Re: [Qemu-devel] Direct guest device access from nested guest

2013-08-29 Thread Aaron Fabbri
Has anyone considered a paravirt approach? That is: Guest kernel: Write a new IOMMU API back end which does KVM hypercalls. Exposes VFIO to guest user processes (nested VMs) as usual. Host kernel: KVM does things like collapse {guest_va - guest_pa - host_pa} mappings to {guest_va - host_pa},

[Qemu-devel] Fwd: Direct guest device access from nested guest

2013-08-29 Thread Aaron Fabbri
Sorry. Resending in plain text. (Gmail). -- Forwarded message -- Has anyone considered a paravirt approach? That is: Guest kernel: Write a new IOMMU API back end which does KVM hypercalls. Exposes VFIO to guest user processes (nested VMs) as usual. Host kernel: KVM does

Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC] Device isolation infrastructure v2

2011-12-20 Thread Aaron Fabbri
On 12/20/11 8:30 PM, Alex Williamson alex.william...@redhat.com wrote: On Wed, 2011-12-21 at 14:32 +1100, David Gibson wrote: On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 04:41:56PM +0100, Joerg Roedel wrote: On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 11:11:25AM +1100, David Gibson wrote: snip Well, the iommu-api was designed

Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH] vfio: VFIO Driver core framework

2011-11-15 Thread Aaron Fabbri
On 11/15/11 12:10 PM, Scott Wood scottw...@freescale.com wrote: On 11/15/2011 12:34 AM, David Gibson wrote: snip +static int allow_unsafe_intrs; +module_param(allow_unsafe_intrs, int, 0); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(allow_unsafe_intrs, +Allow use of IOMMUs which do not support interrupt

Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH] vfio: VFIO Driver core framework

2011-11-08 Thread Aaron Fabbri
I'm going to send out chunks of comments as I go over this stuff. Below I've covered the documentation file and vfio_iommu.c. More comments coming soon... On 11/3/11 1:12 PM, Alex Williamson alex.william...@redhat.com wrote: VFIO provides a secure, IOMMU based interface for user space

Re: [Qemu-devel] kvm PCI assignment VFIO ramblings

2011-08-26 Thread Aaron Fabbri
On 8/26/11 7:07 AM, Alexander Graf ag...@suse.de wrote: snip Forget the KVM case for a moment and think of a user space device driver. I as a user am not root. But I as a user when having access to /dev/vfioX want to be able to access the device and manage it - and only it. The admin of

Re: [Qemu-devel] kvm PCI assignment VFIO ramblings

2011-08-26 Thread Aaron Fabbri
On 8/26/11 12:35 PM, Chris Wright chr...@sous-sol.org wrote: * Aaron Fabbri (aafab...@cisco.com) wrote: On 8/26/11 7:07 AM, Alexander Graf ag...@suse.de wrote: Forget the KVM case for a moment and think of a user space device driver. I as a user am not root. But I as a user when having

Re: [Qemu-devel] kvm PCI assignment VFIO ramblings

2011-08-23 Thread Aaron Fabbri
On 8/23/11 10:01 AM, Alex Williamson alex.william...@redhat.com wrote: On Tue, 2011-08-23 at 16:54 +1000, Benjamin Herrenschmidt wrote: On Mon, 2011-08-22 at 17:52 -0700, aafabbri wrote: I'm not following you. You have to enforce group/iommu domain assignment whether you have the