Shadow CVQ will copy buffers on qemu VA, so we avoid TOCTOU attacks from the guest that could set a different state in qemu device model and vdpa device.
To do so, it needs to be able to map these new buffers to the device. Signed-off-by: Eugenio Pérez <epere...@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasow...@redhat.com> --- include/hw/virtio/vhost-vdpa.h | 4 ++++ hw/virtio/vhost-vdpa.c | 7 +++---- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/hw/virtio/vhost-vdpa.h b/include/hw/virtio/vhost-vdpa.h index a29dbb3f53..7214eb47dc 100644 --- a/include/hw/virtio/vhost-vdpa.h +++ b/include/hw/virtio/vhost-vdpa.h @@ -39,4 +39,8 @@ typedef struct vhost_vdpa { VhostVDPAHostNotifier notifier[VIRTIO_QUEUE_MAX]; } VhostVDPA; +int vhost_vdpa_dma_map(struct vhost_vdpa *v, hwaddr iova, hwaddr size, + void *vaddr, bool readonly); +int vhost_vdpa_dma_unmap(struct vhost_vdpa *v, hwaddr iova, hwaddr size); + #endif diff --git a/hw/virtio/vhost-vdpa.c b/hw/virtio/vhost-vdpa.c index 0b13e98471..96997210be 100644 --- a/hw/virtio/vhost-vdpa.c +++ b/hw/virtio/vhost-vdpa.c @@ -71,8 +71,8 @@ static bool vhost_vdpa_listener_skipped_section(MemoryRegionSection *section, return false; } -static int vhost_vdpa_dma_map(struct vhost_vdpa *v, hwaddr iova, hwaddr size, - void *vaddr, bool readonly) +int vhost_vdpa_dma_map(struct vhost_vdpa *v, hwaddr iova, hwaddr size, + void *vaddr, bool readonly) { struct vhost_msg_v2 msg = {}; int fd = v->device_fd; @@ -97,8 +97,7 @@ static int vhost_vdpa_dma_map(struct vhost_vdpa *v, hwaddr iova, hwaddr size, return ret; } -static int vhost_vdpa_dma_unmap(struct vhost_vdpa *v, hwaddr iova, - hwaddr size) +int vhost_vdpa_dma_unmap(struct vhost_vdpa *v, hwaddr iova, hwaddr size) { struct vhost_msg_v2 msg = {}; int fd = v->device_fd; -- 2.31.1