad, however, 
and all secular or moderate Syrian Muslims, realize that with the failure of 
Arab nationalism, Islamic nationalism is taking over the Middle East. Watching 
the Arab defeat in Palestine since 1948, the Muslim defeat in Afghanistan in 
2001, and the Arab defeat in Iraq in 2003, many Syrians and Arabs in general 
have turned to Islam for salvation. The crippling economic conditions, the lack 
of political parties to follow, and the increasing worldwide appeal of Islam 
all made the Brotherhood an attractive outlet for many of those in misery. 

Based on the local motto, "If you want to popularize anything, ban it" the 
Brotherhood began capitalizing on state restrictions and appealing to the 
masses in secret after they tried to topple the Ba'athist regime from Hama 
twice, in 1964 and 1982. Behind-the-door lectures were held, fiery sermons were 
conducted, banned books by Said Qutub and pamphlets speaking of an Islamic 
state were distributed. All of this ended right after the violent showdown 
between the Brotherhood and the state in the 1980s, and many lost faith in the 
Brotherhood for having ordered its members to enter into such an ill-planned 
and destructive war against the Syrian government. 

>From the early 1990s onwards, however, mosque going, blind adherence to cleric 
>instructions, fasting, and women wearing headscarves became increasingly 
>common in Syria, a country traditionally famed for its moderate Islam. In the 
>1950s, when secularism was the trend in the Middle East, it was difficult to 
>find many veiled women among university students in Damascus. Today, it is 
>difficult to find many unveiled woman among university students in Damascus. 
>Clearly, an Islamic trend was emerging in Syria that must be combated 
>immediately. The secular and moderate Syrians watched in disbelief when it was 
>revealed that many senior members of al-Qaeda in Europe were Syrians. In April 
>2004, several Islamic fundamentalists who had been to Iraq in 2003 found their 
>way back to Damascus, with arms they had obtained from Iraq, and attacked an 
>United Nations building in the residential Mezzeh neighborhood of Damascus, 
>sending shockwaves through Damascus. 

Radical Islam is not being taught at schools in Syria, mainly because schools 
are closely monitored to avoid that by Syrian authorities. Yet, the popularity 
of Islam, not only in Syria but throughout the world, explains why so many of 
the actions taken in its name frightens the regime in Damascus. And out of the 
thousands who come to Syria to study Islam from all over the Muslim world, 
nobody can guarantee that a few of them will not transform into 
fundamentalists. 

At the Sheikh Ahmad Kaftaro Islamic Foundation in Damascus, there are 5,000 
students, 20% of them being foreigners. Although its founder and leader, 
Syria's late Mufti Ahmad Kaftaro, was a moderate cleric who advocated a secular 
state, he never could guarantee that all of his students would graduate with 
similar views on Islam. His son Salah Kaftaro elaborated, saying: "There is no 
room for political Islam on our agenda." 

Today, much is being speculated in the Western press that if regime change 
takes place in Syria, the Brotherhood would replace the Ba'athists in a true 
democracy. The Iraqi example gives enough reason for this fear because in the 
Iraqi elections of January 2005, the clerics won with an overwhelming majority, 
and Iraq's new Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari is from the Islamic al-Da'wa 
Party, which had fought Saddam Hussein in the underground throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s. Although it has pledged to work with the US, many are uneasy in 
Washington with the fact that a believer in political Islam like Jaafari should 
rise to power in Iraq, fearing a similar scenario in Syria. That is utter 
nonsense. 

Unlike the al-Da'wa Party, which had a lot of supporters in Iraq, the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood is still hated by many for having inflicted so much 
senseless blood on Syria in the 1970s and 1980s, forcing the regime to 
transform into a police state. In a pure democracy, a rough guess would give 
the Islamic groups a 15-20% representation in parliament. The reason that 
number is so much higher in Iraq is that the Iraqis, having been living in such 
miserable conditions since 1990, turned en masse to religion. 

That has not been the case in Syria. Although religiousness is increasing, not 
everybody is willing to support, or become a member, in an Islamic political 
party. The Islamists in Syria would not win a majority, since a majority of 
Syria's 17 million, even the mosque-goers among them, are advocates of a 
secular Syria. Yet, the Islamic groups do represent a certain segment of Syrian 
society that cannot be ignored. Rather than have them on the offensive, as they 
had been since the 1960s, Assad hopes to contain their activities and meanwhile 
appease their opposition through varying measures. Appeasement would take the 
form of a relaxation of political control, an amnesty for the Brotherhood's 
exiled leadership, and pursuing a foreign policy, vis-a-vis Palestine and Iraq, 
that runs parallel with their political aspirations. Curtailed, contained, 
politically and financially bankrupt, the Brotherhood is forced to return to 
Syria under Assad's regulations. Step one on their agenda should not be 
resuming political activity in Syria, but rather returning physically to Syria. 
Once this is achieved, political re-activation can be discussed. However, both 
the Brotherhood and Assad know that while step one is feasible and perhaps in 
the near future, step two is still nothing but a distant dream since 
authorities have made it very clear that once a new party law is passed in 
Syria in June 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood will not be given a license to 
operate. The most they can dream of at this stage is to return to Syria to live 
as private citizens. 


A lesson from history
Many in Syria and abroad are wondering how to deal with radical Islamic groups, 
especially the Muslim Brotherhood, and control their influence to avoid 
problems if a healthy democratic culture is created in Syria. The only solution 
would be to create powerful and attractive alternatives to the Islamic groups, 
and a strong civil society that can lobby against the radical Islamification of 
  society. 

A story from history gives a perfect lesson for future conduct in Syria. In the 
1920s, a Muslim society called al-Gharaa was created in Syria. It started out 
as a charity organization for the Muslim poor, and by the 1940s began preaching 
political Islam. In future years, many of its young members went on to found 
the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. In 1944, its leaders presented a long list of 
demands to president Shukri al-Quwatli. They included installing special 
tramcars for rush hour to separate the sexes, shutting down all cabarets and 
casinos that served alcohol, arresting the owners of nightclubs, and the 
establishment of a moral police squad, similar to the one in Saudi Arabia, to 
be charged with patrolling streets and punishing all women appearing unveiled 
in public. In May 1944, al-Gharaa violently protested against a charity ball 
held in Damascus, which wives of the ruling elite were planning to attend 
unveiled. 

Demonstrators took to the streets, carrying revolvers and knives, stoning 
cinemas that welcomed women, burning nightclubs, and attacking women on dates, 
or those promenading unveiled. To win, the president decided to discredit the 
clerics in districts were they enjoyed most power; the poor neighborhoods of 
Damascus. Quwatli got Adila Bayhum, head of the independent Women's Union, to 
temporarily cease the free distribution of milk to the city's poor. When 
mothers came to collect, they were politely turned away and told, "go to the 
shaykhs, let them give you milk." This was echoed all over Syria. 

Then, Quwatli cut off flour distribution in Midan, where the Islamists were 
popular, knowing perfectly well that nobody else could provide bread since the 
government controlled all flour rations in the wartime economy. The clerics 
could not provide, and overnight the demonstrations supporting the Islamic 
groups turned against them. Such measures were repeated over and over again by 
civil society groups during the 1940s and 1950s, ensuring that populist Islam 
remained weak, and that many alternatives to political Islam exist in Syria. 
This is what Syria needs to do today to curb the influence of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, or any other emerging Islamic group in Syria, to preserve a 
secular Syria. 

Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst. 

(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us 
for information on sales, syndication and republishing.)




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