On 2020-10-12 12:49, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
On Mon, Oct 12, 2020 at 05:21:15PM +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
* Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (to...@linux.vnet.ibm.com) wrote:
> AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob
> into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is
> encrypt
On Mon, Oct 12, 2020 at 05:21:15PM +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> * Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (to...@linux.vnet.ibm.com) wrote:
> > AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob
> > into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is
> > encrypted with the SEV Transport Encryption Key a
* James Bottomley (j...@linux.ibm.com) wrote:
> On Mon, 2020-10-12 at 16:57 +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> > * Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (to...@linux.ibm.com) wrote:
> > > On 2020-09-21 15:16, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> > > > * Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (to...@linux.vnet.ibm.com) wrote:
> >
* Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (to...@linux.vnet.ibm.com) wrote:
> AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob
> into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is
> encrypted with the SEV Transport Encryption Key and
> integrity is guaranteed with the Transport Integrity
> Key. Although QEMU f
* Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (to...@linux.ibm.com) wrote:
> On 2020-09-21 15:16, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> > * Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (to...@linux.vnet.ibm.com) wrote:
> > > AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob
> > > into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is
> > > encryp
On Mon, 2020-10-12 at 16:57 +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> * Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (to...@linux.ibm.com) wrote:
> > On 2020-09-21 15:16, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> > > * Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (to...@linux.vnet.ibm.com) wrote:
> > > > AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret bl
On 9/21/20 3:33 PM, Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum wrote:
> On 2020-09-21 15:16, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
>> * Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (to...@linux.vnet.ibm.com) wrote:
>>> AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob
>>> into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is
>>> encrypted with th
On 2020-09-21 15:16, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
* Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (to...@linux.vnet.ibm.com) wrote:
AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob
into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is
encrypted with the SEV Transport Encryption Key and
integrity is guaranteed with
* Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (to...@linux.vnet.ibm.com) wrote:
> AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob
> into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is
> encrypted with the SEV Transport Encryption Key and
> integrity is guaranteed with the Transport Integrity
> Key. Although QEMU f
On 2020-07-06 17:54, Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum wrote:
Not sure if v3 is necessary, but here it is.
Fixed the 32-bit issues and removed the checks
on header and secret length. I agree with Brijesh
that those are best left to the PSP, which
returns somewhat helpful errors if either are incorrect.
Hav
AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob
into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is
encrypted with the SEV Transport Encryption Key and
integrity is guaranteed with the Transport Integrity
Key. Although QEMU faciliates the injection of the
launch secret, it cannot access the se
On 2020-07-03 09:25, Brijesh Singh wrote:
On 7/3/20 6:11 AM, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
* Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (to...@linux.vnet.ibm.com) wrote:
From: Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob
into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is
encrypted
On Fri, 2020-07-03 at 17:02 +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> * James Bottomley (j...@linux.ibm.com) wrote:
> > On Fri, 2020-07-03 at 12:11 +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> > > * Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (to...@linux.vnet.ibm.com) wrote:
> >
> > [...]
> > > > +input.trans_uaddr = (uin
* James Bottomley (j...@linux.ibm.com) wrote:
> On Fri, 2020-07-03 at 12:11 +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> > * Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (to...@linux.vnet.ibm.com) wrote:
> [...]
> > > +input.trans_uaddr = (uint64_t)data;
> > > +input.trans_len = data_sz;
> > > +
> > > +input.guest
On Fri, 2020-07-03 at 12:11 +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> * Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (to...@linux.vnet.ibm.com) wrote:
[...]
> > +input.trans_uaddr = (uint64_t)data;
> > +input.trans_len = data_sz;
> > +
> > +input.guest_uaddr = (uint64_t)hva;
>
> Thanks for changing these; alth
On 7/3/20 6:11 AM, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> * Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (to...@linux.vnet.ibm.com) wrote:
>> From: Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
>>
>> AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob
>> into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is
>> encrypted with the SEV Transport Encr
* Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (to...@linux.vnet.ibm.com) wrote:
> From: Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
>
> AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob
> into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is
> encrypted with the SEV Transport Encryption Key and
> integrity is guaranteed with the Transpo
From: Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob
into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is
encrypted with the SEV Transport Encryption Key and
integrity is guaranteed with the Transport Integrity
Key. Although QEMU faciliates the injection of the
launch
On 2020-07-02 11:53, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
* Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (to...@linux.vnet.ibm.com) wrote:
From: Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob
into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is
encrypted with the SEV Transport Encryption Key an
* Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum (to...@linux.vnet.ibm.com) wrote:
> From: Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
>
> AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob
> into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is
> encrypted with the SEV Transport Encryption Key and
> integrity is guaranteed with the Transpo
From: Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob
into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is
encrypted with the SEV Transport Encryption Key and
integrity is guaranteed with the Transport Integrity
Key. Although QEMU faciliates the injection of the
launch
This is an update to part of a patch submitted previously to
provide support for injecting a secret blob into guest memory
using AMD SEV.
The user provides a header and a wrapped secret blob via QMP,
which are provided to the AMD Secure Processor and injected
into the guest.
Note that this patch
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