Re: [Qemu-devel] spec, RFC: TLS support for NBD

2014-10-21 Thread Wouter Verhelst
On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 10:35:06AM +0100, Daniel P. Berrange wrote: > On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 12:10:39AM +0200, Wouter Verhelst wrote: > > On Mon, Oct 20, 2014 at 01:56:43PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote: > > > I cannot comment on whether the proposed STARTTLS command is at the > > > correct > > > s

Re: [Qemu-devel] spec, RFC: TLS support for NBD

2014-10-21 Thread Daniel P. Berrange
On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 12:10:39AM +0200, Wouter Verhelst wrote: > On Mon, Oct 20, 2014 at 01:56:43PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote: > > I cannot comment on whether the proposed STARTTLS command is at the correct > > stage of the NBD protocol. If there is a protocol description for NBD, I > > can ha

Re: [Qemu-devel] spec, RFC: TLS support for NBD

2014-10-20 Thread Wouter Verhelst
On Mon, Oct 20, 2014 at 01:56:43PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote: > I cannot comment on whether the proposed STARTTLS command is at the correct > stage of the NBD protocol. If there is a protocol description for NBD, I > can have a look. To make this discussion in that regard a bit easier, I've com

Re: [Qemu-devel] spec, RFC: TLS support for NBD

2014-10-20 Thread Richard W.M. Jones
On Mon, Oct 20, 2014 at 01:56:43PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote: > On 10/20/2014 01:51 PM, Markus Armbruster wrote: > >Furthermore, STARTTLS is vulnerable to active attacks: if you can get > >between the peers, you can make them fall back to unencrypted silently. > >How do you plan to guard against

Re: [Qemu-devel] spec, RFC: TLS support for NBD

2014-10-20 Thread Florian Weimer
On 10/20/2014 01:51 PM, Markus Armbruster wrote: Furthermore, STARTTLS is vulnerable to active attacks: if you can get between the peers, you can make them fall back to unencrypted silently. How do you plan to guard against that? The usual way to deal with this is to use different syntax for T

Re: [Qemu-devel] spec, RFC: TLS support for NBD

2014-10-20 Thread Daniel P. Berrange
On Mon, Oct 20, 2014 at 01:51:43PM +0200, Markus Armbruster wrote: > Stefan Hajnoczi writes: > > > On Mon, Oct 20, 2014 at 08:58:14AM +0100, Daniel P. Berrange wrote: > >> On Sat, Oct 18, 2014 at 07:33:22AM +0100, Richard W.M. Jones wrote: > >> > On Sat, Oct 18, 2014 at 12:03:23AM +0200, Wouter V

Re: [Qemu-devel] spec, RFC: TLS support for NBD

2014-10-20 Thread Markus Armbruster
Stefan Hajnoczi writes: > On Mon, Oct 20, 2014 at 08:58:14AM +0100, Daniel P. Berrange wrote: >> On Sat, Oct 18, 2014 at 07:33:22AM +0100, Richard W.M. Jones wrote: >> > On Sat, Oct 18, 2014 at 12:03:23AM +0200, Wouter Verhelst wrote: >> > > Hi all, >> > > >> > > (added rjones from nbdkit fame -

Re: [Qemu-devel] spec, RFC: TLS support for NBD

2014-10-20 Thread Stefan Hajnoczi
On Mon, Oct 20, 2014 at 08:58:14AM +0100, Daniel P. Berrange wrote: > On Sat, Oct 18, 2014 at 07:33:22AM +0100, Richard W.M. Jones wrote: > > On Sat, Oct 18, 2014 at 12:03:23AM +0200, Wouter Verhelst wrote: > > > Hi all, > > > > > > (added rjones from nbdkit fame -- hi there) > > > > [I'm happy t

Re: [Qemu-devel] spec, RFC: TLS support for NBD

2014-10-20 Thread Daniel P. Berrange
On Sat, Oct 18, 2014 at 07:33:22AM +0100, Richard W.M. Jones wrote: > On Sat, Oct 18, 2014 at 12:03:23AM +0200, Wouter Verhelst wrote: > > Hi all, > > > > (added rjones from nbdkit fame -- hi there) > > [I'm happy to implement whatever you come up with, but I've added > Florian Weimer to CC who i

Re: [Qemu-devel] spec, RFC: TLS support for NBD

2014-10-17 Thread Richard W.M. Jones
On Sat, Oct 18, 2014 at 12:03:23AM +0200, Wouter Verhelst wrote: > Hi all, > > (added rjones from nbdkit fame -- hi there) [I'm happy to implement whatever you come up with, but I've added Florian Weimer to CC who is part of Red Hat's product security group] > So I think the following would make

[Qemu-devel] spec, RFC: TLS support for NBD

2014-10-17 Thread Wouter Verhelst
Hi all, (added rjones from nbdkit fame -- hi there) So I think the following would make sense to allow TLS in NBD. This would extend the newstyle negotiation by adding two options (i.e., client requests), one server reply, and one server error as well as extend one existing reply, in the followi