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>From Jakarta to Cairo: The Dictators' Discourse by Aboeprijadi Santoso on Monday, February 14, 2011 at 11:00am International media have recently cited Indonesia experience as example for Egypt. Not Iran Islamic Revolution, but post-Soeharto transition is viewed as model. The argument, favoring the secular and moderate forces, is based on the fear that the small but vocal Islamic Brotherhood would hijack the transition. Others, however, compare Egypt revolution to the post-Berlin Wall wave that brought democracy to Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Is post-Soeharto transition the right model? Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak exit has been inevitable. Any delay would have risked a dangerous situation, not least for he himself. Dictators' demise characteristically goes along the course that presses them to rely on both strategic and day to day situation until they see no other option than exit - as happened to Ferdinand Marcos, Soeharto and others - until, perhaps, they risk Romania's Ceacescu's fatal fate. In the case of Soeharto, let's recall, he was well aware of the growing tension at home while visiting Egypt mid-May 1998. On May 13 he declared "If they no longer trust me, let it be known, I would rather opt to become a 'wise ruler'," echoing the Javanese concept of Pandito Ratu, which means he believed he still enjoyed his people credit and, if resigning, will do it in legitimate way. A president who ruled like a King, Soeharto must have been instinctively aware that his days were numbered, but thought it was not appropriate to concede. He calculated his chances and left it to Foreign Minister Ali Alatas to convey his assurance that "possible change at home will only occur according to the constitution". Soeharto hoped his message would help reduce the tension. Instead, on May 15 he was 'welcomed' home by the huge inferno that took the life of hundreds mall workers and the suffering of Chinese women. A few invisible hands behind the events forced him to challenge the pressures by offering a cabinet of reform and inviting religious figures for advice. But some ministers had resigned and mass protest continued unabated. It took Soeharto six days since his first statement in Cairo before he, on May 19, decided to step down. Typically, to imply that he was somehow still in control, he personally announced it two days later, by saying "I decide ..". The fact that he did it angrily - shouting 'gak pathèken' to express his being fed up with his current status - suggests, however, that he grossly miscalculated his options. No wonder, rather than acting constitutionally as promised, he apparently wanted to break the protest and prepare his own scenario. Both failed and he blamed his then son-in-law, gen. Prabowo Subianto, and his successor, B.J. Habibie. It's the desperate act to stubbornly cling on power that dramatically changed the cautious president Soeharto, like other dictators, into an angry autocrat, who took his final decision only after he saw no other option. In 1986, in the aftermath of the EDSA mass protests that gave birth to the term 'People Power', Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos went through similar pattern only soon - at the very last minutes - to be hurriedly flown by the U.S., not to his homeland Ilolo, but - perhaps without him being aware of it - to Hawaii. In both cases, the fact that they could no longer rely on their (former) ally - the Army - basically tipped the balance. What is more: since no Young Turks were available, only maverick officers could seize the momentum. Hence, the events ended up with failed attempts at coup d'etat - by Gringo Honasan in Manila and Prabowo Subianto in Jakarta. Dictators' fate thus ultimately depends on the military elite. They may leave them split, but must prevent the institution from disintegrating, since this would not only worsen the fate of the nation, but won't guarantee their own survival either. It is at this the crucial juncture that the state enabled Marcos to seek refuge and Soeharto, along with his cronies, to remain safe and influential. Similar pattern and dilemma have typically evolved in Egypt as the mass protests went into the third week. Some 24 social groupings demanding Mubarak exit have been able to exercise real heavy pressures, yet this only resulted in a-week-long stalemate. Even after the Higher Military Council announced that "all protesters demands will be met" on the 17th day of the protests, last Thursday (10 Feb), Mubarak refused to step down. Yet the next day he resigned with the military establishment appearing intact and united. At the same time, though, worries apparently intensified and chaos might ensue with a coup d'etat being the last option - a confusion which arose perhaps not in spite of, but thanks to the fact that this is one of the most stable military regimes on earth (since Gamal Abdel Nasser's coup d'etat of 1952). Egypt's military, it should be noted, has a better image than the security police. Unlike Soeharto and Marcos, then, Mubarak - embarrassed and humiliated - left office 'secretly' with the military remaining calm. Egypt, after all, is U.S second best ally needed to guarantee peace in the region. It means any U.S. dealing with Cairo may have critical implications for Israel, the whole Middle East and the Gulf. Hence, analogy with domino-like changes in Eastern Europe following the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) is possible, but definitely not preferred. If Bush Jr. succeeded to impose regime change and democratic reform only through war (for Iraq at least), now Obama has to do it peacefully. But post-1998 Indonesia transition is neither simple nor "smooth" as the West would have it. There surely have been greater freedom and democratic reform, but Soeharto's legacy, in terms of blood, method and spirit, was visible in much that happened to East Timor, Aceh, Papua and the ethnic and sectarian wars until the late-2000s. Quite the contrary, what happened in Egypt is itself an example. Seldom a massive people revolt remains admirably peaceful, consistent and united for weeks as those protesters at Tahrir Square, Cairo. Like in Europe, from Leipzig to Budapest in the 1990s, but less so in 1986 Manila and 1998 Jakarta, the popular movement in Egypt has demanded the dismantling of the ruling political party. All they would have to do next is what the civic organizations in Eastern Europe did i.e. calling for the dissolution of the regime's intelligence apparatuses - which the pro-democracy movement in the Philippines and Indonesia completely neglected. Dictators discourse is a symptom of state's discourse. Soeharto - like Spain's Francisco Franco and Chile's Augusto Pinochet - were most lucky. Less fortunate, a number of ex-African dictators have to live in Paris' famous-turned-infamous Arrondisement 16. They all enjoy their remaining privileges until death. Such a discourse for Mubarak has now been denied by his people. * The writer is journalist. He covered the Philippines (1987), Indonesia and Eastern Europe throughout the 1990s for Radio Netherlands. 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