Re: [RFC PATCH v2 17/19] heki: x86: Update permissions counters during text patching

2023-11-30 Thread Edgecombe, Rick P
On Wed, 2023-11-29 at 15:07 -0600, Madhavan T. Venkataraman wrote: > Threat Model > > > In the threat model in Heki, the attacker is a user space attacker > who exploits > a kernel vulnerability to gain more privileges or bypass the kernel's > access > control and self-protection mech

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity

2023-05-30 Thread Edgecombe, Rick P
On Fri, 2023-05-26 at 17:22 +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > > > Can the guest kernel ask the host VMM's emulated devices to DMA > > > into > > > the protected data? It should go through the host userspace > > > mappings I > > > think, which don't care about EPT permissions. Or did I miss > > > where

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity

2023-05-25 Thread Edgecombe, Rick P
On Thu, 2023-05-25 at 09:07 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > On Thu, May 25, 2023, Rick P Edgecombe wrote: > > I wonder if it might be a good idea to POC the guest side before > > settling on the KVM interface. Then you can also look at the whole > > thing and judge how much usage it would get f

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity

2023-05-25 Thread Edgecombe, Rick P
On Thu, 2023-05-25 at 15:59 +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: [ snip ] > > The kernel often creates writable aliases in order to write to > > protected data (kernel text, etc). Some of this is done right as > > text > > is being first written out (alternatives for example), and some > > happens > > way

Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/9] Hypervisor-Enforced Kernel Integrity

2023-05-24 Thread Edgecombe, Rick P
On Fri, 2023-05-05 at 17:20 +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > # How does it work? > > This implementation mainly leverages KVM capabilities to control the > Second > Layer Address Translation (or the Two Dimensional Paging e.g., > Intel's EPT or > AMD's RVI/NPT) and Mode Based Execution Control (Inte