[An Asia Pacific Millennium] 'Freelance Terrorism' in Asia?

Philip Dorsey Iglauer
Korea Times Columnist

Noordin Mohammed Top: Asia Pacific’s Public Enemy No.1

Two weeks ago, he narrowly escaped capture for at least the second time when 
Indonesia’s paramilitary counter-terrorism squad, Detachment 88, raided a 
small apartment in Wonosobo, Central Java, killing two members of his inner 
circle and arresting two others.

The international press paints a picture of a bespectacled 35-year-old 
Malaysian on the run: A man who will soon be captured or killed. If that 
happens, Indonesia would have eliminated the person most determined to drive 
Western interests out of the country.

But Asia will still have to contend with Noordin’s legacy _ a new system of 
terrorism in which militants work `freelance’ and not for a specific 
faction, party or ideological group.

Since 9-11, Noordin has tapped into several terrorist networks to build a 
following of diehard loyalists, and those same networks will be available to 
others in the future.

Noordin is nicknamed the ``Moneyman’’ by the media in his native Malaysia 
for his ability to recruit militants into becoming suicide bombers and his 
skill at raising the funds that finance terrorist missions. He is said to 
have cut his teeth in insurgency tactics through years of Jihadi struggle in 
the southern Philippines and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

Though Noordin is now a freelancer, he hails from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the 
region’s largest militant Islamic organization. JI continues to provide his 
following’s elite core, as specific missions and individuals have been 
linked to the group.

The two killed in the police attack in Wonosobo, in addition to being close 
Noordin associates, were also longstanding JI members.

Since 2004, however, Noordin began reaching out to young men from other 
organizations and some with no previous organizational affiliation.

Top’s partner, Azahari bin Husin, was killed last November during a dramatic 
police raid on his hideout in East Java, in which suicide bombs were 
detonated.

Many JI members reportedly see the group he has cobbled together in what 
Noordin calls ``al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago’’ as a splinter group. 
Those JI members believe Noordin has done great harm to the organization 
they joined in the mid-1990s.

Noordin, however, reportedly sees himself as leading JI’s military wing, 
even though he answers to no one.

In putting his group together, Nordin has relied neither on ideology, 
religious authority nor political affiliation, but personal contacts, 
although he employs any and all of these means to effect what amounts to 
subcontracting terror.

According to the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG), he relied 
on three networks for the Australian embassy bombing in September 2004: A 
blend of JI members, alumni of militant Islamic schools and Darul Islam and 
an Indonesian Islamic militant group that sent members to Sulawesi and 
Maluku provinces in 1999 to conduct terrorist operations.

While individuals from his Ring Banten faction had worked with JI before, he 
is the first insurgent leader to have outsourced military operations. 
Noordin’s freewheeling ``terror outsourcing’’ does share at least one 
characteristic with terrorism in general since 9-11 _ innovation.

After the Australian embassy bombing in Jakarta, Noordin was short of funds, 
weapons and experienced fighters. He turned to two men who had access to all 
these, neither of whom were JI.

Noordin turned to a leader from Darul Islam, an established group with 
connections to movements across Asia. The other had been head of the Ambon 
office of the Islamic charity KOMPAK and capable of mobilizing religious 
soldiers. Although these two men did not join Noordin, their subordinates 
did, according to reports in the Jakarta Post.

Intense negotiations followed, with couriers used to relay messages between 
the bosses. It turned out that neither the Darul Islam nor the KOMPAK leader 
was interested in joining forces but both were arrested in mid-2005 and 
began to lose control over their followers, some of whom went over to 
Noordin.

For the second Bali bombing last October, Noordin relied on his inner 
circle, including the two who were killed on April 29, to find and train new 
members.

He is said to have been a key figure behind every major terrorist attack in 
Indonesia: The 2002 Bali bombing, the 2003 JW Marriott Hotel and the 2004 
Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta, and the second Bali bombing last 
year.

For the August 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta, he used a small 
circle of Sumatra-based JI members who had either been associated with a JI 
school in Malaysia, or an Islamic boarding school in Ngruki near Solo, 
Central Java.

Though crediting him with so many high-profile attacks could be an 
exaggeration, Noordin has shown remarkable determination and capacity to 
plan operations even as he loses his closest colleagues to special 
counter-insurgency forces.

After the second Bali attack, speculation in the Malaysia Star and Jakarta 
Post suggests police are closing-in on the terrorist chief. The April 29 
raid eliminated men close to Noordin.

>From that raid, police succeeded in later capturing several other Noordin 
aides, according to reports in the Malaysia Star and other Southeast Asian 
media. If Indonesian forces can arrest Noordin, religious extremism will 
surely be dealt a significant blow.

Even if Noordin is killed, the ``4-minute mile’’ barrier in recruiting has 
been broken. Insurgents, regardless of factionalism or ideological 
affiliation, are open to the idea of freelancing and working with ambitious 
leaders.



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http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/opinion/200605/kt2006050817531654270.htm
05-08-2006 17:53




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