> -Original Message-
> From: Michael S. Tsirkin [mailto:m...@redhat.com]
> Sent: Sunday, December 11, 2016 10:51 AM
> To: Eric Blake
> Cc: Gonglei (Arei); qemu-devel@nongnu.org; stefa...@redhat.com
> Subject: Re: [PATCH for-2.9 v2] virtio-crypto: zeroize the key material before
> free
>
On Thu, Dec 08, 2016 at 09:20:07AM -0600, Eric Blake wrote:
> On 12/07/2016 08:33 PM, Gonglei (Arei) wrote:
>
> >> Sensitive information is sometimes also held in mlocked pages to prevent
> >> it being swapped to disk, but qemu in general is not currently taking
> >> that level of precaution (see
On 10.12.2016 03:58, Gonglei (Arei) wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 09.12.2016 02:42, Gonglei (Arei) wrote:
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH for-2.9 v2] virtio-crypto: zeroize the key
>>>> material before free
>&
>
>
> On 09.12.2016 02:42, Gonglei (Arei) wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> >>
> >> Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH for-2.9 v2] virtio-crypto: zeroize the key
> >> material before free
> >>
> >> On 08.12.2016 16:23, Eric Blake wrote:
> &
On 09.12.2016 02:42, Gonglei (Arei) wrote:
> Hi,
>
>>
>> Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH for-2.9 v2] virtio-crypto: zeroize the key
>> material before free
>>
>> On 08.12.2016 16:23, Eric Blake wrote:
>>> On 12/07/2016 08:28 PM, Gonglei (Arei) wrote:
Hi,
>
> Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH for-2.9 v2] virtio-crypto: zeroize the key
> material before free
>
> On 08.12.2016 16:23, Eric Blake wrote:
> > On 12/07/2016 08:28 PM, Gonglei (Arei) wrote:
> >
> >>> As far as I'm aware, other projects usuall
On 08.12.2016 16:23, Eric Blake wrote:
> On 12/07/2016 08:28 PM, Gonglei (Arei) wrote:
>
>>> As far as I'm aware, other projects usually have a special memset
>>> variation for doing this. That is because compilers may choose to
>>> "optimize" memset(p, ...) + free(p) to just the free(p). Having
On 12/07/2016 08:28 PM, Gonglei (Arei) wrote:
>> As far as I'm aware, other projects usually have a special memset
>> variation for doing this. That is because compilers may choose to
>> "optimize" memset(p, ...) + free(p) to just the free(p). Having a
>
> Actually, I googled this, but I didn't
On 12/07/2016 08:33 PM, Gonglei (Arei) wrote:
>> Sensitive information is sometimes also held in mlocked pages to prevent
>> it being swapped to disk, but qemu in general is not currently taking
>> that level of precaution (see also commit 8813800b).
>>
>>>
>>> Let's zeroize the memory of
>
> From: Eric Blake [mailto:ebl...@redhat.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, December 07, 2016 11:22 PM
> To: Gonglei (Arei); qemu-devel@nongnu.org
> Cc: m...@redhat.com; stefa...@redhat.com
> Subject: Re: [PATCH for-2.9 v2] virtio-crypto: zeroize the key material before
> free
>
> On 12/06/2016 08:29 PM,
Hi Max,
>
> On 07.12.2016 03:29, Gonglei wrote:
> > Common practice with sensitive information (key material, passwords,
> > etc). Prevents sensitive information from being exposed by accident later in
> > coredumps, memory disclosure bugs when heap memory is reused, etc.
> >
> > Sensitive
On 07.12.2016 03:29, Gonglei wrote:
> Common practice with sensitive information (key material, passwords,
> etc). Prevents sensitive information from being exposed by accident later in
> coredumps, memory disclosure bugs when heap memory is reused, etc.
>
> Sensitive information is sometimes
On 12/06/2016 08:29 PM, Gonglei wrote:
> Common practice with sensitive information (key material, passwords,
> etc). Prevents sensitive information from being exposed by accident later in
> coredumps, memory disclosure bugs when heap memory is reused, etc.
>
> Sensitive information is sometimes
Common practice with sensitive information (key material, passwords,
etc). Prevents sensitive information from being exposed by accident later in
coredumps, memory disclosure bugs when heap memory is reused, etc.
Sensitive information is sometimes also held in mlocked pages to prevent
it being
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